Trade Unions behaviour in multinationals in Indonesia by Rachmawati, Riani
TRADE UNIONS BEHAVIOUR TOWARDS MULTINATIONALS
IN INDONESIA 
By 
RIANI RACHMAWATI 
A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of 
 DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Business School 
The University of Birmingham 
December 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Birmingham Research Archive 
 
e-theses repository 
 
 
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 
of the copyright holder.  
 
 
 
 i 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis has aimed to explore the strategy chosen by unions in multinationals 
which in turn would influence the union’s behaviour towards the management in the 
so-called ‘neo-liberalism’ environment. Multinationals were chosen for this thesis as 
multinationals have been among the role players in Indonesian economy particularly 
after the Suharto’s era (1966-onwards). As cheap labour is one of the necessary 
conditions to attract foreign investment as Indonesia does not have technological 
superiority or abundant skilled labour, it was important to examine the role of trade 
union in multinationals as the representative of the employees to enhance to 
conditions of its members. Four multinationals from different industries were studied 
to enable comparison.The theoretical model underpinning this thesis has been that of 
Huzzard’s (2004) strategic choice model. This model suggested that there are four 
levels of strategy which unions would have to choose. The Huzzard’s strategic choice 
model ranges form choosing and defining the union’s mission, ideology and identity 
to that of choosing union’s structures, processes and capacities. This model also 
suggests that the choice of the strategy is highly influenced by the internal and 
external factors of the union. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
As the 4th most populous country in the world, Indonesia offers an abundant 
supply of workers for domestic as well as multinational companies. It has been 
argued that the activities of multinationals (MNCs) have been an important 
contributor to Indonesia’s rapid economic growth during the New Order era, 
along with orthodox macro-economic policy and political stability (Hill, 1988: 
introduction). This situation is commensurate with the argument that developing 
countries often seek to underpin economic growth via foreign direct investment 
(FDI), which is attracted by cheap and compliant labour (Abbott, as cited in 
Rowley and Benson, 2000: 6). MNCs can use foreign investment in developing 
countries as a countermeasure to problems of profitability and competitiveness 
in those economies arising from the pressures of high labour costs, union 
militancy, and labour market rigidities (Schoenberger, 1989). MNCs are 
attracted to developing countries because labour in these countries is cheaper, 
readily available, equally productive, more easily subjected to discipline and 
work longer hours (Southall, 1988: 10).  
Trade unionism in Indonesia on the other hand, has had a long history, having 
commenced during the period of Dutch colonial rule in 1897 (Cahyono, 2003). 
After independence in 1948, one of the biggest trade unions at that time, SOBSI 
(Centre of All-Indonesia Workers Organisation) announced their affiliation with 
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the Indonesian Communist Party. When the Communist party was suppressed in 
1966 with the emergence of Suharto’s government, SOBSI was banned. Suharto 
styled his cabinet as the New Order and proceeded to centralise labour relations 
(Simanjuntak, 2009). 
When the Asian financial crisis occurred in 1997, the Indonesian economy 
collapsed, demonstrating the fragility of Indonesia’s economic and social 
foundations. This resulted in a mass desire for social reformation and hence the 
downfall of Suharto. Industrial relations was one of the areas where reforms 
took place. There were changes in the laws relating to employment conditions, 
including those which give trade unions the right to independently establish and 
organise. However, it is not clear what effect these changes have had on union 
activity and interaction with MNCs. 
Hence, it is apparent that there is a shortage of data on unions and their activity 
in multinational establishments in Indonesia. There is virtually no data on trade 
union density in multinationals or by industry in Indonesia. In the absence of 
aggregate data, industry-level case study research is needed. 
 
1.2 Aims 
The purpose of the thesis is to explore the union-management relationship in 
MNCs, particularly in the post-1998 reformation era where freedom to organise 
was guaranteed by the Government through the ratification of ILO conventions. 
In particular, there are two research questions that this thesis attempts to 
explore: 
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What is really happening in the workplace in terms of union-management 
relationship?  
Do unions enjoy greater freedom after the reformation era and how have 
multinationals reacted to the changes? 
 
The analysis is conducted through case studies in four multinationals operating 
in different industries, so as to enable a comparison which then will be 
examined by using strategic choice theory. 
These questions are appraised through a critical comparison of how external and 
internal constraints have shaped union strategy in the case studies analysed. 
 
1.3 Data 
The principal source of data was from interview transcripts conducted with 19 
managers, 26 union representatives and 4 union members from the MNCs being 
studied; as well as with an ILO officer and two “independent unionists” to 
provide a broader understanding of the Industrial Relations system in Indonesia. 
The interviews were semi-structured, and explored the issues outlined below. 
The key interview questions covered with union representatives were: 
1. What was the relationship between the union and the management and how 
the respondents appraised this relationship in achieving union’s objectives. 
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2. The respondents were asked to describe the union’s strategy in dealing with 
management and whether this strategy has ever changed. 
3. How the respondents assessed Indonesian economic and social context as 
affecting union operations.  
4. The issues that the union was concerned with and whether these were 
discussed in collective bargaining. 
5. The type of consultative mechanisms that union use. 
6. The description of union structure and the nature of the union’s relationship 
with its members. 
7. The attitudes towards, and procedures for taking industrial action. 
 
The key questions covered with managers were as follows: 
1. Why the company decided to recognise a union in the workplace. 
2. How did managers see union activity as affecting the success of the 
Company. 
3. Management strategy in dealing with union and whether this strategy has 
ever changed. 
4. How management reacted towards a hypothetical drop in sales in terms of 
labour force adjustment. 
5.    Respondents were also asked to provide reasons as to why they thought 
Indonesia was attractive as a receiver of FDI. 
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6. What improvements respondents wanted to see in Indonesia in order to 
maintain an attractive environment for foreign investment. 
The first multinational studied operates in the automotive industry. They have 
operated in Indonesia for more than three decades and have now become one of 
the biggest car producers in the country. Employing more than 5,000 
employees, this company has had a long history of union recognition. The union 
in this multinational is affiliated with the All-Indonesian Workers Union 
(Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia – SPSI) federation, within the section of 
Metal, Electronic, and Machinery union.  
The second multinational studied has operated in Indonesia for more than 40 
years and is a well-established foreign bank in Indonesia, employing around 300 
employees and also recognizes a union in its workplace. Organizing half of the 
total employees, the union in the multinational has been affiliated with OPSI 
(Organisasi Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia- All Indonesia Employee Organisation) 
since 1998. 
A multinational operating in the textile industry was the third participant. This 
multinational has been operating in Indonesia since 1976. The union in this 
company is facing great challenges since the company has implemented 
significant changes in their efforts to survive increasing competition. Currently 
organising more than 1,000 workers, the union has affiliated with the National 
Workers Union (Serikat Pekerja Nasional – SPN) federation since the 
democratization era. 
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The last multinational studied in this thesis is a manufacturer and supplier of 
vehicle parts around the world. It is also a key supplier to the first multinational 
in this research.  It started operating in Indonesia in 1975 and (at the time of 
research) employed approximately 2,000 employees. The union is now an in-
house (enterprise) union after detaching themselves from a union federation in 
2000. It currently organises approximately 1,400 employees across both 
establishments in Jakarta and Bekasi. 
 
1.4 Methods 
The primary methods used in the research constitutes case studies, which were 
conducted in four MNCs from different industries where unions were present 
and being recognised. Case studies are one of most common ways to conduct 
qualitative enquiry, but they are neither new nor essentially qualitative (Stake, 
as in Denzin and Lincoln 2000: 435). Yin (2003) defines a case study as ‘an 
empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident’ (Yin, 2003: 13). As such, case studies may comprise a mixture 
of qualitative (e.g., interviews) and quantitative (e.g., surveys) methods – the 
key defining characteristic of case studies as an epistemology is the emphasis on 
contextual, primary data. 
 
1.5 Organisation 
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Chapter 2 discusses the literature review on the Indonesian labour market to 
provide a clearer picture on the position of trade unionism in Indonesia. It is 
followed by a review on multinationals and trade unionism development in 
Indonesia during the New Order and reformation era (post 1998) 
Chapter 3 provides a theoretical perspective on the nature and impact of trade 
unions in the workplace; and hence the implications of union activity for 
employment and competitiveness. The views from neoclassical and institutional 
economics regarding this issue are explored and compared. Whilst the 
neoclassical view regards trade unionism as disrupting equilibrium in the labour 
market, institutional economics regards trade unionism as a viable, indeed 
necessary institution to contribute to the (efficient) functioning of the labour 
market. 
However, in the more hostile recent policy context of neo-liberalism, it could be 
argued that trade unions need to develop a more focussed, strategic approach to 
increase membership. A number of scholars have examined the nature of union 
behaviour in terms of the strategic parameters shaping union actions. Kelly 
(1996), for example, classifies union strategy in terms of a moderate vs. militant 
outlook. He argues that militant trade unions more are likely to achieve their 
goals.  Gardner’s eight strategy elements (Gardner, 1989) and Gahan’s 
framework of union strategy construct (1998) are amongst other attempts to 
explain strategy.  
A comprehensive approach is proposed by Huzzard (2004) who utilises 
strategic choice theory to argue that there are four levels of strategic choices 
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upon which unions have to decide. Each level will consequently influence the 
choice of the following level. This approach will be explained further in this 
chapter and become the theoretical framework in this thesis. 
Chapter 4 outlines the research methods used in this thesis. 
Chapters 5 to 8 discuss the findings of case study #1 (the automotive 
multinational), case study #2 (the textile multinational), case study # 3 (the 
foreign bank) and case study # 4 (the automotive component multinational). The 
structures of the case study chapters are similar. The first section provides an 
overview of the Company and the union, followed by the relationship of the 
union and management and the coverage of collective bargaining. The next 
section explores the union’s internal and external constraints in developing their 
“strategic choices”. The final section of the chapters summarise the findings and 
evaluate the union’s strategic choices. 
Chapter 9 provides a comparative discussion of the case study findings by 
exploring and comparing the most important aspects of the union’s internal and 
external constraints and considers their implication for Huzzards’ model. 
Section 9.2 revisits the theoretical framework outlining Huzzard’s model and 
the research questions. Section 9.3 and 9.4 examines union external and internal 
constraints in developing their strategic choices. Section 9.5 revisits formulating 
union strategy by evaluating the most important aspects and the links between. 
Section 9.6 summarises the findings of this chapter; while Section 9.7 provides 
the suggestions for further research. 
Chapter 10 presents the conclusions and recommendations of this thesis. 
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1.6 Caveats 
Given the nature of case study research which tries to explore rather than 
generalise, the analysis and findings in this research cannot provide a complete 
picture of the constraints facing the entire union movement in Indonesia. The 
research comprised case studies in four well-established multinationals which 
have recognised unions for a long time and have relatively strong market 
position (except for the textile multinationals). Thus, the findings cannot 
provide a picture of unions operating in weaker-position multinationals such as 
subcontractors or the unions in local companies (as access was not obtained to 
do research in such companies).  
However, as the research aim is to ‘shed light on the labour process and thus 
help to penetrate the ‘black box’ of firms’ practices’ (Yin, 2003: 15), case study 
methods are hence used. Through this, one can build up an iterative profile of 
the labour process and shed light on the employment strategies (Mintzberg, 
1978) used by MNCs and unions in Indonesia; using what Williams (2000) calls 
a ‘moderatum’ approach, whereby aspects of a phenomenon provide indicators 
for broader phenomenon.  
The next chapter will discuss the literature on labour markets, multinationals 
and trade unionism in Indonesia; in order to give a better context, and hence 
understanding of the case studies in trade unions in four multinationals which 
will be discussed in the subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW: THE LABOUR MARKET, 
MULTINATIONALS AND UNIONS IN INDONESIA 
 
2.1. Introduction 
As the 4th most populous country in the world, Indonesia offers an abundant 
supply of workers, particularly less skilled labour (Bende-Nabende et al, 2001: 
392), for domestic as well as multinational companies. In 2005, the Indonesian 
work force comprised over 155 million workers, of which 60% were estimated 
to be working in the informal sector -- defined as the self employed and unpaid 
family workers (Sugiyarto et al, 2006: 302): particularly in the agricultural and 
trade sectors.  The presence of an informal sector that can absorb displaced 
formal sector workers is believed to have provided Indonesia with a flexible 
labour market and an alternative for workers who cannot find jobs in formal 
sectors (Manning, 2000: 122) 
Those who work in the formal sector are employed by domestic and 
multinational companies. Although there is no data showing the proportion of 
workers in each category (domestic and foreign companies), a government 
agency publishes statistics of employment absorption in “approved investment” 
in several simultaneous years which demonstrates that foreign direct investment 
appears to account for more formal sector employment than domestic 
investment. 
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Table 2.1 Employment absorption by approved investment, 2002-October 
2007 
 
Types of investment 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007* 
Domestic Direct Investment 53,996 49,339 61,935 122,750 79,415 80,385 
Foreign Direct Investment  88,386 117,224 148,401 156,109 206,945 147,507
Source: 
http://www.bkpm.go.id/en/publications/investment_statistics/investment_statisti
cs_october_2007; *The data on 2007 statistics is only available up to October 
2007. 
 
Multinationals have played an important role in driving industrialisation in 
Indonesia. However, the presence of multinationals has not been free from 
controversy, as many consider multinationals to be the agents of ‘modern 
colonialism’ whose financial influence may lessen the independence of the host 
country. Multinationals are also seen as the drivers of ‘the race to the bottom’ 
(Hadiz, 2000: 6) whereby they seek the cheapest yet productive workers - 
particularly from developing countries like Indonesia – which in turn they use 
as a bargaining tactic to drive down wages and working conditions in general by 
playing off one country, or group of workers, against another – the so-called 
“fragmentation” under globalisation (Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001: 17; 
Robinson, 2004: 15 Bonnano and Constance, 2008: 254; ). 
Hence, this chapter will first of all discuss the state of Indonesian labour market; 
where the level of unemployment and the issues of informal and contract 
workers as well as outsourcing practices will be raised, so as to depict the 
challenges Indonesian unions are currently facing. The second part of this 
chapter will explore the nature of multinationals which many scholars argue has 
weakened the bargaining position on trade unions (Horn and Wolinsky, 1988: 
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494; Bean, 1994: 190; Cox, 1994: 44). This section will be followed by a 
discussion of the presence of multinationals in developing economies and 
impacts on organized labour. This is followed with a description of the 
industrial relations system and trade unionism in Indonesia, particularly the 
changes that have taken place since the downfall of the Suharto “New Order” 
Government in 1998. This last section will summarise the literature review and 
examine the gaps between the existing debate and the current situation in 
Indonesia and to what extent this PhD thesis contributes to the development of 
understanding trade union behaviour in developing countries.   
 
2.2. The Indonesian Labour Market 
This section describes the condition of the Indonesian labour market, 
particularly after the onset of the Asian crisis in 1997. This section will show 
that the labour market in Indonesia is highly flexible, as the informal sector 
plays an important role as an alternative of employment for workers. The fact 
that Indonesia is still predominantly an agricultural country also means the 
workforce could retreat to this sector when they lose their (modern/formal 
sector) job. 
Statistical depictions of the Indonesian labour market, however, should be 
treated with some caution. Some phenomena might be ill-defined which may 
cause an underestimation of the extent of a phenomenon, such as the data on 
unemployment which is discussed below.  The following paragraphs, thus, will 
try to capture the problem and its implications. 
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The official unemployment rate in Indonesia during the initial years of the 1997 
Asian crisis did not show the extreme decline one might have expected (as 
shown in the table below). Rather, unemployment growth was considered slight 
in comparison to other countries affected by the regional crisis. In South Korea, 
for example the unemployment rate increased from 2.2% in 1997 to nearly 8% 
in 1998, whilst in Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Thailand unemployment nearly 
doubled (Manning, 2000: 121) 
 
Table 2.2   Unemployment rates by gender, BPS (Statistics Indonesia) and 
the Ministry of Manpower 
 
 1994-1997 1998-2000 2004 2006 2008 
Male 
Female 
 Total 
4.6 
4.1 
5.6 
6.0 
5.6 
6.6 
 
 
9.9 10.3 8.4 
Source: National Labour Force Survey (Sakernas) as cited in Dhanani, S, 2004: 
10 and BPS (http://www.bps.go.id/sector/employ/table1.shtml) 
 
Manning (2000) argues that the growth in unemployment was alleviated by the 
existence of the agricultural and informal sectors, which played an important 
role in absorbing workers who lost their modern/formal sector jobs. In addition 
to the agricultural sector, Manning (ibid.) argues that the remaining crisis-
affected unemployed were also being absorbed by another sector; trade (retail 
smallholdings).  
Nevertheless, this figure suffers from ill-defined concept of unemployment, as 
being argued by Ahmed and Dhanani (1999). They argue that the official 
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unemployment statistics by the BPS (Statistics Indonesia) failed to address the 
true magnitude of unemployment as it excludes those unemployed who are not 
seeking work because they do not believe there are jobs available for them 
(discouraged/disguised unemployment). They compare their data with that of 
the BPS and from this it can be seen that there is a striking difference on the 
level of unemployment. It is mainly caused by the indicator they use in 
measuring unemployment as they include those who are willing to accept work 
at the time of the survey (regardless they are actively seeking work or not) into 
their unemployment indicator. Their findings are shown in the table below: 
 
Table 2.3 Unemployment rates by gender, all-inclusive indicators 
 1997 1998 
As % of labour force 
Male 
Female 
12.38 
5.64 
19.54 
14.19 
6.12 
21.53 
Source: Ahmed and Dhanani, 19991 
 
However, it should be noted that since 2001, the BPS changed its definition of 
unemployment, adding discouraged workers into the unemployment measure 
(Sugiyarto et al, 2006: 333). As a result, official unemployment rate doubles and 
higher: 8 per cent in 2001,  9.1 per cent in 2002, 9.9 per cent in 2004 and 8.4 per 
cent in 2008 as shown in table 3.2 (Sugiyarto et al, 2006: 333; 
http://www.bps.go.id/sector/employ/table1.shtml).  
                                                 
1 Ahmed and Dhanani (1999) Indonesia’s Recovery: Employment Optimism or Statistical Illusion? 
ILO Jakarta Office. 
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The survey conducted by the BPS shows that there has been an increasing trend 
of female unemployment, particularly when the new unemployment definition 
is applied. The gap between female and male unemployment rates has widened 
as shown by the BPS survey which shows that in 2003 the rates were 13 per 
cent and 8 per cent respectively-- whereas by using the old definition, in 1994 
the rates were 4 per cent and 3 percent. Thus it can be concluded that 
discouraged workers are mainly females.  
The survey also shows that more females are leaving the labour market and 
staying at home. Sugiyarto et al (2006) argue that poor working conditions for 
females have created the ‘push factor’ of females leaving the labour market 
instead of experiencing the “pull” of any genuine welfare improvement in their 
households.  (ibid, p: 333-338).  
The agricultural sector has been the dominant component of (re-)employment, 
serving as an alternative employment destination in the informal sector, 
particularly for low-skilled workers who cannot find jobs in the formal sector. 
Agriculture was the main industry of employment for workers, comprising 55 
per cent of workers in 1990. The share continued to decline until 1997, when 41 
per cent of workers were employed. However, the share was again increasing 
after the 1997 financial crisis as many workers returned to work in this sector.  
Indeed, in 2007, figures on employment by industry confirmed that the 
agricultural sector still holds the highest percentage of employment in 
Indonesia, as shown below. 
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Figure 2.1 Workers by industry, 2007 
Workers by industry, 2007
Transportation, 
storage and 
communication
6%
Financing, 
insurance, real estate 
and business service
1%
Utilities and other 
services
11%
Construction
5%
Wholesale trade, 
retail trade, 
restaurants and 
hotels
20%
Manufacturing 
industry
12%
Mining and 
quarrying
1%
Agriculture, 
forestry, hunting 
and fisheries
44%
Source:  counted from employment statistics, BPS 
(http://www.bps.go.id/sector/employ/table2.shtml) 
 
As the agricultural sector has served as the alternative for jobs since the 1997 
economic crisis, the number of informal workers has increased. After the 
decline from 77 per cent to 63 per cent during 1990-1997, this percentage 
increased to 71 per cent by 2003 where 51% of the workforce were unpaid 
workers and 20% were self employed. 
Unlike the significant change in the incidence of informal employment, the 
incidence of part-time workers in urban areas in Indonesia has tended to be 
stable, despite the crisis. In a study conducted by the ILO, workers who were 
categorised as ‘part timers’ were those who worked less than the normal hours 
 17
of 38 hours per week (Dhanani, 2004: 22). The rate of part-time workers has 
been around 30% of total employment for years. However, in 1998, the 
percentage of part-time employment increased quite significantly even though it 
decreased again in the subsequent year. The fluctuation in 1998 was explained 
as the reaction of the workers who were desperate to find permanent full-time 
jobs in the beginning of the crisis. (Irawan et al, 2000: 21).   
Nevertheless, the figure reveals something different when part-time workers in 
rural areas are discussed as the rate of part-time workers is significantly higher. 
Nearly 80 per cent of part-time workers were found in rural areas by which over 
70 per cent of them were engaged in agriculture. This situation can be explained 
by the extent of part-time workers working in agricultural sectors, where 
working hours are generally 32 hours, shorter than in the other sectors (ibid).  In 
terms of gender, female workers comprise over 50 per cent of part -time 
workers whereas they accounted for just 30 per cent of full-time workers 
(Dhanani, 2004: 23).  
However, Sugiyarto et al (2006) use the term ‘underemployed’ rather than part-
time workers in identifying workers who involuntary work less than the usual 
full time. The figure of the underemployed with their definition is similar than 
Dhanani’s part-time workers and that underemployed are also more commonly 
found in rural area and agricultural sector. 
 
Table 2.4 Characteristics of underemployed workers, 2003 (% of total)  
Urban 
Rural 
22.6 
77.4 
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Agriculture 
Other sectors
73.1 
26.9 
Male 
Female 
52 
48 
Informal sect
Formal sector
88.6 
11.4 
Source: Sugiyarto et al, 2006:344 
The other type of workers which have become more popular currently is that of 
‘contract workers’ (i.e., fixed-term contracts). The use of contract workers has 
been steadily increasing after the Government introduced Employment Law 13 
(2003), in which the use of contract workers was legalised. However, there is no 
comprehensive data on contract workers in Indonesia, although several partial 
studies have taken place in different areas, which show an increasing trend of 
contract labour use.2 
Research held in Tangerang (near Jakarta) and Surabaya (East Java) show that 
90 per cent of the companies studied had employed contract workers: though 
the number of contract workers varied between each industry - from 10 per cent 
to 90 percent of the total workers employed. Textile and garment industries used 
more contract workers than other industries studied (although the report does 
not mention all types of industries being studied)3.  
On the other hand, the Government argues that the practice of ‘contract 
workers’ is not clearly legalised in Employment Law No. 13, but has become a 
popular term among the community for the term ‘fixed-term work contract’ 
which is essentially different from the practice currently done by many 
employers. The Government states that in the Law, ‘fixed-term work contracts’ 
                                                 
2 See: http://www.geocities.com/edicahy/anti-imperialisme/buruhapec.html 
3 See: http://iika.blogspot.com/2005/07/gerakan-buruh-di-tengah-globalisasi.html 
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can only be used by employers for jobs which can be completed within a   
definite time (three years maximum) and/or the jobs are only done within 
particular seasons. Law 13 also states that ‘fixed-term work contract’ cannot be 
used for regular jobs or main jobs of a company. 
The Government argues that a ‘fixed-term work contract’ is meant to give 
workers more chance to obtain work rather than create job insecurity among the 
workers. However, many employers have actually breached the law by using 
‘fixed-term work contract’ for core duties in their main business and thus, the 
term ‘contract workers’ has become more popular4. Hence, it can be argued that 
the Government has not taken sufficient action to enforce Law 13 and 
remove/reduce the practice of ongoing contract workers by the employers. 
With the characteristics typical of informal, part-time and contract workers (i.e. 
shorter hours of work, less than minimum-wage income, uncertainty of income 
and job continuation), it can be argued that the welfare of these workers is 
highly questionable. This condition in turn is worsened by the absence of a 
social security net for these workers. Although the Act that regulates social 
security for workers includes all types of workers, the implementation of the 
regulation and the actual practices of employers show a contrasting 
phenomenon.   
The implementation regulation of social security, (Regulation No. 14: 1993) 
only emphasises the obligation of social security contributions to employers 
with 10 or more employees and a monthly payroll of not less than one million 
                                                 
4 See: http://sim.disnakertrans-jateng.go.id/index.php?xici=berita&idberita=20080107140201 
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Rupiahs (around 60 GBP). As such, the most common non-compliance practice 
by employers is that they declare that workers employed are paid on a daily 
basis or are contractors and thus not insurable by any social security scheme in 
Indonesia; a practice which actually is not consistent with the Act or the 
regulation of who should be covered by a social security scheme (Angelini and 
Hirose, 2004). 
Whilst workers in the formal sector enjoy employer assistance in paying social 
security contributions, informal workers, with the absence of clear employer-
employee relations, cannot expect the same privilege. The burden of joining a 
social security scheme is also higher for informal workers as they earn a low 
and irregular income that cannot guarantee the contribution payment for the 
scheme. The general lack of awareness of social security entitlements and low 
trust towards government institutions amongst many informal workers, 
however, has exacerbated this problem (ibid).  
 
 
2.3 Multinationals and Labour in Developing Countries: the case of 
Indonesia 
2.3.1 Multinationals and labour in developing countries  
In this section we now consider the impact of multinationals. Multinationals 
have been viewed as the major actors of making the world become one integral 
part in terms of economic activities. They are defined as those companies which 
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either directly or indirectly control production or service provision, in two or 
more countries. 
Since 1960, there were attempts to develop a comprehensive theory explaining 
the phenomena of multinationals or foreign direct investment (FDI). The work 
was initialized by Stephen Hymer who argued that FDI involved the transfer of 
a package of resources and not merely just finance capital as had been argued 
before (as explained in Dunning, 1993: 69-70).   
Another theory developed during this decade was that by Vernon with his 
theory of ‘product life cycle’ to explain the multinational activity. He suggested 
that at the first stage, products were produced for the home market in the home 
country. In the later stage, the products were exported to other countries similar 
to home countries in demand pattern. As the products become standardised, the 
pressure comes from the need of cost-efficiency as imitators start to penetrate 
the market and demand becomes more price elastic. Labour cost as well as trade 
barriers imposed by competitor in the host country have created an attraction of 
producing abroad rather than domestically (ibid. 70-71). 
Along with the development of theory on multinationals, in his book, Dunning 
(1993) argues that multinationals expand abroad to achieve one or several 
objectives: searching for natural resources and/or lower labour cost, expand 
their market, and/or gain efficiency of their production processes, and/or 
promote their long-term strategic objectives (p. 56-61). 
Furthermore, it can be argued that multinationals have two distinctive features 
that distinguish them with other kinds of business that involve international 
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activities and domestic multi-activities. First, multinationals organize and 
coordinate multiple value-adding activities across national boundaries (while 
international trading only exchanges goods and services across national 
boundaries without involving value-adding activities). Second, they internalize 
the cross-border markets for the intermediate products arising from these 
(value-adding) activities (Dunning, 1997). 
As they operate within several countries, multinationals deal with a number of 
industrial relations systems simultaneously. This condition is believed to create 
asymmetrical relationships between multinationals, government, and unions. 
Unions are threatened with the superior position of multinationals by the latter’s 
ability to relocate their business to more favoured locations. Enderwick (1985) 
and Bean (1994) argue that multinationals often use their ability to relocate their 
production facilities to put trade unions in a disadvantageous position. Actual 
shifts reduce job security and labour demand, whilst the threat of closure may 
be used as a bargaining tactic.  
Furthermore, the broader financial base of multinationals has weakened the 
bargaining power of unions in most countries (Bean, 1994: 190). In the event or 
threat of strikes at one of the subsidiaries, multinationals can maintain (or 
increase) production at other sites, and thus their cash-flows - which alleviates 
the costs of strike activity. This situation is usually worsened by the laws 
introduced by government to maintain foreign investment, such as the policy of 
a sole union controlled by the government which existed in Indonesia 
between1973-1998.   
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In developing countries, the presence of multinationals has raised some 
controversies despite their important role in driving forward the globalization of 
economic activity and their capability in stimulating industrialization in 
developing countries. Labour exploitation is one of the main themes of 
controversies along with host country’s economic policy, national sovereignty, 
and cultural identity (Guillen, 2001: 124). 
Abbott argues that developing countries often seek to underpin economic 
growth via foreign investment, which is attracted by cheap and compliant labour 
(Abbott, as cited in Rowley and Benson, 2000: p. 6). Multinationals from 
developed economies, on the other hand, can use foreign investment in 
developing countries as a defensive reaction to problems of profitability and 
competitiveness in those economies arising from the pressures of high labour 
costs, union militancy, and labour market rigidities (Schoenberger, 1989). 
Multinationals are attracted to developing countries because labour in these 
countries is dramatically cheaper, readily available, equally productive, more 
easily subjected to discipline, work longer hours, and offer optimal selection of 
workers in terms of age, gender, and so on (Southall, 1988:p. 10; Carbaugh, 
2009: 307).   
The issue of “cheap” labour has made the presence of multinationals in 
developing countries a more debated issue than in developed economies. 
Guillen (2000) lists three key features of the debate, which are: 
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 1. Most of developing countries are rich in natural resources and/or cheap 
labour that multinationals lack in their home countries. Abundant cheap labour 
is definitely an attracting point of a host country.  
2. During the post-World War II period, many developing countries were ruled 
by authoritarian regimes, which tended to repress labour and mollify its political 
and economic demands to satisfy investors. One of the most unique features of 
industrial relations in developing countries has been the centrality of the state in 
terms of tight governmental control over the trade union movement and its 
activities. The purpose is undoubtedly to protect the interest of foreign capital 
(Bean, 1994: p. 218). This control is strengthened by growth-oriented 
developmental plans in developing countries where the state is much more 
centralised. In most developing countries, strikes prove burdensome as they 
neither encourage the welfare of capital nor attract foreign investment, both of 
which have become identified with the ‘national interest’ (ibid: p. 220). 
3. Multinationals are often perceived as limiting national sovereignty or being 
agents of colonialism. The dependence of developing countries on 
multinationals has forced governments to consider multinationals’ interests in 
developing national policies, which can disadvantage the host country’s labour.  
 
2.3.2 The debate over multinationals: the case of Indonesia 
In the context of Indonesia, after decades of a hostile approach towards 
multinationals during Sukarno’s era, Indonesia tried to “restore” its reputation 
with international business as part of its efforts to attract foreign investors since 
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1966. The early years of the New Order government were characterised by a 
very liberal policy towards multinationals in order to attract foreign direct 
investment. Japanese multinationals were chief amongst those who expanded 
their business in Indonesia since then. In fact, the Japanese have been the largest 
investors in Indonesia, especially in the manufacturing sector. Another 
developed country, the United States, has dominated the petroleum sector (Hill, 
1988: 54). Over the period 1967-1984, these two countries accounted for almost 
80 percent of Gross Realised Investment in all sectors, owing mainly to 
American investment. 
Regardless the country of origin of foreign direct investment, attracting 
multinationals requires the presence of some necessary conditions. Cheap 
labour is one of the necessary conditions as Indonesia did not have 
technological superiority or abundant skilled labour at that time (Bende-
Nabende et al, 2001: 396). Hence, the majority of multinationals invest in 
industries which are labour-intensive in nature, such as textile, garment, 
electronic manufacturing and motor vehicles manufacturing industries. Another 
factor of importance with respect to Indonesia is that it possesses abundant 
natural resources: especially gas and petroleum; which needs foreign 
technological expertise in order to be able to utilise these assets. 
The dominant industrialisation strategy at the beginning of the New Order was that 
of import substitution. Multinationals were “invited” to help the government 
promote economic growth, create jobs and gain revenue needed for development. 
Multinationals, conversely, required the political and social “stability” from the 
host country. The decisions of the Suharto regime to ban the Communist Party in 
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1960s and reduce the number of political parties to three in the early 1970s were 
part of their efforts to maintain this appeal.  
In 1974, the government applied a more restrictive policy towards 
multinationals as the people protested over the over-presence of Japanese 
multinationals. The people considered multinationals as villains, which 
endangered national sovereignty and created over-dependence. The government 
responded to this protest by applying the new principles governing all new 
foreign investment, which included (Hill, 1988: 31):  
• All new investments were to be joint ventures;  
• Indonesian equity should be increased to 51 per cent within a certain period 
(ten-year period); 
• The list of industries closed to foreign investments was to be extended; 
• Tax incentives were to be reduced; and 
• The number of foreign personnel were to be reduced 
 However, the government still needed multinationals in developing the 
economy. Thus, the restrictive approach was never applied enthusiastically.  
In the beginning of 1980s, the government changed its industrialisation strategy 
to become export-oriented. The government launched an investment package in 
May 1986 to attract foreign investment. This package, which reinstated the 
liberal policy towards foreign investment like that introduced in 1967, consisted 
of: equal treatment for multinationals whose 75 per cent equity owned by 
Indonesia with those of domestic firms in terms of domestic distribution rights 
 27
and access to state banks; liberalisation of domestic equity;  increasing the 
numbers of sectors accessible for foreign investment; the ability of foreign firms 
to reinvest their profits in their own activities; the chance for foreign firms to be 
authorized for an additional 30 years; and the relaxation of the minimum 
investment requirement5  
With a rather restricted approach towards multinationals and an export-
oriented industrial policy, multinationals were seen as arm’s length 
collaborators, whose presence was needed to increase exports (Guillen, 
2000). Multinationals under this category were interested in low wages, 
labour docility, and the absence of unions in the host country. In order to 
fulfil the requirements, the government strengthened the application of the 
Pancasila Labour/Industrial Relations (HPP/HIP) during 1980s to ensure 
“harmonious” employment relations. The HPP/HIP industrial relations system 
will be explored further in the next section. 
However, the attractiveness of Indonesia as a foreign investment destination 
declined sharply in 1998, owing to political instability, national insecurity, law 
insecurity, and the changing labour policy and industrial relations system. These 
changes were triggered by the Asian Financial crises in 1997 caused by the 
collapse of regional currency. Among the countries affected, Indonesia was by 
the most severe.  There have been massive layoffs as a result of closures of 
companies, or as a result of their liquidation by the government for their failure 
                                                 
5 www.bappenas.go.id/get-file-server/node/5914/ 
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to repay debts or for other economic reasons, pushing the proportion of the 
population living below the poverty lines to rise to almost 40%6.  
This sudden turnaround has demonstrated the weakness of Indonesia’s 
economic fundamentals. The people forced the government to reform social and 
political conditions. The fall of President Suharto in the mid-1998 was an 
indication of the greater desire of the people to experience a more democratic 
and transparent political life. In order to gain domestic and international 
support, Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid, who were subsequently the second 
and third president, took a radical step towards labour policy. Habibie ratified 
ILO convention No. 87, Year 1948 on “Freedom of Association and Protection 
on the Rights to Organise”. Abdurrahman Wahid followed his step by enacting 
the Law 21 (2000), which enabled the establishment of unions with a minimum 
of 10 members.  
The absence of an independent trade union movement, which had been an 
attracting factor for foreign investment certainly could not be provided anymore 
by the Indonesian government, as hundreds of unions were formed after the 
enactment of Law 21.  However, in practice workers were not necessarily more 
protected in conducting industrial action despite the growing numbers of trade 
unions. The fact that unemployment as well as the inflation rate has remained 
high has created a situation whereby an employee would be conscious of 
keeping their job; and hence being reluctant to engage in union activities. 
However, multinationals could have considered that the presence of unions 
could entail the possibility of a disruption to labour docility.  On this basis, the 
                                                 
6 See: http://www.delidn.ec.europa.eu/spf/spf_4akatiga-reportfinal.pdf 
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next section will consider the detailed evolution of the Industrial Relations 
system in Indonesia. 
 
2.4 Industrial relations system and trade unionism in Indonesia: 
development and challenges 
2.4.1. Industrial relations system in Indonesia 
On December 1974, the Indonesian government introduced an industrial 
relations system which confirmed its attempts to become more “friendly” to 
foreign investment. The system was known as Pancasila Labour/Industrial 
Relations (HPP/HIP) which had three basic principles: 
1. Partner in production. 
2. Partner in responsibility. 
3. Partner in profits and benefits. 
 
The HPP/HIP model postulated that the relationship between workers and 
employers was one of a harmonious relationship in production for joint 
prosperity. Thus, industrial conflict must be avoided and resolved through 
“consensus”, not by strike action7.  Through the law, the government insisted 
trade unions that were going to go on strikes get permission from P4D 
(Regional Committee for the Settlement of Labour Disputes) first. Without this 
                                                 
7  See: http://www.asia-pacific-action.org/southeastasia/indonesia/publications/doss1/ teten.htm 
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permission, strikes could incur criminal sanction. In practice, the P4D never 
gave permission for labour strikes8. 
 However, even though conducting a strike during the New Order period was 
almost impossible; many cases of this action still took place. These strikes were 
organised by workers outside SPSI and without going through official 
procedures, i.e. asking permission to P4D. Thus, the government considered that 
those strikes were illegal or criminal acts and could incur punishment to the 
organisers; the military were often involved in suppressing industrial action and 
many independent trade unionists were imprisoned.  
HIP was operated through a tripartite institution between the sole worker 
organisation controlled by the state, SPSI, APINDO (Employer Association), 
and the government (through the Department of Labour). The tripartite body’s 
work was overseen by the security institutions (territorial military commands 
and the police) and state intelligence.  
Indeed, territorial military institutions, particularly the Korem (Millitary 
Command post), Kodim (District Military Command), and Koramil, played 
important roles in the HIP. Military intervention in labour disputes was 
legitimised under the Ministry of Labour Decree No. 342 (1986). Even though 
this decree was later officially withdrawn on January 1994, through the Ministry 
of Labour Decision No. 15A/1994, the role of the military over labour issues 
was still considerable. Hence, it can be said that industrial relations during this 
                                                 
8 http://www.202.159.18.43/jsi/101uwiyono.htm 
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era was that of “unitarist corporatism” whereby trade unions were highly 
controlled by the state.  
When Suharto finally gave up his presidential position, the government under 
Habibie was forced to remove the Labour Minister Regulation No. 
Per./01/Men/1975, which had made trade union formation very difficult, as 
many new trade unions had emerged and demanded recognition. This removal 
was followed by other radical changes: ILO convention 87 (1948) on “Freedom 
of Association and Protection on the Rights to Organise” was ratified through 
the Presidential Decree No.83 (1998)9. 
The step taken by Habibie in legislating for an independent trade union 
movement was followed by Abdurrahman Wahid. He enacted a new law: No. 
21, 2000, which enabled the establishment of unions with a minimum of 10 
members. This law enactment has resulted in massive union formation: The data 
in 2001 shows that there were 3 confederations, 86 federations and more than 
11,000 workplace-level unions (Rahayu and Sumarto, 2003: 7). In 2003, this 
figure was again increasing with 87 national unions/federations and more than 
18,000 work-place level unions (Ministry of Manpower, 2006). However, 
despite the mushroomed formation of new independent trade unions, trade 
union membership only accounts for a minority of the workforce, in the formal 
sector, as will be explained in the following section. 
The radical steps taken by the two presidents towards trade unions were 
believed to be part of their efforts to gain public support to legitimise their 
                                                 
9 ibid  
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presidency position as well as a result of pressure from international NGOs. 
However, some labour activists consider that the change of law was only 
another tool to control unionism. They argued that the Law 21 (2000) mainly 
regulates the administrative and procedural matters on union establishment, 
rather than protecting the freedom of unionism itself. Thus, although the number 
of trade unions has increased significantly, it is believed that labour is still in 
weak position as industrial actions still often result in the arrest of union 
activists, as had happened during the New Order period.  
2.4.2. Trade unionism in Indonesia 
Unionism during the New-Order government 
Trade unions in Indonesia had commenced in 1897 during the Dutch colonial 
era.  After independence, one of the biggest trade unions at that time, SOBSI 
(Centre of All-Indonesia Workers Organisation) announced their affiliation with 
the Indonesian Communist Party. When the communist ideology was 
suppressed in 1966, the communist party and hence SOBSI were banned. 
Suharto came into power in that year, and styled his cabinet as the New Order.  
The main focus of the early years of the New Order was promoting economic 
“recovery”. In order to achieve it, the government started to control all kinds of 
mass-based organisations which were considered radical; including political 
parties and trade unions that were suspected as the main factors to be blamed for 
the chaos during the Old Order period. Thus, the early years of New Order 
government was characterized by its effort to amalgamate the existing non-
communist trade unions into one workers organization (Hadiz, 2000: p. 247). It 
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started by sponsoring the establishment of the MPBI (Indonesian Workers 
Consultative Assembly) in 1969. Twenty-two trade unions became members of 
this assembly. The government gradually directed the MPBI to form a single, 
easily controllable trade union. In 1973, the government finally succeeded, 
establishing the FBSI (All-Indonesia Workers Federation), which claimed itself 
as the only workers’ organization officially recognized by the government 
(ibid).  
The FBSI “submitted” itself to HPP (Pancasila Labour Relations), under the 
auspices of a government-initiated industrial relations approach. Under this 
model, FBSI was operated as a tool for safeguarding political security and 
stability, by involving the FBSI officers in OPSTIB (Operation Security) under 
the military. The heads of central or regional FBSI bodies were those who had 
been actively involved in OPSTIB. Moreover, the selection of the executive 
leadership of local FBSI committees had to go through an examination by 
Korem (Millitary Command post) and Kodim (District Military Command), and 
the Muspida (Local Government Assembly)10. 
However, after several years, the 22 sectoral trade unions which were members of 
FBSI became more independent, as they had built direct affiliation with 
international trade unions. Trying to stop the greater independence of the unions, 
the government changed the form of labour organisation from a federative to a 
unitary form. FBSI was renamed SPSI (All-Indonesia Trade Unions) in 1985. The 
industrial relations policy was renamed Pancasila Industrial Relations (HIP), even 
though there were no changes in the substance of this model.  
                                                 
10 (http://www.asia-pacific-action.org/southeastasia/indonesia/publications/doss1/ teten.htm 
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The form of SPSI was later changed again into a federation in 1995, due to 
negative critiques from domestic and international labour activists on the 
government policy that made trade union formation and recognition impossible. 
It became the FSPSI (All-Indonesia Trade Union Federation), but government 
control over this organisation was scarcely different (Hadiz, 2000: p. 248). In 
practice, this new form did not change the number of recognised trade unions, 
as the government did not withdraw the regulation on the union establishment; 
the Ministry of Labour Decree No. 05 (1987). This decree stated that the 
precondition that should be met by a union to be officially accepted and 
recognized was that it should have a Unitarian structure, branches in no less 
than 20 regions at the sub-provincial level and in 100 bodies at the district level 
and in 1,000 units at the workplace level.11 
SPSI/FSPSI could not be independent labour organisations as they got their 
funding from the government as well as from their members. Therefore, their 
concern over labour welfare and other issues were subordinated to the 
government’s interests. Moreover, the heads of SPSI/FSPSI were company 
owners or politicians.  Imam Sudarwo himself, the first SPSI leader, was a 
businessman, while most of other SPSI heads were leaders of the New Order’s 
ruling party, Golkar (Golongan Karya) (ibid). This kind of the so-called 
“company union” had led to the failure of SPSI to be independent in addressing 
the interests of the workers and rather play their role as the agent of the 
employer in executing the latter’s agendas; a typical example of the agency 
problem where the agent (union) fails to address the interest of the principal (the 
                                                 
11 ibid 
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members) because of different goals and/or risk aversion (of the agent) 
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 58).  
Moreover, the possibility for the emergence of a trade union at the work place 
level through efforts by the workers themselves was obstructed by the 
involvement of the company and the Department of Labour in the process of the 
establishment and operation of the work place unions. This intervention was 
legitimized through Ministry of Labour Decree No. 1109/MEN/1986. This among 
others requires that: in the process of the establishment of a work-unit union, the 
workers must consult with the company, APINDO (Employers association) and 
KADIN (The Chamber of Commerce and Industry). Thus, it is not surprising that 
the head of SPSI work unit in general was held by an employee whose position 
represented the interests of the company, usually personnel staff or treasurer 
(ibid). 
 
Labour unrest during New Order period 
Under the HIP model, as noted earlier, conducting strikes was very difficult 
as the government required trade unions which intended to conduct a strike 
to get permission from P4D (Regional Committee for the Settlement of 
Labour Disputes) first. Without this permission, strikes could incur 
criminal sanctions; and as noted, in practice, the P4D never gave 
permission for labour strikes12. On the other hand, efforts to undermine the 
power of strikes were also done by giving the rights to companies to carry out 
                                                 
12 (http://www.202.159.18.43/jsi/101uwiyono.htm) 
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mass sackings of workers who were on strike for six days in a row13.  However, 
despite the difficulties in conducting strikes, many cases of this action took 
place, especially after 1990s, as shown in the table below. 
 
Table 2.5 Strikes in Indonesia, 1990-2007 
Year No. of strikes Labour involved  
1990 61 27,839 
1992 251 176,005 
1994 278 136,699 
1996 350 209,257 
1998 234 141,495 
2000 273 126,045 
2001 174 109,845 
2003 146 61,790 
2007 150 135,297 
Source: http://www.nakertrans.go.id/ 
The level of strikes was relatively high since the 1990s, for a reason argued by 
Hadiz in his chapter, Globalization, Labour, and the State: Indonesia (2000). 
He stated that the upsurge in labour unrest was related to a process of sustained 
industrialisation, which changed the way Indonesian workers experienced 
                                                 
13 (http://www.asia-pacificaction.org/southeastasia/indonesia/publications/doss1/teten.htm) 
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everyday life.  Contemporarily, the new-urban based industrial workers are 
urban residents, who think that living permanently in the village is not attractive 
because of the lack of land. Thus, they – who are much younger and better 
educated - are more inclined to aspire to a better life and work conditions 
(Hadiz, 2000: p. 250).  
Additionally, it also important to note that while trade unionism was restrained 
during Suharto’s repressive era, locality-based NGOs whose orientation was 
towards the improvement of labour conditions had provided workers’ education, 
training programs and discussion groups with little control from the 
Government. This activity, led by middle-class individuals outside the labour 
movement had created a sense of class identity amongst workers and in return 
had enabled the conduction of worker strikes during Suharto’s new Order (Ford, 
2001: 103; Hadiz, 1997: 137-138). However, when the government finally 
introduced the Law No. 21, 2002 which enable the formation of independent 
unions, these NGOs discontinued the activities (as independent unions were 
able to conduct such trainings and discussions) (Isaac and Sitalaksmi, 2008: 
241). 
Most of the industrial unrest was driven by demands for higher wages and better 
working conditions. Other reasons for disputes14 were:  
• Worker demands for the establishment of work-place level FSPSI units free 
from employer or government intervention. 
                                                 
14 (Hadiz, 2000: p. 251; www.smeru.or.id/report/workpaper/practindustrel/practindustrel.pdf). 
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• Demands for workers’ additional rights, such as the absence of, or 
insufficient amount, of allowances provided for food, transport; menstrual leave 
(one day per month) for female workers; etc. 
• Interference and involvement of third parties, such as workers from other 
enterprises and other affiliated trade unions, which often provoked workers to 
fight for their interests. 
• Pressure from a number of workers inside the enterprise to coerce other 
workers to support their cause through demonstrations or strikes. 
• Solidarity for fellow workers believed to have been treated unfairly by 
employers. 
• Diverging perceptions on government laws and regulations. 
• Changes in corporate management, which are viewed as inconsiderate of 
workers’ interests and welfare. 
 
Unionism during the reformation era --1998 onwards 
After the downfall of President Suharto in the middle of 1998, the policy and 
regulations upon the organisation of labour underwent dramatic changes. The 
new government under Habibie’s presidency made trade union establishment 
much easier by removing previous regulations on union establishment. The 
government ratified eight ILO conventions, of which one of them was 
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convention No. 87 (1948) on the “Freedom of Association and Protection on 
the Rights to Organise”15.  
 
Table 2.6 The dynamics of Indonesian trade unionism 1965-present 
1965-1973 1973-1981 1982-1987 1988-1992/3 1992/3-1997/8 1998-
present 
‘Left’ 
oriented 
unions 
disbanded, 
government 
union (FBSI, 
later SPSI) 
formed 
SPSI expands 
but is heavily 
dependent on 
government 
support, some 
Industrial  
branches of 
union active 
Government 
exerts control 
over 
leadership and 
structure of 
SPSI through 
hard line 
Minister of 
Manpower 
SPSI become less 
financially 
dependent on 
government but is 
bypassed in most 
labour Action. 
New union 
formed (SBM), 
despite 
government 
opposition 
Because of 
domestic pressure 
and US threat to 
with-draw GSP 
trade rights, 
government does 
not ban 
independent 
unions, but they 
are not recognised 
and their leaders 
are harassed 
Government 
reforms 
employment-
related laws, 
including the 
law of Freedom 
of Association. 
The number of 
national unions 
grows quickly 
 
Source: Manning, 1998: 206 
 
The growing numbers of trade unions versus low interest amongst the workers 
These changes resulted in massive union establishment nationally, as mentioned 
in the previous section. Unfortunately, the growing numbers of union 
establishments were not followed by a high willingness of workers to join 
unions. There were several versions on union membership data, all of them 
showed a low density of unionism in Indonesia compared to the mushroomed 
formations of (new) independent unions. Data from 2002 revealed that the 
number of union members was only 8 million: 16-20 per cent of the total 
workforce of formal-sector workers) (Quinn, 2003: 36). However, Quinn also 
                                                 
15 (http://202.159.18.43/jsi/101.uwiyono.htm) 
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noted that this figure is highly questionable. A more recent estimate (2006) 
showed that the union density of much lower than Quinn’s, with only around 6-
7 per cent of formal sector workers (3.4 million union members of 40-50 
millions formal sector workers). Table 2.6 below depicted the proportion of 
union members, showing that union membership concentrated in the first three 
union confederations. 
 
     Table 2.7 Membership of Indonesian trade unions 2006 
  
 Name of trade union peak body (confederation) 
No. of 
federations
No. of enterprise 
union Members 
 KSPSI 16 6,122 1,657,244 
 KSPI 10 1,101    793,874 
 KSBSI 11 1,307    227,806 
 National Federation of Trade Unions 3    833    269,509 
 Non-confederation of Trade Union Federation 50 1,677    403,714 
 Non-federation Trade Union  1,237    305,959 
  TOTAL 11,444 33,888,597
Source: ILO Jakarta, taken from Isaac and Sitalaksmi (2008: 244)   
This phenomenon was also related to the fact that not all of the trade unions 
were formed with a mission to improve workers’ welfare. Many of them were 
formed politically to gain public support for a particular party. Workers thus 
cannot see the advantages they could get if they become members of such trade 
unions. However, trade union activists argue that not all non-enterprise level 
trade unions do have clear missions. They also believe that there are trade 
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unions which have an idealistic approach to defending workers. Yet, they did 
not reject the accusation that most of the unions only exploit labour issues for 
their own self-interest. 
There are several other reasons that have made union membership unattractive 
for many workers16.  
First, most of the trade unions do not have strong national bargaining ability 
compared with employers; whose interests can be forced through big political 
parties as most of the parties’ leaders are also business players. The weak 
bargaining power of trade unions in Indonesia is also caused by the low interest 
in unionism. While the rate of unionism is only around 6 per cent, as seen, the 
official rate of unemployment is also high at nearly 10 per cent by August 2007, 
according to the Government (Statistics Indonesia—this figure would be much 
higher if the category by Dhanani previously - unemployed but not actively 
seeking work and underemployed – was also included). Thus, it is relatively 
easy for employers to replace trade union activists if they disrupt company 
operations. Thus, as noted, it could be argued that workers would prefer to keep 
their jobs than be actively involved in union activities, which may endanger 
their job continuity. 
Second, almost all of the current trade unions are not independent in funding 
their organisation as well. They do not get funding from the government, 
though, but from non-government organisations or international organisations, 
particularly from their international union affiliates, which are not free from 
                                                 
16 (http://pdsorganiser.topcities.com/bacaanprogresif/Buruh/KrisisSP.htm) 
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their own interests. Thus, their decisions or reaction over labour issues cannot 
be separated from the funding providers’ interests. 
Third, existing trade unions do not co-operate in resolving labour problems. They 
consider each other as competitors in gaining members and public support. A very 
clear example of trade unions’ friction externally and internally was when the 
government under Megawati‘s leadership finally enacted the new Employment 
Law No. 13 on 25 March 2003. The government claimed that the enactment of 
the new Law had been approved by a “small team” consisting of 6 trade unions 
which represented 63 trade unions. However, in reality, not all the members of 
the 6 trade unions agreed with their leaders in approving the law. They claimed 
that their leaders acted on behalf of their own interest instead of the wider 
organisation. They disapproved some articles in the law about strikes and 
dismissals as well as about contract workers and outsourcing – arguing that 
contract workers and outsourcing may endanger job security and lower the 
workers’ interest to join unions17. 
Thus, if existing trade unions could not develop national-level bargaining 
power, work co-operatively each with other to resolve labour problems, and be 
independent in funding their organisation; it would be difficult for them to 
increase the level of unionism density among the workers. 
 
 
                                                 
17 (http://www.hukumonline.com/cetak_artikel.asp?code=7497&artikel=) 
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Table 2.8  Summary of Main Labour Regulations, 1945-2004 
Presidential Era and Regulations Description 
I. Sukarno (1945-1967)  
1. Law No. 12/1948 Labour Law 
2. Law No. 1/1951 Implementation of Labour Law No. 
12/1948 
3. Law No. 21/1954 Law on labour union and employer to 
provide a basic agreement 
4. Law No. 18/1956 Ratification of ILO Convention No. 98 on 
the right to organise and bargain 
collectively 
5. Law No. 22/1957 Dispute settlement law 
6. Law No. 80/1957 Ratification of ILO Convention No. 100 
on wages for male and female workers 
  
II. Suharto (1967-1998)  
1.Law No. 14/1969 Main regulation on employment 
2. PP No. 33/1981 Regulations on wage 
3. Ministerial Regulation No. 
01/MEN/1990 
Explanation on minimum wage and its 
implementation 
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4. Ministry of Labour 
Regulation No. 3/1993 
Overall control of all aspects of labour 
organisation 
5. Ministry of Labour 
Decrees No. 4/1986; No. 
1108/1986 and Regulation 
No. 62/1993 
Limitations on the right of strike based on 
mandatory bipartite and tripartite 
negotiations involving Ministry of Labour 
and the security forces and mechanism to 
force workers to resign after 6 days 
absence of strike 
  
III. Habibie ( 1998-1999)  
1. Ministerial Regulation No. 
5/1998 to replace Ministerial 
Regulation No. 3/1993 
Ratification of ILO Convention No. 87 
(on Freedom of association and protection 
of the right to organise); introduce a new 
system for registration of trade unions 
and abolish the previous monopoly union 
  
IV. Wahid (1999-2001)  
1. Amendments to Labour 
Law No. 25/1997 On labour unions 
2. Trade Union Act, Law No. 
21/2000 to replace Regulation 
No. 5/1998 
Guarantee workers' right to organise; 
setting the minimum number of members 
of a trade union (10), conditions 
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governing multiple unionism in single 
establishment, rules for information on 
union federation and confederation 
3. Ministerial Decree 
150/2000 
Operational procedures on rationalisation 
of workers including severance pay 
  
V. Megawati (2001-2004)  
1. Labour Law No. 13/2003 
replaced among others 
Labour Law No. 25/1997, 
Law No. 14/1969, Law No. 
21/1954 and Law No.1/1951 
The new Labour Law includes all basic 
aspects of employment protection such as 
planning, training, industrial relations, 
occupational safety, wages and welfare. 
Several detailed regulations are also 
included such as for severance pay 
2. Industrial Dispute 
Settlement Bill, law No. 
2/2004 
Provides basic procedures on industrial 
disputes 
3. Law No. 40/2004 on 
National Social Security 
The beneficiaries are all Indonesian 
workers. The system includes Jamsostek, 
Taspen, Asabri and Askes 
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2.4.3 Public perception over trade unionism 
Perceptions of Indonesians in general towards unionism are that it is 
provocative and militant. It can be argued that this perception is generated 
because Indonesians prefer to avoid uncertainty as studied by Hofstede18 . The 
uncertainty avoidance of Indonesia comes to second after the Power Distance 
Index where Indonesia is at 78, higher than the average for Asian countries of 
71 (of 100-scale) – indicating a high unwillingness to “disrespect legitimate 
authority”. High uncertainty avoidance and power distance could have created a 
society which perceives trade unionism as a new institution which may 
‘endanger’ the stability of society. The high level of power distance also 
suggests that most Indonesians are in favour of strong leadership/authority to 
direct the unequal power among the society rather than providing bargaining 
conditions which are favourable for trade unions. 
Moreover, these perceptions are very much fomented and reinforced by the 
media, which represents the interests of varied groups, but mainly nationalists, 
opportunists, and religious groups. For example, the case of the Nike’s 
subcontractor shutdown was reported as the result of stronger unionism in the 
workplace. This kind of report was based on interviews with government 
officials, employers and union representatives. However, it was also other union 
representatives who suggested that the company’s closedown was caused by the 
emergence of unionism in the workplace, creating an image that a union is 
dangerous for the job security of workers. Together with reports on 
                                                 
18 See http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_indonesia.shtml 
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demonstrations and strikes organised by unions and rare stories of union’s 
positive contributions for workers and employers, Indonesians question the 
advantages of strong unions, not to mention the lingering public fear of 
communism – as unions were regarded as representing the communist party in 
the Old Order.  
 
2.5 Literature review summary and contribution of this research 
This chapter has explored the Indonesian labour market and multinationals. 
Evident is that the informal sector has dominated employment for Indonesian 
workers, particularly in the agricultural sector. Although the proportion was 
lower during 1990-1997, it has been increasing again during and after the 1997 
economic crisis. Many workers who cannot find full-time permanent jobs in the 
formal sector are effectively forced to retreat to the agricultural and trade 
sectors as an alternative; reinforced by the absence of a social security net in 
Indonesia. 
In terms of the formal sector, multinationals have absorbed more employees 
than domestic companies (BKPM, 2007) as multinationals are usually present in 
the form of large establishments. Formal sector employees, however, are now 
facing a new challenge: the use of contract workers by employers as this 
practice has been legalised by the government in the Law No. 13 Year 2003. 
The government argues that in the Law the term ‘fixed-term workers’ is used 
instead of contract workers, with a different definition to that used by the 
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employers. ‘Fixed-term worker’ is meant to give workers to have higher chance 
to obtain a job, not to create job uncertainty19.  
Nevertheless, there is no action taken by the government toward employers who 
behave illegally and breach the definition of fixed-term workers and thus, many 
contract workers are experiencing job uncertainty. The use of contract workers 
also creates a new challenge for trade unions, as contract workers are very 
difficult to organise and contract workers may be hesitant to join a union due to 
fear of not getting a new job contract after the existing one is completed, 
particularly if they join a union. Although the practice started in 2003, as yet 
there has been no research on the effect of this practice to workers’ behaviour - 
nor any trade union reaction and strategy in facing the challenge. 
Thus, it can be argued that literature on Indonesia industrial relations and trade 
unionism is very limited and mostly is based on aggregate statistical data and 
industry-based surveys involving massive respondents (example: the BPS; 
SMERU report; Manning, 2000; Hadiz, 2000). Although this type of data is 
necessary to provide the background and surface of the Indonesian industrial 
system, what is really happening in the workplace is still a “black box” for 
many researchers; whether the changes in the Law on industrial relations and 
trade unionism really have changed the way the actors (i.e. government, 
employers and employees) act. Have unions experienced freedom in action 
since then? Are employers no longer resistant to trade unionism and its 
demands? Are workers really benefiting under the new conditions? 
                                                 
19 See http://www.disnakertrans-jateng.go.id/index.php?xicix=berita&idberita=20080107140201: 
Fenomena Pekerja kontrak dan outsourcing. 
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The thesis will focus on the industrial relations process in four multinationals 
operating in Indonesia. The importance of multinationals in Indonesia’s 
economy as well the accessibility toward the respondents are main reasons of 
conducting the research in multinationals, where the time and funding 
limitations are also taken into account. The findings of the research are expected 
to give more explanations to what happen in the workplace; to see how the 
process of collective bargaining takes place and how the strategic choices facing 
unions in the workplace are affected by the external and internal factors.  
The research was conducted in four multinationals from different industries: 
automotive, textile, banking and car-parts industries, which were all based in 
Jakarta. The different environment where each multinational operates will be 
explored to examine its impact on trade unionism in each establishment. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to provide a theoretical perspective on the nature and impact 
of trade unions in the workplace; and hence the implications of union activity 
for employment and competitiveness. There have been a number of perspectives 
written on the effects of trade unions on employment and competitiveness. A 
dominant view is that trade unions are widely regarded in many countries as 
raising labour costs and hence driving up unemployment. This view is 
supported by the argument within neoclassical economics that the existence of 
unions would disrupt the equilibrium of wage determination in the market, 
which would have the effect of increasing unemployment (employers decrease 
the number of employees) - or of the undercutting of the wage rate by the 
unemployed. Both of these outcomes would be deleterious for trade unions. 
The simple competitive neoclassical model also suggests that individuals are the 
central agents of economic action. Individual preferences and satisfactions, 
shaped by the (perfect) information they have in regard to the market determine 
aggregate supply and demand in the market, including the terms of labour. 
Hence, collective action such as trade unionism would represent a market 
distortion and would constrain individual choice and thus reduce the 
‘efficiency’ of the market. 
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Institutional economics, in contrast to the methodological individualism 
inherent in simple neoclassical theory, offers an alternative perspective by 
arguing that institutions define and limit the set of choices of individuals (North, 
1990: 4); economic activity does not merely operate within free individual 
preferences and perfect information. They also believe that instead of human 
satisfaction, the end of economic activity is the provision of maximum 
opportunity of “human growth” (Kaufman, 2000: 192). The interest of human 
growth is reserved by the functions played by institutions; in this case, within 
the labour market and the workplace. Collective bargaining conducted by trade 
unions is said to constitute an institution whereby the ‘rules of the game’ in the 
workplace are set collectively to ensure the protection of employees (who are 
believed to be in a weaker bargaining position towards employers). The 
following section considers the neoclassical view of the labour market and 
criticisms of it, before turning to institutional theories and the role of trade 
unions. 
However, in the more hostile (to unions) policy environment known as neo-
liberalism, it becomes necessary for trade unions to start developing an effective 
strategy in order to maintain their viability. The approach used in this thesis is 
that of Huzzard (2004), who draws on strategic choice model to argue that there 
are four levels of strategic choices which unions have to decide. Each level will 
consequently influence the choice of the following level. This approach will be 
explained further in this chapter and hence becomes the theoretical framework 
in this thesis. 
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3.2. Neoclassical competitive labour market 
Neoclassical economics, which represents the mainstream (or orthodox) view in 
labour economics, is a revision of the classical economics developed by Adam 
Smith, David Ricardo, and other nineteenth-century economists. One of its 
distinct assumptions is that human behaviour is driven by what is called the 
‘rational actor model’. In the simple neoclassical model, firms are assumed to 
maximize profits, whilst individuals seek to maximize their level of well being 
(or utility) and are able to calculate the values of every alternative (“opportunity 
cost”) in order to choose the optimal income. 
Furthermore, in the simple neoclassical model, the labour market is perfectly 
competitive, having a large number of buyers and sellers, and it is relatively 
easy to enter into and exit from the market. This assumption, together with the 
‘rational actor model’ shapes the theory of how market forces determine wages 
and the allocation of labour. 
Under perfectly competitive markets, both employers and employees are wage 
takers; they do not have any economic power to affect wage rates. The wage is 
determined solely by the interaction of demand and supply in the labour market. 
This behaviour is stimulated by another assumption underlined the simple 
neoclassical model, which is the existence of perfect knowledge and 
homogeneous labour. Perfect knowledge means that employees are aware of the 
available wage rates in the market while employers know how productive the 
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labour is. Homogeneous labour, hence, assumes that all labour in a given 
category have identical productivity.  
This model suggests that if unions exist in this kind of market, they can only 
raise wages at the expense of employment. Firms would incur increased costs 
once unions force up wage rates. Fewer workers would be employed, ceteris 
paribus, which would cause a decline in output, and stimulate higher prices. 
This will enable firms to pay higher wage rates to the remaining employees with 
higher productivity (marginal products), as shown in figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1 Wage determination in perfectly competitive markets 
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unemployed (unless unions are able to prevent companies from employing non-
unionised labour). 
However, these assumptions have been subjected to a number of criticisms 
(including from many who might otherwise describe themselves as neoclassical 
economists). The first criticism is that the markets scarcely operate under 
perfect competition; they usually operate within imperfect competition. 
Employers could exist in the form of monopsonists or oligopsonists. When there 
is only one employer for a particular type of labour, the company is called as a 
monopsonist; when there are few employers, they are called oligopsonists. 
These employers have power to determine wage rates; they are not wage takers. 
Furthermore, they are able to force wage rates down. The way they set wages as 
depicted in figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2 Wage determination in imperfectly competitive markets 
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Monopsony employers face an upward-sloping labour supply curve. When the 
firm needs more labour, it has to increase its wage rates in order to attract 
workers from other industries. However, this means that the firm will have 
higher wage bills, and thus a decrease in its profit (as the profit-maximising 
quantity of labour is given by MCL = MRPL). Therefore, monopsony firms 
would produce less and employ less labour (L1) in order to be able to pay lower 
wage rates (W1), and hence maximize profits. 
Thus, in monopsonistic labour market, the employers are believed to have some 
market power (Manning, 2003: 3). However, unlike the previous definition of 
monopsonistic labour market above where there is only one available buyer, 
Manning (2003) preferred to characterise monopsonistic labour market as not 
‘being infinitely elastic’ as being argued in competitive labour market although 
there might be more than one buyer.  
Using this assumption, employees are believed would not suddenly change their 
jobs when there was a small wage cut as information on alternative employment 
opportunities is less than perfect although softer impacts such as higher turnover 
rate and recruitment difficulty might occur (Gunderson and Riddell, 1988: 213-
214; Manning, 2004: 146); .  
However, it is interesting to see the impact of unionisation to the wage in a 
monopsonistic labour market. Unions in this labour market are believed to have 
a higher wages mark-up for both the unionised and non-unionised sectors; 
furthermore, a higher level of unionisation does not always mean lower (non-
union) wages. Rather, a ‘threat effect’ applied by non-union employers is also 
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evidence found where higher unionisation in labour market would increase the 
wage for non-unionised labour as well. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 The impact of unionisation to non-union wages in monopsonistic 
labour market  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
In a monopsonistic labour market, non-union employers are competing for 
labour with other employers, including the unionised ones and hence indirectly 
increase wages in local labour market created a spillover from unionisation to 
non-union wages (Manning, 2003: 351-352). 
Nevertheless, it is believed that monopsonistic labour market is not a common 
phenomenon (McConnel and Brue, 1986: 150; Fleisher and Kniesner, 1984: 
219). Unions may well have a unitary control in labour supply in labour market 
in facing a single buyer or in monopsonistic labour market as defined by 
Manning above and thus, creates a bilateral monopoly situation (Hieser, 1970).  
As both the employer and the union have equal power, the situation of 
bargaining within bilateral monopoly market is said to be indeterminate as being 
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argued by Edgworth (1881) and Pigou (1938) which means deadlock could 
happen anytime. In contrast, Hieser (1970: 57) argued that in the real world, a 
stable, determinate situation commonly accomplished; when deadlock occurs, 
which are very rare, it would lead to strike (union’s action) or lockouts 
(employer’s action). 
The second critisism of the simple neoclassical model concerns the way in 
which wages are determined. Wage determination in the simple neoclassical 
model is based on the assumption that employers and employees have equal 
bargaining power. Hence, employers will try to pay a wage as low as possible 
while the employees will move from one firm to another to find the highest 
income they could get. However, Alfred Marshall, one of the founders of 
neoclassical economics, realized the potential problems within this approach. 
He noted that workers suffer from unequal bargaining power vis a vis 
employers, due to such factors such as the lack of reserve funding, difficulty in 
obtaining financial capital to invest in additional skills and training, mobility 
problems, and the fact that the services of labour are perishable (labour cannot 
be inventoried and sold later) (Kerr and Staudohar, 1994: 151).  
Furthermore, the equal bargaining power of employers and employees is also 
challenged by Marxian economists who argue that society is divided into 
classes, whereby one class (capital owners) exploits another (labourers) (Marx, 
2004: 21-22) Exploitation occurs when the labourers who perform surplus 
labour (i.e. the labour power expended exceeds the need to produce 
commodities to cover the cost of production) is not the one who enjoys the 
surplus value he created. In reacting to the exploitation, the labourers may 
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accept or not to accept the situation. Those who do not accept the situation may 
create the ‘class struggle’ with pressing or higher wages as the centre of the 
struggle.  
Imperfect information is the fourth limitation of simple neoclassical models. 
Whilst it is argued that employees have perfect information on jobs and wages, 
in reality acquiring information in the labour market through job search is 
costly, both in terms of money and the time devoted for it – i.e., transaction 
costs. Thus, rather than being paid on the same rate, two identical workers could 
be paid different wage rates because of imperfect information. Furthermore, 
even if a worker has complete information of the possibility of gaining higher 
income in another firm, immobility might occur as the next problem (as has 
been noted by Marshall). Moving geographically for higher income is not 
costless.  
Moreover, another key criticism of simple neoclassical theory is the rejection of 
the ‘rational actor model’. A person’s “choice” can be irrational, owing to the 
presence of emotions as well as the limited capacity of human brain in valuing 
every alternative, called bounded rationality. Some theorists, such as Herbert 
Simon, argue that individuals do not always maximize their economic income, 
but rather, individuals pursue a goal until they reach a satisfactory level 
(Kaufman and Hotchkiss, 2000: 30-31). On the other hand, firms might actually 
pay higher wage rates than the average market rates to avoid confrontation with 
unions.   
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In addition, the “principal-agent” problem faced by unions and their members 
also underlines the weakness of ‘rational actor model’ of neo-classical 
economics. Agency theory is concerned with the problems that can occur in the 
relationship/contract between the principal (i.e. the one who delegates the work) 
and the agent (i.e. the one who does the work) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Eisenhardt, 1989) when the agent has different goals with that of the principal 
and different risk preference (Eisenhardt, 1989: 58). 
The agency problem can also be found in the relationship between the unions 
and their members, where union representatives are the agents to whom the 
members delegate their collective voice in negotiating with the employers. 
Unions, as part of their survival strategy, might choose a moderate approach of 
partnership in their bargaining which, as argued by Kelly (1996) may become 
too lenient and compromise their central role as management opposition to fight 
over their members’ interests. 
The practice of discrimination in the world of work has also undermined the 
arguments supporting the rational actor model. Discrimination is defined as the 
treatment of individuals or groups of individual that is unequal and more 
importantly, unfair (Kaufman and Hotckiss, 2000: 471). Discrimination may 
take place among various race and gender groups. This practice is caused by 
personal prejudice, imperfect information, and market power.  
Personal prejudice is a subjective feeling of dislike for a person or group, while 
imperfect information inhibits an employer’s ability to examine a worker’s 
productivity at the time of hiring. As a result, an employer could use personal 
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characteristics of the worker as the basic of sorting the worker into productivity 
groups. Some of the characteristics hence could be group characteristics such as 
race, gender, or nationality. 
Discrimination caused by market power can occur when monopsonistic firms as 
well as trade unions set wage rates that discriminate between workers of various 
races, gender and other socio-demographic groups. In addition to the ability of 
monopsonists to pay wages below market rates, they could also increase their 
income by paying a certain group lower wage rate than others. On the other 
hand, trade unions may also become a source of discrimination by imposing 
internship programs and hiring and firing mechanisms which restrict the 
employment of minority workers in order to gain support from the majority 
workers (the “insider-outsider” model). This practice could take place where 
unions are strong enough to control the firm’s policy.  
Thus, it can be concluded that there are several forces which shape the operation 
of labour market. Employers, trade unions, and even government have distinct 
and significant power in influencing labour market. The existence of these 
forces and their impacts are the central issues of ‘institutionalism’ which is 
discussed in the next section in this chapter. 
 
3.3 The New Institutional Economics  
The definition of institutions is not straightforward as one would expect. There 
are two contrasting views in defining institutions. As Aoki (2000) stated, if a 
society is depicted by a game, institutions are defined differently by 
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institutionalists, either as the players of the game or the rules which should be 
followed by the players. The first view defines institutions as organisational 
establishments such as the government, corporations, universities, etc (Aoki, 
2000:12). Thus, this view regards institutions as the players of the game.  
The second view in defining institutions, on the other hand, in effect regards 
institutions as the rules of the game (Veblen’s “habits of thought”). They argue 
that institutions are the rules of the game in a society which directs individuals 
towards particular behaviour. When it is successful, it provides structure for 
everyday activity and sets constraints that shape human interaction (Furubotn 
and Richter, 2005: 7; North, 1990: 2). In this thesis, the second view will be 
used in identifying institutions. 
While neoclassical economics centres its argument in individual (free and 
rational) choice in shaping the market, institutionalists argue that institutions 
define and limit the set of choices of individuals (North, 1990: 4) – i.e., that 
preferences are not ‘given’ or ‘exogenous’. Thus, institutionalists hold different 
views from neoclassical economists on how labour markets operate. 
Institutionalists argue that the labour market is shaped by institutional forces 
such as collective bargaining by trade unions, or a minimum wage set by the 
government, as well as by sociological factors such as class and gender.  
Clark Kerr, one of the more prominent institutional labour market theorists, 
developed a typology of labour markets which consisted of five models or 
types: perfect, neoclassical, natural, institutional, and managed (Kerr, 1950: 
279). The perfect market is where buyers and sellers have free entry and exit, 
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complete knowledge is accessible, and there is no collusion amongst or between 
buyers and sellers. 
The second type, the neoclassical market was mainly based on the perfect 
market, with several adjustments to get closer to “reality”. This type of market, 
states Kerr, is one as viewed by Marshall whereby the supply of skilled workers 
is inelastic due to the time needed to gain skills, whilst unskilled workers are in 
a disadvantaged position because of the perishability of their labour; i.e. their 
labour cannot be inventoried for future use. Unions operating in this type of 
market can increase wage rates, which, like the perfect market, are mainly 
determined by the market. Workers have adequate information of alternatives, 
and can easily move from one job to another.  
The natural market is characterised by an uneven distribution of wages, which 
is worsened by the non-wage conditions of unemployment. Unions are not 
present in such markets while employers, on the other hand, may exercise their 
market power over workers. Wages are not determined in a competitive manner. 
In fact, the market does not determine the wage rate at all. Rather, wages are set 
within a limit in which employers pay and the workers choose. Moreover, 
whilst economists believe that the labour market is “objective” in that workers 
could pick and choose between jobs, workers themselves see it as subjectively 
described. For the workers, they can only choose jobs for which they have 
adequate information mainly from their friends or which fit with their 
occupation and income level. Hence workers are passive players in this type of 
market.  
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The fourth type, the institutional market, is characterised by the presence of 
institutional rules and policies. These are developed by individual firms, trade 
unions, employer associations and government as the more important factors in 
wage and employment determination. In terms of wage determination, for 
example, market forces no longer solely set the wage bargain limit. Formal rules 
are set in place to restrict the lower limit employees accept as well as the upper 
limit employers pay: a single wage rate may occur as a result of institutional 
control rather than because of the equilibrium position of supply and demand in 
labour market. As such, in this kind of market: 
 
 ‘Supply and demand do adjust and can be adjusted to the wage rate rather than 
wages adjusting to supply and demand. This is not to say that supply and 
demand have no effect on price, but only that their influence is often indirect 
and muted’ (Kerr, 1950: 283)  
 
The final type of labour market in Kerr’s typology is the managed market. This 
type of market occurs as a solution offered to reinstate the theory of market 
perfection. There are two distinct groups within this market; employers, who 
favour a return to competition (labour flexibility); and workers and unions, who 
support the positive participation of government. Correspondingly, there are two 
views of the ‘managed market’: compulsory individualism, which views that 
trade unions should be disbanded, or legislated against as they disrupt the 
workings of the market; and the second view, collective determination, which 
 64
argues that government should control prices and wages and use arbitration 
tribunals to resolve industrial disputes. 
The above typology shows that Kerr was deeply aware of the role and power of 
institutions in shaping the labour market. The rising attention of economists on 
the effect of labour institutions in economic performance altered the classic 
attention given to macroeconomics in explaining and curing economic problems 
(Freeman, 2007: 3). Wage setting and employees’ normative standards that are 
determined through collective bargaining between trade unions and employers 
are parts of labour institutions shaping the behaviour of the most prominent 
players within the labour market: employers and employees (which in this case, 
are represented by trade unions).  
However, as economic theory does not provide clear guidance to the effect of 
labour institutions on economic performance (given their manifold nature and 
complexity), studies measuring the impact of trade unionism towards a nation’s 
economy show somewhat inconsistent findings. There are clearly situations 
where institutions do affect economic performance and where they do not affect 
performance (such as when the market constraint is very high). However, 
institutions can also improve efficiency outcomes (such as communication 
channels between employers and employees) or on the contrary, hinder 
performance (like wage setting above the market price that leads to less 
employment) (see discussion in Freeman, 2007: 11-17). 
As stated in the beginning of this chapter, trade unions are prominent players as 
labour institutions; and are often accused as being the ‘trouble maker’ which 
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raises labour costs and drives up unemployment. However, they also serve as 
employee representation channels, to which employers could communicate 
more simply and provide grievances procedures which could also prevent 
employers from losing employees. Therefore, in order to understand the role 
played by trade unions in labour markets and the workplace in the context of 
case studies in this thesis, the theories of union ideologies, purpose and strategy 
will explored within the following sections. 
 
3.4. Theorising unions strategy and strategic choice  
Trade unions can be defined as institutional representatives of worker interests 
both within the labour market and in wider society. They accentuate the 
collective rather than individual power-resources of employees (Bean, 1985: 
20). The purpose of trade unions, as stated by Sydney and Beatrice Webb, is 
‘maintaining or improving the conditions of their members’ working lives’ 
(cited in Martin, 1989: 10). Hyman (1975) further states that the central purpose 
of trade unions is to permit workers to exert, collectively, the control over the 
conditions of employment which they cannot hope to posses as individuals 
(cited in Farnham, 2000: 275). As such, it has been argued that trade unions are 
able to shape their own destiny and thus have a responsibility to take actions for 
their survival and effectiveness (Huzzard, 2004: 20; Boxall and Haynes, 1997: 
567).  
In achieving their purpose, effective organisation, high-levels of membership, 
responsive leadership at a national level, and sufficient income are needed. The 
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absence of any one of these means will impair the representative function of 
trade unions. The effectiveness of unions has become more important as they 
are now facing a more challenging environment driven by globalisation and 
structural change (Olney, 1996, as cited in Huzzard, 2004: 21), often cited in the 
context of a more neo-liberal policy agenda adopted by states. As such, in this 
context, the use of sophisticated HRM tools such as the individualisation of 
employment relations (Jeffries, 1996: 180) and the use of ‘soft’ forms of joint 
consultation as well as the absence of state sponsorship for union survival 
(Boxall and Haynes, 1997: 567) have threatened the existence of unions across 
countries.  
Therefore, union development and aspirations, to a great extent, depend on the 
ability to adapt to a highly globalised environment. This means that unions have 
to determine steps they can take for their adaptability; and hence, behave in a 
“strategic” manner.  
However, unlike business strategy, union strategy is rarely linked with 
conscious and well-planned characteristics because of the defensive and reactive 
nature of unions. Despite this limitation, several studies (such as Boreham and 
Hall 1994; Gahan and Bell 1999) show that strategy is one of important 
determinants of organising success. 
Union strategy has not been widely discussed in detail (Satrya and Parasuraman, 
2007:  32). However, scholars such as Kochan, McKersie and Katz (1986); 
Gardner (1989); Boxall and Haynes (1997); and Gahan (1998) are among those 
who have attempted to define and explain union strategy.  
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In addition to the above attempts in explaining union strategy, a number of 
studies also examine the (strategic) choices unions might undertake for their 
survival. The strategy might be a straightforward choice between “moderation” 
versus “militancy” (Kelly, 1996). Militant trade unions are those which are strict 
with their traditional roles and rely on their strength to membership and 
willingness to act through industrial actions: i.e. strikes (Kelly, 1996: 88). 
Moderate trade unions, in contrast, emphasise “partnership” between trade 
unions and employers, and cooperation in achieving so called ‘common 
interests’, which are mainly organisational success and employment security 
(Clydon, 1998, as cited in Tailby and Winchester, 2000: 375). Other scholars, 
for example, Jeffries (1996) - argue that union strategy can be best described as 
a continuum ranging from conflict, containment aggression, accommodation, 
co-operation and collusion.  
However, without exception, the arguments on a union’s strategic choice all 
suggest that unions are bounded in choosing their strategy. Jeffries (1996: 172-
3) argues that both the external and internal environment of unions will affect 
their choice of strategy. The external environment includes the nature of the 
legal system, the labour market, labour process, and political factors, while the 
internal environment relates to the type of union movement in a particular 
country. 
The aspiration by unions for higher wages, for example, is limited by economic 
constraints in the environment in which they operate and by resistance from 
employers. Those constraints sometimes convince unions that they could not 
win a strike or that wage increases will cause undesirable reduction in hours or 
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employment (Rees, 1978: 283). The interaction of political and economic 
pressures is quite different when employment is rising than when it is falling. 
When employment is rising, unions experience the greatest freedom from 
economic constraints. In periods of rising employment, employers are more 
willing to grant wage increases for at least two reasons. Firstly, their losses from 
strikes will usually be greater in this period; as competitors can increase output. 
Secondly, wage increases can be used by employers in tight labour markets in 
obtaining and maintaining adequate numbers of qualified workers. However, 
employers could resist raise wages under these circumstances if they think that 
it is only temporary and that they will not be able to reduce the high union wage 
rates once it is no longer useful. In contrast, when employment is falling, 
economic constraints become a very significant obstacle for trade unions to take 
any political manoeuvre in their attempts to raise wage rates. If unions are 
already strong during a depression, employers may continue to recognise them 
but try to negotiate (real) wage cuts instead.  
A more comprehensive model of union strategic choice is proposed by Huzzard 
(2004). He argued that there are four levels of strategic choices that unions have 
to decide (described in the following material). The choice they make in a 
particular level will influence the strategic choice of the next level. As in 
Jeffries’ model, these choices are also bounded by several constraints such as 
the industrial relations system, economic context, tension between 
administrative and representative systems, social expectations of unions, 
employer strategies, and technology as the external environment, while internal 
environment includes past strategic choices and financial resources.  
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Figure 3.4 Huzzard’s strategic choice model 
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What is called as ‘level 1’ in Huzzard’s model is concerned with union 
decisions on identity and mission; that in turn will shape the union’s long-term 
decision making. Huzzard takes an example of the typology by Hyman (2001) 
in explaining the example of choices union can take at this stage. The Hyman 
model is depicted as a triangle of three apexes: class, society, and markets. 
Unions can be represented by one of these apexes in terms of their ideology and 
identity. 
Level 2 in Huzzard’s strategic choice is where the decisions on what activities 
to undertake should be made. Ansoff’s (1968) product/market grid is used by 
Huzzard as an illustration of the choices of activities unions can implement. The 
grid suggests the activities of directing existing issues or developing new issues 
to existing or new members. 
 
Figure 3.5 Level 2 strategic choices for trade unions (adapted from Ansoff, 
1968) 
     Existing issues/ New issues/ 
     service mix  service mix 
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Level 3 of this model is to a great extent shaped by the choice in level 2. Unions 
which offer products to their existing members would tend to choose the 
traditional approach of collective bargaining and thus might choose to become 
‘militant’. On the other hand, if the union decided to offer new issues or 
services to existing members, they could become more moderate and would 
prefer the partnership model in their relations with the employers, as little 
evidence shows that this could be achieved by militant /traditional approach 
(Gustavsen et al, 1996 as cited in Huzzard, 2004: 31).    
Level 4 demonstrates the implications of union choice in level 3 as it is 
concerned with union’s internal structures and processes; which is sometimes 
referred to as ‘union renewal’. For example, if a union decides to refocus on 
promoting gender equality, then it might have to change its structure if it is a 
male-dominated hierarchy. 
Huzzard’s framework is the preferred model used in this thesis. In 
demonstrating how union behaviour is shaped by internal and external factors, it 
provides a useful template on which to evaluate union activity and roles in the 
workplace; and, more importantly, provides a context from which to evaluate 
the key casual factors shaping union effectiveness; particularly in a volatile, 
changing economic environment driven by the imperatives of globalisation, 
multinational corporations, and ‘competitiveness’. Accordingly, the next section 
seeks to provide a critical evaluation of the factors influencing trade union 
strategy and effectiveness, through an examination of the Indonesian experience 
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(focusing on the post-1997/Suharto period). It commences with a discussion on 
the theories of union purposes which in turn derive from a union’s ideological 
preferences, in order to enable further explanation of the first level of the 
Huzzard’s model. 
 
3.5 Trade union ideologies and purpose 
In terms of purpose, Martin (1989) argued that the purpose of trade unions is 
derived from their ideological reference. As he cited the words of Richard 
Hyman and Bob Fryer (although he highlighted the use of the word ‘function’, 
not ‘purpose’): ‘Evidently… debates about trade union functions are typically 
mediated by … ideological frames of reference’ (p. 11-12). The ideologies 
explored in his book were described under the labels of pluralists, syndicalists, 
Marxists-Leninists, organicists, and authoritarians. These ideologies underlie 
the position of unions vis a vis employers under capitalism. It can be 
demonstrated that broadly there are two positions which trade unions may stand 
for: accommodate and therefore bargain with the capitalism - or seek to 
overthrow capitalism (although it is less clear what capitalism would be 
“replaced” with). 
It is pluralists who view that trade unions should bargain with employers within 
capitalism on the behalf on their members; and confirms trade unions’ purpose 
from the view of the pluralists which confirms the Webbs’ definition of trade 
unions: ‘… maintaining and improving the conditions of their working lives’. 
One key advocate; Selig Perlman, argued that there were two themes that 
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constituted the central purpose of trade unions. The first is job security, 
involving both obtaining a job when needed, and holding it once acquired. 
Furthermore, workers also valued ‘concrete freedom on the job’, which is the 
second theme, which involve the ability of a worker to face his boss without 
fear. However, these two ultimate purposes will not be realised without the 
existence of job control. Job control is trade union’s ability to control access to 
the job opportunities available to their members. Thus, job control is a 
prerequisite for the achievement of the purposes (Martin, 1989: 16-17). 
In contrast, syndicalists and Marxists-Leninists argued that capitalism should be 
overthrown, though each has a different emphasis and approach. There are three 
variants within syndicalism; where each has a slightly different emphasis and 
approach in obtaining and administering workers’ control. Anarcho-syndicalism 
and One Big Unionists emphasise the position of manual workers. They viewed 
that trade union struggle was a reflection of a class war between the proletariat – 
or the working class - and the bourgeoisie. The third variant, the Guild 
Socialists, on the other hand, assumed that control should be administered by all 
employees which constitute both manual and non-manual employees including 
those at professional and managerial levels (ibid.).  
In terms of control, syndicalists argue that workers, through their trade unions, 
should not only control the employment relationship, but all aspects of the 
enterprise. Trade unions will then act as the controllers of industry, instead of 
employers or the state. Another principle that underlies this school of thought is 
the notion of ‘industrial unionism’, which stipulates that each industry should be 
covered by a single union, which recruits all employees within that industry.  
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Organicists reject the idea of conflicting interests and inter-group clash as they 
neglect the innate harmony and co-operation which generally characterise 
human society. Thus, this type of unionism promotes co-partnership, workers’ 
participation (not control), profit sharing and other arrangement which favour 
corporatist arrangements in the area of employment relations. Authoritarians 
(who may also be thought of statists, or state corporatists), the last category of 
Martin’s, put an overwhelming emphasis on the role of the state or ruling 
political party and put trade unions in a subordinate position for the purpose of  
maximizing industrial production.  
Hyman (2001), as outlined earlier, developed an argument of the ideological 
orientation of (European) trade unions, which centred on three aspects, namely: 
market, class and society, which he referred to as ‘the eternal triangle’ as no 
trade union strictly holds only one ideological orientation but rather contains a 
mix of two categories. The categorisation is actually not very much different 
with that of Martin (above). Instead, his categorisation is an extract for Martin’s 
classification of union’s ideology.  
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Figure 3.6 Hyman’s triangle of unions ideological orientation 
                                                                 Society 
 
                                      Market                                           Class 
The first category of union ideological orientation is ‘market’. As implies in the 
name, unionism within this category believes their main function is to serve the 
need of their members’ needs maintaining and improving their members’ 
welfare (i.e. higher wages, shorter hours and better working conditions) within 
the market where the employees are the seller (of skills and labour) and 
employers the buyer. Thus, unions which follow this ideology conduct 
collective bargaining with employers to set the minimum standard of the 
condition of employment of their members (ibid: 6-7).  
This type of unionism is similar to business unionism in the US, which, 
according to Hoxie, is more trade-conscious rather than class-conscious and 
regards unionism as a bargaining institution in enhancing the member’s 
employment conditions (ibid: 8-9). It can also be argued that pluralist unionism 
defined above by Martin in similar to this type of unionism, as it recognises the 
different interests between employees and employers where the latter is more 
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powerful again and thus unions need to bargain collectively with the employers 
to for their members.   
‘Class’ is the second type of unionism where the difference of - and the 
continual conflict between - workers and employers, suggests that men and 
masters are the main themes. The advocates of this orientation do not believe 
that bargaining in the labour market is sufficient to defend (let alone improve) 
the workers’ welfare as the market forces is too strong. Furthermore, collective 
bargaining is believed to give advantage only to certain type of workers as it 
organises by occupation or sector while sacrificing other type of workers; 
particularly those weakest in labour market (ibid. 7). Thus, for the welfare of all 
workers, Karl Marx argued, workers need to unite in the face of their employers 
(Marx, 2004: 21-22). He further argued that unions have to deliberately act as 
organising centres for the working class in and bring forward the class struggle 
against the interests of ‘capital’. Regarding Martin’s work, syndicalism and 
marxist-leninism are types of unionism which hold the class ideology.  
Finally, the ‘society’ type of unionism is similar to the organicist unionism of 
Martin, which on the other hand, emphasises on the cooperation of workers and 
employers to create a harmonious society as both trade unions and employers 
are embedded in society in which they are able to shape the development of 
(ibid. 39). The condition whereby workers and employers should respect each 
obligation applies in this depiction of unionism: workers should labour loyally 
to the employers and employers should respect the dignity of their workers. 
Whenever the standards for workers are not respected and upheld by employers, 
the state should intervene.  
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It is important to note that combining these three values is unlikely within a 
union organisation although some mixtures may exist (such as a market-
oriented union broadens its role in creating industrial peace among the society) 
(Gospel, 2008: 15). 
 
3.6 Trade union functions and activities in the workplace 
A trade union’s ideology would substantially shape the strategy, and hence 
activities of the union in the workplace or within a broader scope. Trade unions 
might simply negotiate through collective bargaining to enhance the welfare of 
their members, representing their market orientation ideology. Unions which 
choose to negotiate with employers are often forced to compromise to the 
employers’ agenda and avoid frontal approach. Institutionalists further believe 
that trade unions are trying to set ‘the rule of the game’ within the employer-
employee relationship through collective bargaining. Other unions, on the other 
hand, choose to mobilize their members to do collective action to show their 
power to the ‘ruling class’—the employers and thus represent their orientation 
of class struggling. Hyman (2001) argues that there are several conditions 
should be provided to enable mobilization, each will be explained in the next 
section. 
 
3.6.1 Union voice and governance functions in the workplace 
In the workplace, it can be argued that unions have two main functions in 
namely voice and governance functions. Within the collective voice function, 
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trade unions establish desirable working conditions for their members by 
providing discontented employees a communication channel to resolve the 
dispute and thus, avoid quitting (or exit) as the first source of problem solving 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1984: 8).  
Freeman and Medoff further argue that collective voice would benefit both 
parties: employees and employers. For employees, collective voice would help 
them to disclose their true preferences; and put aside fear of dismissal as they 
are protected by other employees as well as the country’s labour laws (p. 9). 
From the employer side, collective voice may prevent them from losing 
employees as problems and grievances would be reported and thus entail lower 
recruitment and training costs as well as prevent “quiet sabotage” or shirking by 
dissatisfied employees (p. 11). 
The second function, the governance function, was initiated by institutionalists, 
as they viewed trade unions ‘as a part of the governance structure of industry 
and a vehicle for promoting industrial democracy (or industrial citizenship) in 
the employment relationship (Kaufman, 2000: 195). Institutionalists believe that 
the collective action provided by trade unions is able to determine “the rule of 
the game” by which the economy operates. A firm is seen as a governmental 
entity as it manages certain resources and develops working rules that determine 
what members may and may not do (ibid. 196).   
Within this function, trade unions are actively involved in collective bargaining 
with the employer in setting the rules of the game. Collective bargaining is 
explained in detail in the following section. 
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3.6.2 Collective bargaining 
Alan Flanders argued that collective bargaining is the activity in which trade 
unions devote most of their time; and constitutes the key means through which 
strategies are enacted. He defined collective bargaining as a process ‘…to 
ensure that when labour is bought and sold (the specific kinds of labour referred 
to) its price and the other terms of the transaction will accord with the provision 
of the agreement’ (Flanders, 1971: 14).  
Thus, his view of what collective bargaining goes beyond the conventional 
argument, which states that collective bargaining is a means whereby unions try 
to defend and improve their members’ terms and conditions of employment. For 
Flanders, collective bargaining has a further function; it is also a rule-making 
process. Trade unions are interested in regulating employment issues that their 
members are concerned about. The rules made by collective bargaining provide 
protection for their members (as cited in McCarthy, 1978: 21). 
The argument of rule-making function is the central theme that makes Flanders’ 
view towards collective bargaining is different with that introduced by the 
Webbs. Flanders argued that collective bargaining is not a replacement for 
individual contracts as proposed by the Webbs. Rather, he suggested that it 
regulates individual bargaining for employees when they sell their labour and 
for employers when they buy it. Thus, workers covered by collective 
agreements remain free to enter into a wage bargain with new employers, 
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provided that the rules in the relevant collective agreements are observed (by 
both parties) (Flanders, 1971: 16). 
In developing his arguments on collective bargaining, Flanders also examined 
the work of Chamberlain and Kuhn (1965). Chamberlain and Kuhn argued that 
the various theories on collective bargaining can be summarised into three 
views, which are (1) the marketing concept; (2) the government concept; and (3) 
the industrial relations concept.  
Their view on the marketing concept is similar to the conventional view of 
collective bargaining: it is a means of contracting for the sale of labour. It is a 
process which determines on what terms labour will continue to be supplied by 
present employees as well as newly hired employees in the future. Wage scale is 
usually the basis of the contract, though other terms may also be included, such 
as shorter hours, longer lunch periods, a vacation plan, and a seniority system 
(Chamberlain and Kuhn, 1965: 113-14). 
The government concept views that the contract defined in the marketing 
concept is a ‘constitution’ for which government for the plant, the company, or 
the industry is based on. The industrial constitution is complied by a joint 
conference of union and management representatives and the agreement 
resulting from a conference generally results from a compromise by both 
parties. The main function of the constitution is to ‘set up organs of government, 
define and limit them, provide agencies for making, executing, and interpreting 
laws for the industry, and means for their enforcement’ (ibid. 121).  
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Collective bargaining, however, does not need to have an analogy of 
government by the state. In the industrial relations view, collective bargaining is 
a natural method of conducting a joint decision-making process on matters 
affecting labour. Employees can participate in the determination of policies 
which regulate their work lives through their representatives in trade unions. 
Thus, collective bargaining, by its very nature, involves worker participation 
through having union (or other employee) representatives in joint decision-
making roles (ibid. 130). 
Chamberlain and Kuhn further argue that these three views are not mutually 
exclusive. In fact, to some extent, these views represent stages of development 
of the bargaining process. They are also a representation of the stages of 
recognition of what collective bargaining is, as well as the different conceptions 
as to what collective bargaining should be (ibid. 137-8).  
There have been several attempts to develop the concept of power in collective 
bargaining; one which has been developed by Chamberlain, who defines 
bargaining power in terms of the costs to each party of agreement relative to the 
cost of them of disagreement (Levinson, 1966). 
Hence, 
Bargaining power of A= 
The costs to B of disagreement with A’s terms 
  The costs to B of agreement with A’s terms   
Conversely, 
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Bargaining power of B= 
The costs to A of disagreement with B’s terms 
  The costs to A of agreement with B’s terms 
 
In a collective bargaining context, the greater the costs to the employer of 
disagreeing (sustaining a strike) as opposed to the costs of agreeing (granting 
the union’s demands), the greater will be the bargaining power of the union. 
Conversely, the greater the costs to the union of disagreeing (calling a strike) as 
opposed to the costs of agreeing (accepting the company’s offer), the greater 
will be the bargaining power of the company. 
Chamberlain’s model, however, has several difficulties in implementation. This 
model does not provide any clues in identifying and quantifying those variables 
affecting the power position of each party in actual bargaining situations. 
However, despite its weakness, this model is able to provide an overall 
framework within which to analyse the concepts and attributes of the union-
employer relationship (ibid. 94). 
It has been argued that when Collective Bargaining fails to reach agreement, 
industrial action such as strikes might occur. Nevertheless, J.R. Hicks, in his 
‘Theory of Wages’ argued that settlement in a bargaining would be achieved 
when parties involved have adequate knowledge (Hicks, 1963: 146); industrial 
actions only occur the parties have acted ‘irrational’ which causes negotiation 
breakdown (Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1969, 36). Other scholars such as Zeuthen 
(1930) and Nash (1950) also emphasised on the rational behaviour in bargaining 
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though different approach was applied. However, Bishop (1964) argued that the 
rational model of bargaining could not estimate the expected benefit obtained 
from giving or not giving more concession towards the other party’s demand.  
In terms of union wage policy, there are at least two forces shaping policy. The 
first is generated from the wants and aspirations of their members for higher 
wages as well as the ambitions of the leaders. Pressure for higher wages, 
however, is contained by economic constraints in the environment where unions 
operate and by resistance from employers. Those constraints sometimes 
convince unions that they could not win a strike or that wage increases will 
cause undesirable reduction in hours or employment (Rees, 1978: 283). 
 
3.6.3 Mobilisation 
Tilly (1978) refers to mobilisation as the process by which a group acquires 
collective control over the resources needed for action. Mobilisation is part of 
collective action commonly done by trade unions to show their ‘root-based 
power’ to the employers, or in Marxist language, ruling class. It is derived from 
the collective interests of workers who experience injustice in the workplace. 
One challenge faced by trade unions is how to bring forward the (individuals) 
feeling of injustice to become collective interest which will lead to member 
mobilisation. Hyman (2001) summarises the necessary factors needed to 
transform the sense of injustice to mobilisation, i.e., attribution, social 
identification, and leadership. 
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An attribution is an explanation for reasons and/or cause of an event. Hewstone 
(1989) classifies attribution into three dimensions of causality: personal (or 
internal) vs. external (or situational), stable vs. unstable and controllable vs. 
uncontrollable. Each attribution will result in different behaviour. For example: 
low workforce militancy can be seen as unstable; which can be changed with 
more campaigning, or as stable; which is a given condition within which the 
union should operate.  
The second factor, social identification is based on the argument that each 
individual has a personal identity (personality/character) and social identity 
(categories to which an individual belong). Thus, the argument suggests that 
each person can think and act individually and collectively depends which facet 
of their identity is currently dominant. For example, the identity can be 
‘switched on’ by the news about strike or by the sight of picketing line. 
Leadership is important in order to shape the attribution of an issue which will 
direct the behaviour of the people within the group. For example, a union leader 
plays an important role in framing an issue (grievance) into the feeling of 
(social) injustice. The language used by the leader is strongly influenced by the 
definition of the people’s interest. The language used by a union leader who 
espouses a market orientation will be different from that used by a leader of 
class-type unionism; while the first emphasis on the interests of particular 
workers, the latter would refer to all working class. 
 
3.7 Union’s relationship with employers: militant vs. partnership  
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Militant or adversarial trade unionism, as Kelly (1996) argues, emphasizes 
mobilization as part of confronting employers and the state with collective 
power and seeking to impose costs on them. Industrial actions such as strikes, 
overtime bans, subordinates go-slow and work to rule are common methods 
used in achieving their objectives. Furthermore, militant unions will not accept 
the idea of non-union consultative committees and insist that the union is the 
only channel of bargaining. The other characteristic of militant unionism 
stresses conflicts of interests between workers and employers and promotes 
adversarial ideology. 
Kelly (1996) also attempts to summarise the difference between militant 
unionism, which support the adversarial ideology and moderate unionism which 
emphasises partnership ideology, as depicted in table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1 Components of union militancy and moderation 
Component Militancy Moderation 
Goals Ambitious demand 
(scale and scope) 
with few 
concessions 
Moderate 
demands with 
some or many 
concessions 
Membership 
resources 
Strong reliance on 
mobilization of 
union membership 
Strong reliance on 
employers, third 
parties or law 
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Institutional 
resources 
Exclusive reliance 
on collective 
bargaining 
Willingness to 
experiment 
with/support non-
bargaining 
institutions. 
Methods Frequent threat or 
use of industrial 
action 
Infrequent threat 
or use of industrial 
action 
Ideology Ideology of 
conflicting interests 
Ideology of 
partnership 
 
Many writers, either academics, trade union officials, or politicians, approach 
the term ‘partnership’ in various ways; therefore, it is difficult to define what 
partnership really is, since each definition covers different features and 
principles of partnership. Guest and Peccei (2001) argue that the benefits of 
partnership will be experienced more by management rather than by its partners. 
Trade unions, for example, adopt the concept of partnership because they have 
to ensure to employers that their existence will benefit the organisation, e.g. 
working together with management in applying working practices that give the 
organisation a greater chance to “win” the intensive global business 
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competition. In other words, it could be argued that unions seek to engage in 
‘partnership’ when they are in a position of weakness.20 
At the level of rhetoric at least, it is argued that the most important key feature 
of partnership is a constructive relationship between trade unions and employers 
and their cooperation in achieving so called ‘common interests’; which are 
mainly organisational success and employment security. These features mean 
that management should start to change their approach of cost-cutting measure, 
especially labour cost; develop and apply fair financial rewards to all of 
employees and share the ‘bad and good time’ of the enterprise together; 
promote two-way communication and recognise unions and/or employees 
representatives; and be aware of the need of investment on training in order to 
gain employment flexibility. 
Partnership is believed to provide an opportunity to trade unions to regain 
influence in the workplace, since partnership requires employee representatives 
as one of the partners to bargain over the ‘distinct interests’. Hence, as Ackers 
and Payne argue, partnership implies a pluralist-voluntarist view (not unitarist), 
which means that conflict is one of its essential features, as well as trade union 
and/or employee representatives who have rights to bargain over the conflict 
(Ackers and Payne, 1998: 533).   
However, Kelly (cited in Ackers et al, 1996) argues that partnerships can result 
in unions becoming too moderate and compromise their central role as 
management opposition who have to fight over employees’ interests. He further 
                                                 
20 And in this context “partnership” could be hence seen as antithetical to Marxian class struggle, as a 
joint commitment to the organisation (or region) under the auspices of “competitiveness” serves to 
fragment the labour movement. 
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argues that partnership will not result in higher power and influence in the 
workplaces, which are shown by increasing membership and collective 
bargaining coverage. Consequently, Kelly suggests that in order to enhance and 
protect their existence and influence, trade unions should remain their 
traditional roles, as militant unions. 
 
3.8 Union structure  
Alongside with the work of Huzzard, Kochan and Katz (1988) argue that 
union’s organizational structure is determined by the choice on goals, strategy 
and bargaining structure as well as influenced by the environmental constraints.  
Fiorito et al. (1991) argue that structures are functions of strategy, which is 
derived from goals chosen.  
They further argue that there are two dimensions of union structure: the vertical 
dimension which corresponds with ‘internal structure’ and horizontal dimension 
which correspond to ‘external structure’ (Fiorito et al, 1991: 111-116). 
Within the vertical dimension, the trade union should make two types of choices 
from two main features: the hierarchy (structuring) and locus of control 
(centralization) of the structure. In terms of structuring, a union may choose a 
type of organizational structure it would implement, whether it would affiliate 
to a national union (or international federation) or be an independent (company 
or national) union. The locus of control on the other hand, would tell the union 
whether the control of the organization is centralized at the national or 
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federation level or local/workplace union is given a complete authority over all 
activities. 
The horizontal dimension, on the other hand, includes a range of decisions 
related to the boundaries that a trade union draws between itself and its 
environment, i.e., the choice of which type of workers should be admitted for 
membership. The membership decision may be based on craft/occupational, 
industrial or general lines (Farnham, 2000: 273-274). Occupational unions are 
exclusive bodies which recruit horizontally across industries. This is the 
traditional type of union organization that has emerged in the UK. However, 
this type is now relatively small in size as the effect of changing occupational 
boundaries, the widening scope of occupational classifications, the de-skilling 
of craftwork due technological changes and the growth of multi-skilling.  
While industrial unions recruit vertically within an industry, general unions 
welcome all workers to become their membership. Their members are: 
1. non-exclusive 
2. from amongst both manual and non-manual workers 
3. horizontally across industries 
4. vertically within industries 
Other decisions should be made as to the relationship among units in the same 
level of the vertical structure which may merge or disassociate with one another 
such as mergers or amalgamations among unions to strengthen their bargaining 
position and gain stronger membership bases.(ibid: 271). Hence, the discussion 
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on union structure, organisation and function is symptomatic of the choices 
facing unions in Huzzards’s strategic choice model outlined in section 3.5.  
 
3.9 Summary 
This chapter discusses the theoretical framework of the thesis by firstly 
outlining two economic theories which have two contrasting views toward trade 
unionism: neo-classical and new institutionalist theories. Neo-classical 
economics rejected the presence of trade unions and regard them as a disruption 
to labour market equilibrium. On the other hand, institutionalists suggested that 
trade unionism influence the labour market (through their collective bargaining) 
as well as other institutions such as government policy. 
Thus, it is important to discuss and understand how trade unions can be 
effective in serving their function, particularly in a globalised environment 
which may threat their bargaining power. Many scholars argue that trade unions 
should start to build a strategy for their own survival and suggest a model of 
union strategy while others suggest strategic choice by which union can choose 
among alternatives. The strategy can be a direct choice such as becoming a 
militant and moderate trade union (Kelly, 1996) or a systematic review/decision 
from their ideologies to their activities such as proposed by Huzzard (2004). 
Huzzard argued that there are four levels of strategic choices that unions have to 
decide. The choice of each level will influence the choice in the following level. 
The levels are trade union’s mission, ideology and identity; scope of activities 
and relationship; relation to employers, members, other unions and civil society; 
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and structures, processes and capacities. These choices are also influences by 
both external and internal factor of the union such as economic context, 
industrial relations systems and employer strategies.  
The emphasis on internal and external factors in Huzzard’s model has led to a 
preference in this thesis. Huzzard’s model will be used as a comprehensive 
model to examine the value, behaviour and approach towards the employer and 
tneir members of each multinational and how they develop union strategy by 
considering the union’s internal and external constraints.   
As research on workplace-level unionism in Indonesia is still very rare, 
examining internal and external factors influencing the strategic choice (or 
strategy) becomes a paramount to give a clear understanding of the environment 
in which unions organise. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 suggests that there has been a changing industrial relations culture in 
Indonesia since the downfall of the New Order regime which was characterised 
by a repressive approach towards trade unions. This new-found freedom has 
generated a significant increase in trade union numbers. On the other hand, the 
1997 financial crisis also resulted in higher unemployment, which could also 
have affected union operation, even though one could argue that the flexibility 
of Indonesian labour market was able to restrain the official unemployment rate 
(Manning, 2000).  
However, as noted, there is very little information that actually explains how all 
these conditions have affected trade unions, particularly industry and 
workplace-level trade unions with a notable exception being the work of Satrya 
and Parasuraman (2007) on trade unionism in the postal industry.  Much of 
current research mainly concerns employment and labour market issues at the 
macro-level. An example of such research is the survey conducted by 
Indonesian Statistics (Biro Pusat Statistik – BPS) whose data is then utilised by 
other researchers to explain particular phenomena (see for example ILO, 2002; 
Manning, 2000). Even though there are several more specific research on 
industrial relations in Indonesia, they are usually held in large numbers of 
 93
companies with different characteristics (for example, Smeru Research Report, 
2003 by Rahayu, S. K. and Sumarto, S.). 
Hence, existing information on industrial relations in Indonesia can show the 
changes that happen from time to time and the consequences that follow. 
However, this is not sufficient enough to explain the questions of how and why 
changes and consequences occur with respect to trade union development. Thus, 
this research is designed to enable a deeper exploration on what is really 
happening in a particular workplace in order to explain the ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
questions.   This chapter outlines the particular research methodologies and 
methods used in this investigation.  
 
4.2 Ontological, epistemological and methodological perspectives. 
The ontological perspective taken in this thesis will be that of constructivism. 
Bryman (2001) states that this position ‘asserts that social phenomena and their 
meanings are continually being accomplished by social actors’. It implies that 
social phenomena and categories are not only produced through social 
interaction but that they are in a constant state of revision’. Clearly there is 
scope for this to occur in case-study research, whereby knowledge is ‘revealed’ 
through an iterative, interactive process of interviewing respondents. What is 
understood about trade unions in Indonesia might change once research is 
undertaken as the participants might provide a new set of perspectives on the 
phenomena being assessed. The author also acknowledges that the interaction 
demonstrated in the research will be mainly based on the participants as well as 
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the author’s own perceptions over the phenomena being assessed. This position 
is the opposite of objectivism, which asserts that social phenomena and their 
meanings have an existence that is independent of social actors (cited in Grix, 
2004: 61). 
There are two principal, opposing epistemological positions within the research 
paradigm. The first, positivism, is defined as an epistemological position that 
advocates application of the methods of the natural sciences to the study of 
social reality and beyond’.  It believes that ‘there are patterns and regularities, 
causes and consequences, in the social world just as there are in the natural 
world (Denscombe, 2002: 14, as cited in Grix, 2004: 81). The advocates of 
positivism assume that there is no dichotomy between what wee see and how 
things really are; that the world is not socially constructed.  
The attractiveness of this epistemological position is that it offers the precision 
and prediction promised by natural science. Nevertheless, positivists rely on 
analysing aggregate data whilst ignoring the context in which data is defined 
and constructed. As such, strict positivists tend to assume that there is no 
dichotomy between what we see (appearance) and how things really are 
(reality). Many positivists would acknowledge this criticism with the response 
that theoretical postulates based on deductive logic and aggregate data seek not 
to assess whether a postulate is “true” but rather, under what conditions would it 
be “true”? 
However, these assumptions can fail to identify the context of a social 
phenomenon being analysed. Whilst there is an objective reality “out there”, the 
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process of knowledge construction itself will involve an element of subjectivity 
in interpretation and as such, can be considered at best as a crude approximation 
of “reality”. One can take the phenomenon of ‘unemployment’ as a simple 
example. A positivist relying on simple aggregate measures could treat 
unemployment data in Indonesia as the same as in the UK. The context that they 
could fail to identify is whereas the unemployed in the UK receive benefits from 
the government, the unemployed in Indonesia do not receive such benefits. 
Thus, the unemployed in Indonesia might be actively seeking for jobs or even 
actually working in the so-called informal sector which is not accounted as ‘a 
job’. 
Positivists also argue that experiments can be conducted in social research, 
abstracting from any outside influences (Grix, 2004: 80-81). Thus, positivists 
believe that regular relationships between social phenomena can be established 
by using theory to generate hypotheses, which can be tested by direct 
observation. An extreme example of this assumption is that of “ceteris paribus” 
in economic theories where the researcher examines one variable in isolation 
from all others. Positivist researchers also believe that the methods they use as 
well as themselves are neutral; thus they do not disturb the phenomenon under 
investigation.  
However, as noted, it is difficult to be value-free in social research. As the 
‘object’ being examined in social research is human being, to ignore the 
influence during the interaction between the researcher and the respondent is not 
possible. The researcher’s point of view might affect the respondent’s 
perceptions and the respondent’s reaction may also affect the researcher’s 
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understanding of a phenomenon. Thus, alternative approach is needed in 
conducting social research, which leads to the second approach, interpretivism. 
Interpretivism is an epistemological position which views that a strategy is 
required that respects the differences between people and the objects of natural 
sciences and therefore requires the social scientists to grasp the subjective 
meaning of social action (Bryman, 2001 as cited in Grix, 2004: 64).  The 
advocates of interpretivism believe that the world is socially constructed 
through the interaction of individuals. Social phenomena do not exist 
independently of our interpretations of them and these interpretations affect 
outcomes. Thus, objective analysis is impossible as the researcher’s personal 
and subjective opinions attitudes and values will to some extent influence the 
analysis.  
The argument held by the interpretivists implicitly has raised the question of 
generalisation of research findings.  If the phenomenon being researched is 
neither time-nor context-free (Guba and Lincoln, as cited in Williams, 2000: 
213), and the analysis is subject to the researcher’s opinion, to what extent can 
findings be ‘transferable’ to another phenomenon? The answer of this question 
is not straightforward. While some interpretivists like Lincoln and Guba (2000) 
are explicit in denying the possibility of generalization of findings, others, like 
Williams (2000) argue that it is the meaning of “generalisation” itself that is 
problematic.  
Williams maintains that there are three definitions of generalisation: total 
generalisation, statistical generalisation, and moderatum generalisation. While 
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total and statistical generalizations are mostly used in natural science, 
moderatum generalisations are the form that is used in interpretive research. It is 
‘where aspects of S can be seen to be instances of a broader recognizable set of 
features’ (Williams, 2000: 215).  However, he also notes the limitation of 
generalisation in interpretive research.  
The first limitation relates to the sampling because the sample chosen is wished 
to infer to a wider population. If it is accepted that generalization of interpretive 
research finding is the goal, the researcher needs a sample that will reflect the 
relevant characteristics of the wider group that is to be generalized. The 
interpretive researchers have to make decision as to what will count as 
representative cases or relevant units. 
The second limitation lies to choosing the categories which can be of very 
different kinds: people, physical characteristics, language, cultural artifacts and 
how these categories interact. While physical characteristics of particular place 
may give a familiar sight to other similar instances, cultural characteristics may 
be more difficult. Thus, interpretivists often maintain theoretical inferences 
where they draw conclusions from their data about necessary relationship 
amongst categories of phenomena rather that making empirical generalizations. 
While total generalisation is impossible according to a strict interpretivist view 
of social science research, this research will address these limitations by 
attempting to interview as large a sample of respondents from both unions and 
management, across different levels of the hierarchy, in different industries. 
Thus, an iterative profile of union activity in Indonesia will be generated, 
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allowing a moderatum approach to generalization to be utilised. Wherever 
possible, standardised interview questions have been used, based on previous 
studies and large statistical surveys, such as the UK WERS, in order to ensure 
compatibility of the research epistemology with existing literature.  
In addition to the debate on the possibility of generalisation in interpretive 
research, the importance of generalisation is also worth discussing. It is said that 
the aim of science is prediction and control, which cannot be accomplished 
without something to be based on.  Thus, many scientists believe that 
generalisations are the be-all and end-all of inquiry (Lincoln and Guba as cited 
in Gomm et al, 2000: 27).  
However, Stake  argues that “good generalisations aid the understanding of 
general conditions, but good generalisations can lead one to see phenomena 
more simplistically that one should” (Stake, in Gomm et al, 2000: 23). In the 
case of interpretivism, Martins argues that interpretivists deny the possibility of 
generalisations and even ignore the issue, but they do generalise their findings. 
Hence, in this research, an interpretivist epistemological position will be used. 
This perspective implies that interview participants will respond to the questions 
or statements given within the research according to their experience, 
understanding, and interpretation of the phenomena being assessed. Subjectivity 
thus becomes a key issue in the research process. 
In terms of methodology, as such, while quantitative research will be conducted 
to identify aggregate trends and issues, the primary emphasis will be on 
qualitative research. This is because qualitative research enables the exploration 
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of complex phenomena pertaining to the labour process. Indeed, many industrial 
relations and organisational variables are difficult to quantify and are thus not 
readily amenable to aggregate data analysis. Barton and Lazarsfeld (1979) argue 
that qualitative research can initiate exploration, which helps to analyse research 
objects, identify indicators and establish classification and typologies (cited in 
Sarantakos, 1998: 6, emphasis added).  
 
4.3 Research Methods 
Case studies were conducted on four industries where multinationals and unions 
were present in Indonesia. Case studies are one of most common ways to 
conduct qualitative enquiry, but they are neither new nor essentially qualitative 
(Stake, as in Denzin and Lincoln, 2000: 435). Yin (2003) defines a case study as 
‘an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident’ (Yin, 2003: 13). As such, case studies may comprise a mixture 
of qualitative (e.g., interviews) and quantitative (e.g., surveys) methods – the 
key defining characteristic of case studies as an epistemology is the emphasis on 
contextual, primary data. 
Case studies may suffer from the problem of generalization and that the 
presence of researchers can affect the phenomenon that is being examined 
(Michelson and Baird as cited in De Ruyter, 2002: 105). As Denscombe (1998) 
states that the extent to which case study can be generalized depends on how far 
the case study example is similar to others of its type (cited in Bell, 2002: 11). 
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However, despite their weaknesses, case studies allow a researcher to 
concentrate on a specific situation and enable identification of the various 
interactive processes at a workplace that can be crucial for the success or failure 
of a system which may remain hidden in a large-scale survey (Bell, 2002: 10-
11).  Moreover, Yin also argues that the case study method would be used if 
contextual conditions are deliberately accounted for as an important part of the 
phenomenon being researched (Yin, 2003: 15). Case studies are needed in 
understanding industrial relations and organizational variables, as they can shed 
light on the labour process and thus help to penetrate the ‘black box’ of firms’ 
practices. In this thesis, the emphasis was on qualitative (interview) research. 
Interviewing was the most feasible method used for this research given the time, 
resourcing and distance constraints. Whilst surveys can be very helpful in 
gaining initial data, a survey was not feasible, as it was costly to send the 
questionnaires to the respondents in Indonesia from the UK. Another difficulty 
of conducting surveys would also have come from physically collecting the 
questionnaires from the respondents and hence ensuring a sufficient response 
rate. Initial data was obtained from telephone interviews with union leaders 
from each of the trade unions being studied in order to gain initial sight of the 
conditions and the context that influence the unions operations (and obtain 
further interview contacts).  
In this research, case studies were conducted in four multinational firms from 
four different industries in Indonesia which recognise trade unions.  Thus, it was 
expected to draw some comparison on trade union behaviour across industries, 
as distinctive characteristics may occur in each of those industries. Moreover, 
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given the shortage of the research on trade unionism in Indonesia, cross-
sectional research may provide a preliminary insight of the nature of unionism 
in the industry being studied that could be explored further in subsequent 
studies. 
Firm-level rather than industry-wide research was chosen as this would ensure 
the depth and richness of data generated in order to develop a fuller 
understanding of union behaviour in a given context. Main data was collected 
through in-depth interviews with trade union officials and members working in 
multinationals in addition to managers who dealt with labour issues to examine 
employer strategy towards industrial relations which is paramount for union 
recognition and freedom to organise as the support and protection for the 
government were still questionable. 
. Thus, transcripts and tape recordings during the interviews were the main 
sources of data analysed. However, greater challenges were experienced when 
trying to interview union members and non-member employees for triangulation 
purposes. The main difficulties in interviewing union members and employees 
(according to union representatives) were the work load and permission from 
their direct manager to leave their jobs during working time (while they had 
limited break time). There was also a concern related to ethical compliance if 
the union members and employees were interviewed without the consent from 
the union and/or managers (and this research did not include employees as the 
respondents due to this constraint).   
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Contacting the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Jakarta was the first 
effort in obtaining trade union contacts. Information on trade union federations 
that affiliated with the ILO was provided, from which contact persons from 
several trade unions that operate in multinationals were obtained.  
Furthermore, a preliminary literature review was conducted in order to provide 
insights on the phenomena on industrial relations in multinationals as well as 
trade unionism in Indonesia. Material analysed included labour regulations, 
Indonesian labour force surveys, historical documents on Indonesian trade 
unions, and documents outlining industrial relations practices in multinationals. 
The sources to gather these data were from the collection of Indonesia’s labour 
laws and bills, ILO reports on Indonesian labour market, existing research 
reports on industrial relations (preferably in multinationals), and statements 
from trade union officials which were drawn from newspapers. 
Furthermore, documentary analysis was also conducted as a complementary to 
the interviews. Each multinational’s Collective Agreement as well as company 
profiles and news from newspapers and websites were read and interpreted to 
develop a clear understanding of the context within which the unions organised. 
 
4.4. Case Studies in Multinationals 
Case studies were conducted in four multinationals which are located in Jakarta, 
Bekasi, and Tangerang. As four case studies were conducted, time-management 
was very essential in order to be in line with the schedule. Thus, a preliminary 
approach to trade union officials and managers from designated multinational 
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firms was started simultaneously with the writing of early chapters of this PhD 
thesis. Another emergent problem was the access to participants. As noted in the 
problems involved in trying to interview workers, labour use is a sensitive issue. 
Hence, it was rather difficult to find managers who were willing to be 
participants in this research. Managers are important as they play a central role 
in trade union recognition; hence, their information would be used together with 
those from trade union officials from the same firms. In this context, 
cooperation was sought through guaranteeing confidentiality and anonymity in 
the case study research, in addition to stressing the impartial, academic, nature 
of the research.   
The first multinational studied operated in the automotive industry. They have 
operated in Indonesia for more than three decades and have now become one of 
the biggest car producers in the country. Employing more than 5,000 
employees, this company has had a long history of union recognition. The union 
in this multinational is affiliated with the All-Indonesian Workers Union 
(Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia – SPSI) federation, within the section of 
Metal, Electronic, and Machinery union.  
The second multinational studied has operated in Indonesia for more than 40 
years and is a well-established foreign bank in Indonesia, employing around 300 
employees and recognizes union in its workplace. Organizing half of the total 
employees, the union in the multinational has been affiliated with All-
Indonesian Workers Association (Asosiasi Pekerja Indonesia – Aspek 
Indonesia) since 1998. 
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A multinational operating in the textile industry was the third participant. This 
multinational has been operating in Indonesia since 1976. The union in this 
company is facing great challenges since the company has implemented a 
significant change in their effort to survive increasing competition. Currently 
organising more than 1,000 workers, the union has affiliated with the National 
Workers Union (Serikat Pekerja Nasional – SPN) federation since the 
democratization era. 
The last multinational studied in this thesis is a manufacturer and supplier of 
vehicle parts around the world. It is also a key supplier to the first multinational 
in this research.  It started operating in Indonesia in 1975 and now employs 
approximately 2,000 employees. The union is now an in-house (enterprise) 
union after detaching themselves from a union federation in 2000. It currently 
organises approximately 1,400 employees across both establishments in Jakarta 
and Bekasi. 
The union interviews were semi-structured and issues were discussed around 
the following questions: 
1. What was the relationship between the union and the management and how 
the respondents appraised this relationship in achieving union’s objectives. 
2. The respondents were asked to describe the union’s strategy in dealing with 
management and whether this strategy has ever changed. 
3. How the respondents assessed the Indonesian economic and social context 
as affecting union operation.  
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4. The issues that the union was concerned with and whether these were 
discussed in collective bargaining. 
5. The type of consultative mechanisms that union use. 
6. The description of union structure and the nature of the union’s relationship 
with its members. 
7. The attitudes towards, and procedures for taking industrial action. 
 
Management was involved in this research for the purpose of information 
balance. Managers were approached by sending them a formal request letter or 
phoning them directly. A personal approach was followed after a response to 
confirm their willingness as well as for scheduling purpose. 
The manager interviews were semi-structured with the key questions being as 
follows: 
1.Why did the company decide to recognize a union in the workplace? 
2.How did managers see union activity as affecting the success of the Company. 
3.Management strategy in dealing with union and whether this strategy has ever 
changed. 
4.How management reacted towards a hypothetical drop in sales in terms of 
labour force. 
5.Respondents were also asked to provide reasons as to why they thought 
Indonesia was attractive as a receiver of FDI. 
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6.What improvements respondents wanted to see in Indonesia to maintain an 
attractive environment for foreign investment. 
 
4.5 Ethical Issues 
The nature of the research was voluntary and was fully explained to all 
respondents at the start of the interview. All of the participants were provided 
with the opportunity of viewing a draft of the interview transcript and recording 
to enable them to verify and edit their statements. Trade union leaders and 
management were also to be given the opportunity to have the copies of the 
final report of the case study for approval. Furthermore, all information was 
treated with the strictest confidentiality and anonymity which would remain 
during every stage of this research.  All name and subject identifier data was 
kept in secure storage and destroyed at the conclusion of the research. 
 
4.6 Number of Interview Respondents 
For each of the multinationals studied, the number of respondents involved is 
shown in the following table: 
Table 4.1 Number of interview respondents 
Case Study* 1 2 3 4 
Managers 7 5 3 4 
Union Reps 6 6 7 7 
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Union Members 
(workers) 
-- 1 1 2 
* Case study 1: Automotive multinational; case study 2: textile multinational; 
case study 3: foreign bank; case study 4: automotive component multinational. 
 
The number of managers, union representatives, and union members 
interviewed in the research is not the same for each multinational as the access 
to managers was rather difficult in banking-service multinational; while union 
members were not accessible in the automotive multinational. The interviews 
covered all the issues being explored and thus, were expected to generate 
sufficient information. In addition, some interviews were also held with an ILO 
representative and two federation unionists from two key unions in Indonesia.  
The first key union was a union confederation which was established in 2003 
and currently affiliates with ten union federations from varied sectors, such as 
education, textile, mining, health, forestry, banking, etc. According to the 
verification by the Ministry of Employment, the union has around 2.9 million 
members, but the union claims that the number is actually higher. The 
difference occurred because verification needs to follow time-consuming highly 
bureaucratic procedures. Thus, not all union members have been successfully 
registered in the Ministry of Employment. This union has various types of 
members, from low-skilled manual workers like those working in assembly 
lines to skilled workers like those who work in education or banking sectors.  
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The second key union participant interviewed in this research was from a union 
federation which had actually been established since 1972 as a sector of the 
SPSI (the only union being recognised during the New Order period). However, 
in 1999, they detached themselves from the SPSI and formed an independent 
union called the Textile and Leather Union. They changed their name again in 
2002 as the result of the union’s general congress to enable them to recruit 
members from other sectors.  Currently they have approximately 436,000 
members, showing a significant decrease since the first time they became an 
independent union, which was about 700,000 members. According to the 
representative, the main causes of the contraction were massive dismissals and 
the increased use of contract workers that has been legitimated by Law No. 13 
Year 2003.  
 
 
4.7 Case study findings: An Introduction 
Each multinational studied has long recognised unions and regarded them as 
their “partner”. There was, however, a different pattern of relationship among 
the companies. Both management and the union in the automotive multinational 
were facing hesitation as a change of ownership has altered the management 
system and thus their relationship.  While the union in the foreign bank said that 
they will not conduct a strike as this is not what its members’ preference in 
achieving its objectives, the union of the textile industry, on the other hand, has 
conducted several industrial actions as reactions to management’s strategic 
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changes. The union in the vehicle-parts multinational prefer to avoid an 
industrial action as they had had experienced a negative affect of this action 
several years ago.  It can be argued that the nature of industry will affect the 
union-management relationship.  
These findings are examined and described further in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 5  
MULTINATIONAL IN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
 
This chapter presents the findings of the case study in the automotive company. 
This multinational has recognised unions since it commenced operations in 
Indonesia. Section 5.1 provides the overview of the Company and the union, 
while section 5.2 examines the union-management relationship and the changes 
that have occurred in the relationship due to the change in ownership. Section 
5.3 describes the Collective agreement process and coverage with some of the 
major clauses being listed down, followed by the union’s internal and external 
constraints based on Huzzard’s strategic choice model (Section 5.4). This 
chapter ends with an evaluation of the union’s strategic choices given the 
internal and external constraints faced by the union. 
 
5.1. Overview 
5.1.1 The Company 
The Company commenced operations in Indonesia in 1971 as a car distributor. 
To support its business in Indonesia, it gradually set up another three 
subsidiaries dealing with assembly, body components manufacturing and 
machine production. In every subsidiary, a union or employee association was 
formed and recognised by management.  
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The abundant population of Indonesia and the country’s rapid economic growth 
in 1970s were the major reasons for investment. The sales of this company in 
Indonesia are one of the biggest sales around the world.  As manager 1 claims: 
 
“In terms of sales, this country is number six in the world. Last year we sold 
180,000 units here. Our position is after USA, Japan, Thailand, Australia, and 
Canada. So you can see how important this country is for us. This year may be 
we’ll be number ten. There is a slow down, but we’re still one of the top ten.” 
 
However, the Indonesian branch could not sell as many units as expected in 
2006; as a result, the Indonesian market was no longer among the top ten 
markets for the Company. External factors such as lower purchasing power for 
many Indonesians, which was triggered by higher fuel prices; and more intense 
competition from China were suspected as the main reasons for reduced sales. 
These factors are discussed further in Section 5.4 (external factors: economic 
context). 
 
Table 5.1 Top 10 Markets in terms of sales (1 unit= 1,000)  
  2004 2005 2006 
1 USA 2,060.0 USA 2,260.3 USA  2,542.5 
2 Japan 1,758.8 Japan 1,713.1 Japan 1,692.3 
3 Thailand    234.2 Thailand    278.0 China    318.6 
4 Australia   206.7 Australia    208.8 Thailand    289.1 
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5 Canada    170.2 China    183.5 Australia    221.0 
6 Indonesia    140.0 Indonesia     179.1 Canada    195.8 
7 UK   138.1 Canada    175.8 
Saudi 
Arabia    152.0 
8 Taiwan   135.3 Taiwan    151.2 
South 
Africa    149.1 
9 Italy   128.7 UK    138.5 Germany    141.1 
10 Germany   120.4 Germany    130.5 UK    140.1 
          Indonesia     123.7 
Source: company’s up-close 2007 
 
Management also claimed that they have contributed to employment and 
industrialisation since then. They argue, however, that the advantages of 
investing in Indonesia are gradually disappearing, particularly after the financial 
crisis in 1997, which led to political and social uncertainty. Management 
concerns over the current condition of Indonesia will be discussed in Section 4.  
In 1989, the four subsidiaries were merged into one operating entity for 
efficiency and competitiveness reasons. The majority stock owner for this 
company was the Indonesian partner company.  
The automotive industry is one of the industries that have been highly affected 
by the major changes that have taken place in Indonesia since 1998. The 1997 
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crisis led to lower purchasing power for many Indonesians and hence also 
resulted in lower domestic demand for cars. This condition has been worsened 
by the situation where the political environment is still not stable; in addition to 
perceived problems of corruption and lack of economic infrastructure - which 
was revealed by manager 2: 
 
“There are many things that Indonesia has to change…. corruption, for example. 
If you have those kinds of things, it means that you have to change them. 
Otherwise, overseas investors like us would be less attracted. The government 
should be clean and transparent and also fair. Another thing is that, when a 
country is becoming affluent it means that its social infrastructure; say, roads, 
electricity, gas and water supply - and from our perspective - industrial 
infrastructure, need to be improved”. 
  
It should be noted that only one car model is manufactured by the company in 
Indonesia. As such, the Indonesian establishment must “compete” with 
establishments elsewhere in the SE Asian region. However, it is prescient to 
note that none of the CEOs and managers regard the union as a threat to 
continued operation in Indonesia and the company has invested new plant and 
equipment to produce a second model (given the still relatively large latent 
domestic demand).  
In terms of labour costs, both management and the union agree that Indonesia 
still provides relatively cheap labour which can continue to attract 
multinationals. However, the CEO stated that as labour costs rise with 
development, a country such as Indonesia would need to develop other sources 
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of competitive advantage and hence increase productivity in order to maintain 
its attractiveness for multinationals. 
A significant change took place again in 2003 in the Company, when it was split 
into two subsidiaries, each handling manufacturing and distribution. The 
majority owner of the distribution subsidiary is still the Indonesian partner 
company. However, 95 per cent of the manufacturing subsidiary is now owned 
by the Japanese parent company. The research for this chapter was done in the 
manufacturing subsidiary where the significant change of ownership took place. 
The union in the manufacturing company is the same union as before the split; 
and it affiliates with one of the biggest union federations in Indonesia, the SPSI. 
Management decided to recognise the union; as the union was a part of the 
company’s history, because it has an integral presence in the establishment and 
the fact that they wanted a “partner” from the employees in order to more 
effectively manage the company. Management representatives stated that the 
union was a necessary presence within the Company; as the union provides a 
communication function, whereby the union communicates targets and changes 
from the management to the employees and communicates employees’ 
aspirations to the management. As was stated by one manager (manager 3): 
 
“Through them we speak to the employees. We also try to maintain a good 
working environment with them, so that the employees would be less likely to 
engage in dispute activity if they are not satisfied. I think it’s the most effective 
way of communicating with the employees.” 
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5.1.2 The Union 
Following the merger of the companies in 1989, the unions and employee 
associations from four (previous) companies were also merged into one union. 
According to a previous unionist, who then became the IR manager and has 
now retired, this merger of the unions took one year to settle down. Among the 
unions, two of them had already affiliated with the SPSI, while the other two 
were in-house unions. According to him : 
 
“In 1988, the management told us about the plan to merge. We made a merger 
committee for the unions in 1988 and on April 1989 we declared a new union 
together. It was a new union, so each of the previous union dissolved after they 
report their activities and financial status to the members. And as agreed, the 
new union affiliated with SPSI” 
 
After a negotiation among the unions, a new union was formed whereas the old 
ones were dissolved. In terms of hierarchical union structure, the new union was 
affiliated with the SPSI but the locus of control thus the authority was given to 
the work-place union. 
The majority of employees in the manufacturing company are males; 
comprising around 98 per cent of the 5,400 workers. The union representatives 
were all males (at the time of writing). When asked whether female members 
were reluctant to become representatives within a male-dominated environment, 
one of the union representatives said that the work tenure of the female workers 
was the main reason. Most of the female employees had not worked in the 
Company for a long time. Indeed, most of them resigned when they got married. 
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However, it was not possible to further ascertain this view as interviewing 
female members was not possible during the field research.  
Since the Company has a policy that all employees will automatically become 
union members except if they explicitly refuse it, the union currently organises 
around 5,000 employees in the workplace, or approximately 99 per cent of the 
workforce. With this policy, there is no recruitment program applied by the 
union for seeking new members.  
Referring to the figure below, the union would choose mobilisation as they 
organised existing members and did not plan to expand their membership as 
technically they are a workplace union (given the authority to manage despite 
affiliation with a national federation) and there was new issues offered to their 
members. However, despite choosing a traditional militant approach, the union 
was the employer’s partner in creating ‘harmonious’ employment relations as 
will be further discussed in the next section. 
 
Figure 5.1 Level 2 strategic choices for trade unions (adapted from Ansoff, 
1968) 
 
        Existing issues/      New issues/ 
         service mix      service mix 
 
                                 
 
Existing members 
 
 
 
 
New members 
 
 
 
Mobilization 
 
 
Service development 
 
Recruitment/ 
recognition 
 
 
Diversification 
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Nonetheless, despite the high density of membership and company recognition, 
there are no full-time union professionals in this company - even though the 
Company has been willing to fund such arrangements. Concerns were typically 
expressed over career paths and income. As union executive committee member 
1 stated: 
 
“To be a full timer somebody has to be ready with the consequences. First, how 
his performance will be assessed; second, is about his income. Even in the CLA 
we mutually agree that 5 people can be full timers, the question is, how the 
company will guarantee the performance and income of the full timers. We 
actually can make an MoU (Memorandum of Understanding on the guarantee of 
income and career progression) with Human Resource Department but our 
career and income really depend on our direct manager. So, becoming a full 
timer here so far means that in a month we only come to our job site once.” 
 
It can be argued that the union holds the ‘pluralist’ ideology in underlying their 
position vis a vis the company (Martin, 1989: 16). As implicitly mentioned in 
the previous paragraph, the union is involved in collective bargaining ‘to ensure 
that when labour is bought and sold (the specific kinds of labour referred to) its 
price and the other terms of the transaction will accord with the provision of the 
agreement’ (Flanders, 1971: 14).  
The collective agreement includes both the substantive (e.g. salary, working 
hours, bonuses, allowances, overtime) and procedural (e.g. grievances, disputes, 
redundancies, negotiation) terms of agreement. The major clauses of the 
collective agreement will be depicted later in the section 5.3. 
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Although the union affiliates with the SPSI which organises employees based 
on sectors (in this case within the metal, electronic, and machinery sectors), the 
bargaining process is indeed conducted at the level of the enterprise and the 
(branch of the) union can be considered as an “enterprise union”. However, a 
unionist claimed that the union is independent from management control (union 
executive committee member 3). 
 
5.2 Union-Management relationship 
Both management and the union suggested that their relationship in the 
workplace was relatively harmonious. However, it is apparent that this 
relationship appears to be under pressure, as seen below. The concept of 
“partnership at work” was initiated by both parties and has been codified in the 
CLA since the 1990s. The company representatives argued that they needed to 
have a union engaged as their partner; a posture indicative of the ‘sophisticated 
modern: consultor’ in the Purcell and Sissons (Legge, 2005: 76-77) typology of 
management styles.  
However, both parties admitted that there were fluctuations in the relationship, 
caused by differences in expectations and in understanding the conditions of the 
Company. Management felt that gaps were widened particularly when a new 
union leader was appointed. In their view, how to deal with the union really 
depended on the style of the union leader. Whilst succession planning (or 
regeneration) in the managerial level is well-planned, some managers felt that 
the union did not have a clear concept of regeneration. Failure in appointing an 
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experienced leader would lead to widening the gap in expectations; which is 
happening currently. This dependence on the union leader’s style in dealing 
with management was also admitted to by the union. However, the union leader 
was aware that leader-oriented dependency should be replaced by a systems-
oriented approach (systematic policies and procedures in place). As he 
mentioned: 
 
“So far the union’s strategy really has depended on the leader’s style; and every 
leader’s style would differ, so this is the challenge that we unions have: to 
depend on systems and not depend on individuals. In the past as we have found 
the pattern depending on leader’s style was not a problem. But in the future, the 
challenge in dealing with management is that they now want us to depend on a 
system; to have more formal procedures in place.  This is what we have to work 
with now.” 
 
 
The union argued that this was caused by the major change in ownership; the 
union suggested that there were changes in the way management communicated 
with them. The union representatives said that the relationship which was now 
more formal was not their preference. This was due to the fact that the Japanese 
parent company is listed in New York Stock Exchange, which requires good 
documentation of any information in order to be able to be monitored. However, 
the union argued that when they were willing to agree to a management 
proposal, management were reluctant to document every commitment and 
decision made. Management representatives claimed that they needed 
“guidance” from Head Office before documenting decisions. However, in 
practice, the parent company gave management considerable autonomy over 
 120
operational matters in Indonesia, apart from decisions regarding financial 
matters. This independency is guided by a regulation which is called ‘the article 
of associate’: that management in a branch is able to make decisions based on 
what is stated in the regulation. 
Thus, despite the promotion of partnership at work, both management and the 
union have started questioning their strategy in dealing with each other. The 
union leader thinks that they will have to change their strategy in dealing with 
management. The leader, however, is still not sure what sort of new strategy 
they will take. Management also suggested that the union was becoming less 
compliant and not willing to compromise to the same extent as previously: 
 
“There have been some changes. In 2001, with the previous representatives in 
the union… communication went well, the relationship was OK. But with the 
new representatives, sometimes all of us become silent in the middle of 
negotiations [because of disagreement]. The new representatives often advocate 
members who are non-performers who make mistakes. They gradually changed 
though, but there is still an impression that some of them ask us to negotiate on 
issues that we think are our sole prerogative” (manager 4). 
 
Evident from the above is the important nature of personal contacts in the 
bargaining process (given the lack of involvement of professional union 
officers); and consequent informal channels of communication. However, more 
importantly, a less favourable product market post-1997 has translated into an 
erosion of “trust” and “partnership” in the workplace, as profit margins are 
squeezed and the Company hence seeks additional “concessions” from the 
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union. Also, as noted above, it is not yet apparent that the union appears to be 
adopting a more truculent posture in dealing with management. 
 
5.3 Collective agreement process and coverage 
Given the presence of a union and a management inclined to ‘partnership’, 
terms and conditions of employment are negotiated through collective 
bargaining, serving as the rules of the game in a society (in this case, in 
employment relationship) which directs individuals towards particular 
behaviour (Furubotn and Richter 2005: 7; North 1990: 2) while also 
representing the union’s market orientation as the substance of the CLA was 
mainly that of ensuring the welfare of the members. The scope of bargaining is 
establishment-wide; thus there is one collective agreement (CLA) covering all 
employees (excluding senior managers - their conditions are decided by the 
company but based on the CLA). The CLA is reviewed every three years by a 
committee that is approved by both the union and management. The length of 
CLA negotiation is usually 1-2 months given that both parties have made 
proposals and exchange them to be examined. The major clauses in the CLA are 
reproduced in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2 Major clauses of collective agreement 
1(4) The union The union is The Metal, Electronic, 
and Machinery Union All-Indonesian 
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Workers Union (SP LEM-SPSI)  
3 The coverage of the 
collective agreement 
The collective agreement applies to all 
employees except employees levels 
VII onwards because of their 
functions. Some matters can be set 
solely by the company by considering 
the collective agreement. (e.g. 
functional allowances for managers) 
5 Employer-union 
relationship 
The employer and union work together 
in creating a harmonious industrial 
relations environment. Hence, they 
have regular meetings every 2 months 
to discuss about employment affairs 
and evaluate the implementation of the 
collective agreement. 
7(3) Union facilities As requested by the union, the 
employer can give permission to up to 
five employees to organise the union 
on a full-time basis without lessening 
their rights as employees. 
8 Assurance for the 
union 
The company assures the union that a 
lockout is the last alternative when 
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they find deadlock in negotiating with 
the union. 
9 Assurance for the 
company 
The union assures that strikes are the 
last alternatives they will undergo 
when they cannot reach agreement 
with the company. 
13 Performance appraisal Performance appraisals are conducted 
twice a year by the manager of the 
employees that evaluate the quality 
and quantity of work, initiatives, work 
relationship, and discipline. 
14 Work classes and 
classification 
Employees are classified into 12 levels 
and the arrangement within the job 
structure is as follow:                   
 group head                          (IV-V);             
line head                              (V-VI);             
section head                      (VII-VIII);           
department head                (IX-X);               
division head                       (XI-XII). 
19 Working days and 
hours 
Working days are five days in a week 
Monday to Friday, except for security 
and maintenance officers. There are 
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three shifts for the plant employees:   
Shift 1: 8 hours a day between 7.15-
16.30; Shift 2: 7 hours a day between 
16.15-24.00; Shift 3: 7 hours a day 
between 23.45-7.15. 
21 Overtime work Overtime work is voluntary in nature, 
except under special circumstances, 
such as: under an emergency situation 
that can endanger somebody's life, 
plant worker, when the worker who 
continues his work has not come, when 
there are works that have to be 
completed immediately. 
25 Menstrual leave Female employees have the right to 
take menstrual leave two days a 
month. 
28 Productivity Productivity improvement is a 
requirement to maintain and enhance 
company development and thus the 
company created a TQM Committee 
that involves the union.  
35 Remuneration Remuneration consists of base salary 
and allowances  
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36 Base salary Base salary is based on the classes of 
employees and hence, there are 12 
levels of base salary whose amount is 
evaluated every year. The amount of 
the minimum and maximum amount of 
base salary is decided by the company 
by concerning minimum wage applied. 
However, the rate of wages for each 
position is not written in the CLA. 
37 Allowances and 
incentives 
Managerial-position allowance, 
transport allowance, meals, work-shift 
allowance, business travel allowance, 
and full-attendance incentives. 
39 Salary increase Salary increase as a reward of 
performance is given once a year in 
January based on the performance 
appraisal; salary increase as a 
adjustment of living cost is given once 
a year based on the change of the 
Consumer Price Index; salary increase 
as a means to increase employees' 
quality of life is given once a year on 
January, based on the negotiation with 
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the union.  
43 Bonus The company pays the bonuses to the 
employees every year as a share of 
profit. The amount of the bonuses is 
discussed with the union on November 
and is paid to the employees on 
December. 
60 Employee of the year The employee of the year is chosen by 
a committee that is formed by the 
company and the union. 
95 Grievances 
settlements 
Employees must firstly say their 
complaints to their manager. If the 
action taken is not satisfying they can 
consult their complaints to a higher 
manager. If the steps taken are still not 
satisfactory, the employee can report it 
to the union and the union will discuss 
it with the company. If no agreement 
can be reached, the settlement will be 
set based on Law No. 13 Year 2003. 
 
The process of CLA negotiation is indeed one of the main union concerns of the 
change, which they regard as a very fundamental and worrying change. As the 
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parent company now has majority ownership, adopting a Japanese system is 
reasonably possible and indeed is starting to happen. The CLA in the parent 
company is only a general agreement that can last for 20 years, while the details 
are put in another agreement that can be changed anytime. Furthermore, as part 
of the requirements of being listed in the New York Stock Exchange, is the 
development of a “code of conduct”. The unionists believe the changes will be 
significantly different from the previous espoused values of the Indonesian 
partner company. 
 
“Well, now the company is proposing that we gradually have to make a code of 
conduct; and separate the issues which are included in CLA and code of 
conduct. For example, we only talk about the amount of money in the CLA - but 
the guidance of implementation and rules will no longer be part of the CLA. 
And this is definitely not our previous environment anymore. We became aware 
of this in 2005 and the change has not been fully implemented yet because we 
don’t feel comfortable with this.” (union executive committee member 1) 
 
 
Union representatives argue that a perceived breach of conditions outlined in 
CLAs can be brought before the Labour Court for a hearing. In contrast, they 
argue that breaches of a “code of conduct” cannot be brought before the Labour 
Court. This lack of a policing mechanism is thus a major cause for concern. 
 
5.4. Union’s internal and external constraints 
5.4.1 Internal Factors 
Union strategy: past and current 
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The union in the Company does not have a clear organising strategy. Rather, it 
tends to behave in a reactive and ad-hoc manner. Their actions are based on the 
so-called shared company value as well as the leadership of the union leader. As 
the leader said: 
 
“Honestly, there is no standard strategy currently. Maybe it is more intuitive in 
nature; there is a guidance or commitment, but again, it is not written… HR….. 
when they have a strategy they don't share it with union. The union, when we 
have a strategy, it’s not written; so it’s a kind intuitive management, but is the 
spirit of value is that union can exist and go forward because of the company, 
the union grows because the company grows, and the company grows because 
of the union…. So, so far the union’s strategy really depends on leader’s style, 
and every leader’s style would differ.” 
 
 
However, unionists are aware that they have to create and implement a system 
and strategy to be able to face future challenges, which they predict will be 
more intensive, given that the Company is a global player. 
The need of developing a new and clear strategy in facing management is more 
prominent after the ownership takeover form the Indonesian partner company to 
the Japanese headquarter. Union representatives suspected that there would be a 
new industrial relations pattern implemented under the new system. As noted, 
one their main concerns is over the difference between the Japanese and 
Indonesian CLA. The union is concerned that there would be a legal 
enforcement problem if a Japanese-style CLA were to be implemented in 
Indonesia and hence, they would have to develop a new strategy in facing this 
possibility. The union feels very uncertain in dealing with this situation. 
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“The main problem is, union reps needs competency to be able to understand 
this challenge, how this challenge will not make us forget the basic values. The 
environment will change, and so will the industrial relations pattern…. I feel so 
sad about this… we were going to move forward to the next level but now we 
are facing the downturn in industrial relations. We have to find the new 
adjustment to be able to reach new equilibrium and it will take lot of time…. 
Definitely, we have to be ready for a new strategy.” (union committee member 
1). 
 
Tensions within levels of the union hierarchy 
In communicating with their members and providing the union voice function, 
union representatives have created a hierarchical system to ensure the 
effectiveness of communication. 
The layer that communicates directly with the union representatives (branch 
executive) is that of the ‘koordinator pleno’ (hereafter referred as coordinators). 
Coordinators are appointed in each department in both plants (Sunter and 
Karawang). During the research, there were 13 coordinators in both plants. Each 
coordinator is responsible for communicating with the plenos; whose numbers 
range between 6-27 people in each department (in total there were 175 plenos 
during the research); depending on the size of the department represented. The 
plenos, in turn, are responsible for communicating information to the rest of the 
members. 
The efficiency of this hierarchical mechanism, however, is questionable. Union 
representatives said that the coordinators and plenos have done their jobs very 
well in conveying top-down information. However while top-down information 
flow is effective, there is less satisfaction over the efficacy of relaying bottom-
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up information. The capability of plenos and coordinators and the preference of 
ordinary members are the underlying reasons of this condition. 
Union representatives expect that plenos and coordinators try to solve any 
disputes that happen in the workplace before they bring it to the reps. However, 
according to one union representative (union representative 1), not all plenos 
and coordinators are able to do this effectively. Many of them do not have the 
ability to solve member grievances with the relevant manager(s). Rather, they 
often bring any problems directly to union representatives. 
“When it is top-down information, we communicate through the relevant 
mechanisms, so they know from the coordinators who then inform the plenos 
then to members…. but when it is a complaint from the members, this 
mechanism is not effective. Members usually come to the union office directly 
rather than discuss it with plenos because many plenos are unable to settle the 
grievances. What we expect is that plenos are able to be the bridge between the 
members and management so grievances that can be settled do not have to go to 
the reps.” (union representative 1) 
 
Furthermore, 
 
“There are plenos and coordinators who are not confident in fulfilling their 
responsibilities. They actually have discretion to negotiate with the department 
managers on grievances issues. They have to be able to make judgment, when to 
handle a problem, and when to defer to the representatives. But no, some of 
them just directly talk to us without trying to solve the problem first” (union 
representative 5) 
 
Some of the members, on the other hand, prefer to raise their grievances directly 
with union representatives rather than following the grievances procedures as 
stated in the CLA - where they should consult their problems with their direct 
managers, the managers in the higher level, and with the union representatives if 
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no solution met. Union representatives see this condition has created 
unnecessary responsibilities for them. 
 
“Many members prefer to talk about their problem directly to the union 
representatives. I’m not sure….whether they are afraid to talk to their direct 
boss. But this practice gives us unnecessary responsibilities, as if the union 
office is a place to say their complaints” (union executive committee member 3) 
 
 
The ineffectiveness of the plenos in assisting union members is argued as a 
factor creating the reluctance of union members in dealing grievances with their 
direct managers. Therefore, they prefer to seek for assistance directly from the 
union executive committees in solving their problems for their job security. 
However, the fact that no union members were able to be interviewed in the 
research has made it difficult to explore the reasons of such practice. 
 
Figure 5.2 Union’s information/grievances flow 
 
Union representatives (executive committee): 11 people) 
Coordinators Coordinators Coordinators
pleno pleno pleno pleno pleno pleno pleno pleno pleno 
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Financial Resources 
The union funds most of its activities from membership fees. The fees are paid 
by the members from direct deductions from their monthly salary. In other 
words, the human resources department, treasurer and the union work together 
in ensuring the payment of membership fee. According to the union’s treasurer, 
the amount of fees collected every month is sufficient to fund union’s activities. 
 
“We fund our activities from the membership fees. Members should pay 0.25 
per cent of their salary every month to the union. Because we have lots of 
members, including the directors and managers, our income from the fees is 
very sufficient. In average, we can get around 26 million rupiah every month” 
(union executive committee member 3). 
 
 
As the union affiliates with a union confederation, it has to pay the so-called 
COS (Check off System) to its affiliate, which amounts 40 per cent of its 
income. The union representative admitted, however, that they actually pay the 
COS a significantly lower amount than the stated percentage. The reason is that 
the union does not believe that the confederation has been effective at 
representing their interests. 
 
“Actually we have an obligation to give 40 per cent of our income to our 
affiliate. But we don’t do it. We just give them 10 per cent. We feel that they do 
not contribute anything to us, so why should we pay them?” (union executive 
committee member 3) 
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Union representatives commented that the affiliate did not provide sufficient 
training for them. The previous training provided was very basic and not useful 
for them. The union themselves then conducted training for the coordinators and 
plenos as the preparation for regeneration. The training they conducted included 
training on the implementation of Employment Law No. 13. Moreover, the 
affiliate was never engaged in dispute settlement as the union preferred to 
exclude the affiliate for they were doubtful of the affiliate’s objectivity, 
particularly because the branch leader of the affiliate is part of the management 
of the company. 
After the reformation era, some of the representatives started to question the 
need of keeping the federation as their affiliate. However, when the research 
was held, there was no sign of detaching themselves for the current affiliate and 
have a new one. It might probably because the union leader thinks that all the 
unions in Indonesia do not really care about the condition of the workers; 
therefore, there is no need of switching affiliate. 
 
“Every trade union claims that it is the most ideal, but actually they are just the 
same. They are close to the employer” (union leader) 
 
5.4.2 External Factors 
Employer strategies 
As seen in previous sections, management respondents stated that they regard 
the union as their partner in governing the company. One management 
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respondent even described the union, management, and employees as a “happy 
family” where all parties should work together for the sake of the family. 
 
“A company is like a family. The company, union, and the employees are like 
father, mother and children. So if their relationship is not working, a family 
won’t be working properly, right? So for the company’s management, it is 
important that a union, as a good mother, has to do its best to protect its 
employees. The union as a mother and the father which is the company has to 
do a lot for their children, the employees. On the basis of that mutual trust, 
companies operate. (manager 2) 
 
 The union also said that partnership is a shared concept underlying their 
relationship with management, and this concept was built gradually since the 
merger of four companies in 1980s. 
 
“When the union was formed in this company we tried to engender a 
relationship pattern with management. However, conditions were tough, the 
union was tough; and management was tough. The union sought recognition - 
however, the company didn’t want to recognize us. It was in ‘80s, ‘80s to ’90 
we started to build the concept of a relationship. This was the time when we had 
the concept of tripartite to make the relationship go smoothly; from the ‘90s we 
have had the concept of partnership until now” (union executive committee 
member 1) 
 
 
However, the union is apparently facing a problem regarding their relationship 
with their affiliate; caused by a strategy implemented by management. The 
leader of the affiliate branch in their regional area is a person from the company 
who was IR manager and is currently still a member of staff of the HR 
department. This dual position had created difficulties for the union in 
negotiating with the company. While the union expects the affiliate to support 
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them, they argue that in reality the affiliate’s leader is against them as a 
representative of the company. As a representative said: 
 
“We have a big problem with our affiliate. The leader of our affiliate’s branch is 
a person from this company, a HRD staff member. The problem is, he supposed 
to protect and support us, but the reality is the other way around, he’s against us. 
Well, he was a union leader when he got the position as a manager in the HR 
department, and I think it’s the part of the company’s strategy to put a pressure 
upon us (union executive committee member 3) 
 
However, not all union representatives feel the negative impact of this 
management’s strategy. One of them even feels that this is an advantage for the 
union. 
 
“There was once when union leader of our affiliate was also an HR manager. It 
was good for us. We got advantage at that time as he often gave some ‘signs’ 
when we were negotiating.” (union executive committee member 1) 
 
 
Despite the signs that he often gave, the management’s strategy of deliberately 
forcing union to ‘fight’ against the union’s own person has raised a question 
towards the person. Union representatives expected that he, as the leader of one 
of the affiliate’s branch should provide assistance in bargaining; but in reality, 
the union had to negotiate over different interests with him. This case shows a 
indications of the agency problem; where the agent (the union branch leader) 
has failed to behave as expected by the principal (the union members) because 
of a conflict of interest and different risk preferences. 
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Industrial Relations system 
As noted, the industrial relations system in Indonesia has experienced 
significant change post-1997 after the downfall of Suharto. The formation and 
movement of unions are now free; which has generated a massive increase in 
the number of new union confederations, federations, independent unions and 
workplace unions. Many union respondents stated, however, that this freedom 
has not been augmented by sufficient protection for unions and their activists.  
One example of the weakness of such protection was in the decision made by 
the government to replace the Dispute Committee (P4P/P4D), an institution 
where industrial disputes were settled, with a Labour Court. The dispute 
committee is no longer active. However, the Court has not begun to operate yet 
(interview with independent union 1). Hence, according to the union 
representatives, many industrial relations tribunal cases remain unresolved, 
creating an uncertain situation for workers. However, unionists said that IR 
conditions in multinationals are better than that in local companies. 
 
“The employment conditions in multinationals are relatively better than in local 
companies because multinationals have monitoring systems. In contrast, many 
local companies do not pay the minimum wage, or they say they “pay the 
minimum wage” but actually it’s the amount of basic salary and benefits. 
However, I don’t say all multinationals are good; there are multinationals which 
have bad practices - Korean multinationals in the textile industry, for example.” 
(independent unionist 1) 
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The multinational in this case study has recognised unions since the 1980s. The 
managers stated that the decision for union recognition in the company is part of 
their history. The parent company in Japan experienced friction with the union 
movement during the 1950s. This forced both parties to negotiate and resulted 
to a joint declaration whereby they agreed to develop “mutual trust”. The 
experience of the parent company was interpreted by the Indonesian branch 
company that a union was needed. It was not merely an obligation from the 
parent company that a union should exist and be recognised: 
 
“No, we’re not obliged to recognise unions, but then we see the need of having 
a union in the workplace. We have a history why we decided to recognise 
unions. First, because we have problems, second, it is a regulation stated in the 
Indonesian law, and third, a union provides a means of communication with 
employees.” (manager 3) 
 
It is also prescient to note that none of the CEOs and managers regards the 
union as a threat to continue operation in Indonesia; and the company has 
invested new plant and equipment to produce a second model (given the still 
large latent domestic demand). However, in contrast to the general perception of 
unions that Employment Law No. 13 Year 2003 has favoured employers; 
management’s view that this law protects employees and unions. Management 
in this multinational, however, does not have any real concerns with the law, as 
they feel that wages and working conditions in the company are above the 
standard mentioned in the law. Indeed, management representatives commented 
that the employment system in the Company would work even if no 
employment laws existed. 
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Economic context 
The automotive industry in Indonesia has been experiencing a slow down since 
the financial crisis in 1997. However, some business players have claimed that 
conditions are currently getting better along with improving economic 
conditions21. In terms of new cars being sold in Indonesia, the rate is increasing, 
particularly in 2004 where it was claimed that industry experienced the fastest 
sales growth in the world, 36.6 per cent from the previous year. However, car 
sales dropped again in 2006, due to the government’s decision to increase petrol 
prices by 100 per cent in 2005. This decision has subsequently led to higher 
inflation and interest rates. As most Indonesian buy new cars by using financial 
services, higher interest rates discourage them to buy new cars. Sales in 2006 
were 40 per cent lower than in 2005, showing that Indonesia is still suffering 
instability within its economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 http://www.jawapos.com/index.php?act=detail_c&id=281387 
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Figure 5.3 The sales of new cars in Indonesia 1997-2006 (in units) 
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
1997 1998 1999 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
Un
its
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The multinational in this case study is the market leader in cars in Indonesia, 
followed by four other Japanese manufacturers. Indeed, Japanese multinationals 
dominate the market, with a share of 93.37 per cent; the rest of the market is 
served by manufacturers from Korea, Germany, France, Sweden, Britain and 
the US. Korean cars, which were seen as potential competitors seven years ago, 
have not been able to compete successfully with the Japanese market leaders; 
their market share in 2003 was only 5 per cent.  
The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) also impacts on the strategy being taken 
by the Company and its competitors. The present arrangement allows car 
producers to produce one model until achieving economies of scale; and 
                                                 
22 See for example: http:www.sinarharapan.co.id/ceo/2003/0526/ceo1.html; 
http://www.majalahtrust.com/bisnis/strategi/706.php 
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exporting it to other ASEAN countries, with a very low custom fee (maximum 5 
per cent of production cost). Each country currently produces a different model, 
called the “production base”. AFTA can serve both as an opportunity and a 
threat for Indonesia. The multinational being studied chooses a country as a 
production base of one or more model(s) where it can achieve cost efficiency. 
One manager interviewed expressed his concern over this condition by 
emphasising Thailand as their closest competitor in producing new models, 
while the union leader was still optimistic that Indonesia will retain its position 
as a base for production. 
 
“Currently this company makes a production base in each country it operates. 
So far in Asia, I’m sorry to say, Thailand is the best. There are no worker 
demonstrations and the infrastructure is very good. Thailand is the most 
comfortable production base; it makes our Indonesian employees and also the 
government very disappointed” (manager 1) 
 
 
In contrast, a union respondent argued that, 
 
“No, I’m still optimistic that they will stay because of three aspects: first, this 
company has been here from the 1970s; second, we are the market leader; and 
third we have an abundant potential market. If they were to stop their business 
here and then Indonesia’s economy recovered, customers would demand more 
cars; but if this Company were to have no plant in Indonesia they would still 
have to import, which would take valuable time. Customers would then prefer 
to buy other brands”. (union executive committee member 1) 
 
However, China is also a competitor for the Indonesian car industry, as China 
has an agreement with ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Brunei, Philippines, Singapore, Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) for a 
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free trade arrangement which will be fully implemented in 2010, for the six 
original ASEAN members and in 2015 for the other four23. This arrangement 
will then entail a level playing field within AFTA, with the removal of trade 
barriers.  
The Company commenced its operations in China in 2003. They plan to 
develop a significant presence in China, with various models to be produced. 
The main reason is that China has a very huge domestic market. However, once 
the agreement is implemented, this multinational can export the cars it produces 
in China to serve demands from other countries. China has the potential to reach 
greater economies of scale, while also providing a compliant non-union 
environment that will be an advantage for multinationals. 
 
Public perception of unions 
The confederation and federation which the union affiliates with, on the other 
hand, is known as being very close to employer groups. It was the only union 
federation recognised by the government before the reformation era and most of 
the leaders were close to the leading political party at that time: Golkar. When 
the government enabled the formation of free, democratic unions, many of its 
affiliates detached themselves as an expression of doubting this federation’s 
commitment to worker welfare. One of the previous affiliates is The National 
Workers Union (SPN—Serikat Pekerja Nasional), which currently is one of the 
                                                 
23 See: http://www.bilaterals.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=95 
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strongest union in Indonesia, organising more than 400,000 members (interview 
with 2 independent unions) 
Developing strong unions, however, is not without challenge. There is a 
widespread perception in Indonesia that unions are provocative and militant 
(interview with an ILO representative). As noted, these perceptions are very 
much fomented by the media, which represents the interests of varied groups: 
nationalists, opportunists, and religious groups. As a result of reports on 
demonstrations and strikes organised by unions; and rare stories of positive 
union contributions for workers and employers, many Indonesians question the 
advantages of having strong unions, not to mention a lingering public fear of 
communism; as unions were seen to represent the Communist Party during the 
Sukarno period (“Old Order”). 
Unions try to overcome such perceptions by showing the public that they can 
conduct peaceful, non-disruptive demonstrations. Demonstrations on the 
Maydays (1 May) have shown their intention to be acknowledged as non-
provocative organisations. One confederation, the Indonesian Union 
Confederation, or KSPI (Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia) is also trying to 
organise in the informal sector, e.g., immigrant workers and agricultural 
workers, in order to broaden the people’s understanding on unionism (interview 
with independent union 2). This effort is expected to switch the general 
perception of unions as being politically subversive, provocative organisations 
into strong, worker-oriented organisations. As one independent unionist said: 
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“Unions have to be strong and independent. If the workers are wealthy, they 
will have high purchasing power and thus, buy lots of things, and production 
will also increases. Who got the advantage? Of course, the workers will get the 
advantage as well. If the workers are strong and have an equal position in 
negotiating with employers and the government, then the level of welfare will 
increase and the economy will be better. So, the key is the workers!” 
 
 
Technology and Skills 
The parent company applies a system of production referred to as the Global 
Production Network, whereby each country produces certain model(s), rather 
than only final assembly; which requires considerable skills and training on the 
part of employees. Hence, a majority of the employees in the Company are high 
school graduates; comprising around 84 per cent of total employees. The 
division of work in the plants includes assembling and painting, welding, 
machining, packing, quality control, stamping, casting, and packing. As such, 
employees are aware of the need of improving their working lives, not 
necessarily only wages for their daily life. The research suggests that the 
coordinators, plenos, and members are actively involved in searching 
information regarding the result of union-management negotiation. 
 
Table 5.3 Employee profile by education (July 2006) 
Education level No. of employees Percentage 
Elementary school 98 1.80 
Junior high school 323 5.95 
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Senior high school 4,245 78.18 
Academy 408 7.51 
Undergraduate 354 6.52 
Postgraduate 2 0.04 
 
Employees are separated in two plants; in Jakarta and Karawang (about 2 hours 
from Jakarta). The union executive committees are mixed from both plants, and 
they conduct regular meetings to discuss issues at the union head office in 
Jakarta plant. Most of the union executive committees are academy or bachelor 
graduates, and they are expected to be able to form union’s strategy in the 
future, particularly after the ownership change in 2003.  
Unionist claims that the workers of the company are highly marketable in the 
labour markets; employees who have worked for the company will easily find a 
new job elsewhere (union executive committee member 3). Thus, it can be 
argued that the presence of firm-specific skills held by certain occupational 
groups within the company might be expected to confer additional bargaining 
power to such employees 
 
5.5 Summary-- Evaluating Union strategic choices 
Despite the fact that the union in the Company affiliates with a federation in the 
Metal, Engineering and Machinery sector, it is a company-union type as it only 
operates in the Company as well as being sponsored by the Company (Lewis et 
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al., 2003: 138). The union negotiates over Collective Labour Agreement (CLA) 
as a means to regulate employment issues that their members are concerned 
about as well as to protect their members (Flanders, 1971). Thus, when the 
Company intended to change the substance of the CLA following the change of 
ownership, the union was strongly against it, as this would lead to a diminution 
of and indeed a threat to the CLA functions of regulating and protecting 
workers. 
The union, in theory, has also had the advantage of a single-recognition (closed-
shop) policy by the Company; which has led to them organising nearly all the 
employees, apart from managers. However, a membership of over 90 per cent of 
the employees does not automatically entail that the union is in a strong 
bargaining position. The union executive committees admitted that they often 
have to compromise to the Company’s agenda at the expense of member 
interests. This is because management are adept at using the implicit threat of 
relocation as a moderating tool (given the perception that Indonesia is lacking in 
stability, good infrastructure and law enforcement). As union executive 
committee member 3 commented: 
 
“Yes, we compromise a lot, because if we don’t do so, we are afraid that they 
will relocate this business. They never explicitly say anything like this though; 
but the pleno, coordinators and the members are worried.” 
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Union compromises over the Company’s goals are often complained about by 
ordinary members as they feel that the union has excessively compromised on 
representing their interests. 
 
“We sometimes got complaints from our members as a result of our 
compromise over company decisions. There are targets that we cannot achieve. 
Well, we cannot neglect that this approach also has negative effects” (union 
executive committee member 2). 
 
 
However, the same representative further commented that he and other union 
representatives thought that this approach was better than a confrontational 
approach; as he believed that a “win-win” solution could only be reached 
through partnership. The reaction from members towards the union’s 
“compromise approach” to the management was not able to be explored as the 
access to union members was not gained. The union leader said that members 
should be approached through the management while the management response 
was negative.  
The absence of full-time union officers in the Company is indicative of the 
hesitation of voluntary union representatives over their income prospects and 
career progression. Even though the union and management have mutually 
agreed over providing for paid full-timers (which is stated in the CLA), union 
representatives are not willing to take on this position. In terms of income, full 
timers might forego opportunities to get a higher income from doing overtime. 
As said by union executive committee member 1, income in Toyota is higher 
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than the average wage in the same industry because overtime is accounted as 
monthly income: 
 
“We get high annual income from overtime. Their code of conduct is that they 
(the Company) will respect and will follow every country’s regulation. Our Law 
No. 13 2003 states that maximum over time is 46 hours every month excluding 
Saturday and Sunday. They treat this law carefully with this as they don’t want 
to be seen as exploiting cheap labour in Indonesia. However, so far overtime is 
seen (by the employees) as part of office hours (with overtime rate) and this has 
become an unwritten agreement between the union and the company. This to be 
thought by the union, how over time decreases but the income increases. We 
definitely need to negotiate. When there was crisis, there was no overtime. All 
employees complained. The Company does not want to be penalized because of 
unethical work practice.” 
 
The importance of overtime for employees has prevented union representatives 
from becoming salaried full timers. They argued that not being in the job site 
means they would gradually lose contact with their boss and be unfamiliar with 
the jobs and thus lose the opportunity to do overtime.  
 
“You know, union representatives, like other employees, are always back to our 
job site after office hours to do overtime. If we’re always here (in the union 
office), we’re afraid we’ll be neglected by our boss and lose connection with 
our job. Well, it’s just our own concern, may be it’s not true…We don’t know, 
because nobody dares to take the risk” (union executive committee member 4). 
 
 
Even the company has guaranteed the same facilities for the full timers as for 
the other ordinary employees, there was no sign that they would raise union full 
timer’s wage for encouragement. The absence of full timers has become a 
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concern for management: one manager said that even if there are no full timers, 
the union office is sometimes used as a place to hide from work.  
 
“Now the problem is, the union office is often used as a place to hide. They 
don’t go to work, but they’re not full timers. We told them that full timers will 
get full facilities as the ordinary employees” (manager 3). 
 
 
The union was still mainly a responsive institution as the research suggests that 
it had no clear strategy in dealing with the employer. As such, the union was 
still experiencing difficulties in identifying the steps they should take in 
formulating a cogent, effective strategy. However, the union leader was aware 
that such strategy is needed for a more effective movement and survival, as has 
been suggested by some authors (Huzzard, 2004; Boxall and Haynes, 1997). In 
the next section, we evaluate the same issue in another setting that of textile 
industry. 
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CHAPTER 6 
MULTINATIONAL IN TEXTILE INDUSTRY 
 
This chapter presents the findings of a case study in the textile company. This 
multinational has recognised unions in the early years of its operations in 
Indonesia. The union in this Company can be argued as being the most frontal 
union among other unions being researched. Similar to the previous chapter, 
section 6.1 provides the overview of the Company and the union, while section 
6.2 examines the union-management relationship and the changes that have 
occurred in the relationship due to the change in ownership. Section 6.3 
describes the Collective agreement process and coverage with some of the 
major clauses being listed down, followed by the union’s internal and external 
constraints based on Huzzard’s strategic choice model (Section 6.4). This 
chapter ends with an evaluation of the union’s strategic choices given the 
internal and external constraints faced by the union. 
 
6.1. Overview: Industry Profile 
The textile and clothing industry is an important sector within the Indonesian 
economy that it provides the largest source of employment by employing 
around 1.2 million workers and an additional 3.5 million workers in the textile-
related areas such as distribution in 200524. Thus, it comprises around 13 per 
cent of total workers in Indonesia. As a labour-intensive industry, the textile 
                                                 
24 http://www.expresstextile.com/20050430/perspectives03.shtml 
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sector has traditionally enjoyed Indonesia’s advantages of low labour cost, 
adding to the advantages of low electricity and fuel costs. However, costs have 
been increasing since 1999 due to government decisions over annual increase on 
minimum wages and higher electricity and fuel prices, particularly in 2005. 
In terms of exports, Indonesia is ranked tenth among the world’s largest textile 
exporters and was number one exporter within the ASEAN countries in 2004. 
The US and European countries are the major destinations subject to textile and 
quota applied in 1980 under the MFA (Multi Fibre Agreement). When the 
agreement was abolished in January 2005, Indonesia had to compete with other 
textile and apparel exporters including China, which aggressively penetrates US 
and European markets.  Other competitors are low-cost Asian exporters such as 
Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh as well as from African Countries which enjoy 
privileged access to the US market under the African Growth and Opportunity 
Act (AGOA) (Athukorala, 2006: 200). It was predicted that Indonesia would 
suffer in the new non-MFA environment. 
However, the prediction was not confirmed by the Indonesia’s textile and 
clothing export in 2005 compared to the export in 2004 during the same period 
(January-November). There was a growth of 11.3 per cent of both exports, 
where clothing exports grew faster than textile exports, 13.2 per cent and 8.6 per 
cent respectively (ibid).  
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Table 6.1 Indonesia’s textile and clothing export growth 2004-2005 
 2004 
Jan-Nov 
2005 
Jan-Nov 
2005 Growth 
Jan-Nov (%) 
Textile 
Volume (kg million) 
Unit value ($/kg) 
Value ($ million) 
 
1,052 
 2.73 
2,875 
 
1,118 
 2.79 
3,123 
 
6.3 
2.2 
8.6 
Clothing 
Volume (kg million) 
Unit value ($/kg) 
Value ($ million) 
 
346 
11.75 
4,069 
 
391 
11.78 
4,605 
 
       12.9 
0.2 
       13.2 
Textile and 
clothing 
Volume (kg million) 
Unit value ($/kg) 
Value ($ million) 
 
1,398 
4.97 
6,944 
 
1,509 
 5.12 
7,728 
 
8.0 
1.0 
       11.3 
Source: Athukorala 2006: 201 
 
It is also worth noting that even with the trade quota, China has dominated the 
world’s textile and clothing industry covering 23 per cent of textile exports in 
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2003. When the trade quota was removed in the beginning of 2005, China’s 
textile export to the US increased 50 per cent in the first semester, leaving 
Indonesian textile exporters in a difficult situation. However, in November 
2005, the US and China agreed to limit China’s textile and clothing export to 
the US to only 10 per cent in 2006, 12.5 per cent in 2007, and 15 to 16 per cent 
in 200825. The agreement was seen as an opportunity for Indonesian textile 
exporters to again increase the share within the US market. However, other 
textile business players also view that the agreement may harm the domestic 
textile market as China will shift its export to other countries including 
Indonesia. 
It is believed that Indonesia’s rigid labour market (as discussed in the chapter 2-
- literature review), low worker productivity and low investment in textile 
industry due to high interest rate of industry loan have also impinged its 
competitiveness towards other textile exporters.26 
 
6.1.1. The Company 
The Company commenced operations in Indonesia in 1973 and in 1980 was 
listed in the Jakarta Stock Exchange. Its main business is producing polyester, 
staple fibres and filament yarns. This company is a subsidiary of a large 
Japanese multinational, operating in various industries worldwide. Indonesia’s 
abundant population and natural resources, particularly oil, were the main 
                                                 
25 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4416858.stm 
26 www.fias.net/.../$FILE/FIAS+-+Indonesia+-+Textile+and+Shrimp+Competitiveness+Study+vol+1+10-24.pdf 
 153
reasons for the Company’s investment, as it required cheap, abundant workers 
and fuel to be able to operate cost-effectively.  
Serving the domestic market, the Company is now facing difficult times in 
maintaining production levels and hence profit margins. Based on the 
Company’s 2005 audited financial report, it suffered losses for four subsequent 
years (2002-2005). External factors such as increasing fuel prices and labour 
costs are believed to be the main reasons for these losses: 
 
”Previously, Indonesia had very high competitive power. Firstly was the low 
cost of workers. Second, Indonesia had so many natural resources. For example, 
natural gas or coal, or something like that. But the minimum wage is something 
that always increases year per year. We cannot manage it; it’s the government’s 
decision. This condition is worsened by the (low) productivity of workers and 
the (increasing) BBM (fuel) price. Indonesia doesn’t have much competitive 
power anymore. Labour law also makes it difficult to manage. Frankly 
speaking, I think Japanese companies do not now have much interest to invest 
in Indonesia.” (manager 1) 
 
 
Additionally, the President-Director views that textiles is not a promising 
industry anymore in Indonesia, given increasing labour costs: 
 
“Unfortunately, the textile industry in Indonesia is no longer a growing industry. 
At present, not only us - but also all the other companies in the textile industry 
in Indonesia are faced with challenges… One of the challenges faced by us is 
the establishment of various institutions which are making labour costs higher.” 
(cited from the Company Profile) 
 
One very significant step taken by the Company in coping with rising costs was 
through outsourcing jobs - and hence cutting the number of employees. 
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Employing approximately 2,000 employees until 2003, it currently employs 
1,100 employees (with the percentage of female employees lower than 10 per 
cent). Outsourcing is a business strategy used by management to achieve 
internal efficiencies; by keeping production costs as low as possible (Colling, 
2005: 95). Outsourcing enables a firm to cut labour costs and maintain 
numerical flexibility of workers; a firm could employ more workers when 
needed, without having to increase its budgeted labour cost and ‘dispose’ them 
when production is slowing down (Legge, 1998: 288).  
Additionally, outsourcing also threatens the interest of workers and unions. 
Whilst workers are losing their job security, unions would also be in a 
disadvantage situation of losing members.  In this case, the Company 
outsourcing plan was initially rejected by the union but they were then forced to 
accept it, as their members were ‘happy’ with the plan driven by high severance 
pay. The discussion over the union’s reaction towards the outsourcing plan is 
explored further in the later section. 
 
6.1.2 The Union 
The union was formed and recognised in 1975; affiliated with the only union at 
that time, the SPSI. When the freedom of union formation was introduced by 
the government in 2003, the union was affiliated with previously the textile 
sector within SPSI which for a new union, SPN (Serikat Pekerja Nasional—
National Worker Union). The union now organises nearly all employees who 
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are eligible to be members according to the Collective Labour Agreement 
(CLA).  
Similarly to the union in car manufacturer multinational in the previous chapter, 
this union also organised existing members. However, despite this, the number 
is decreasing due to subcontracting practices enacted by the Company since 
2003. As the issues being addressed were not expanded either, the union tended 
to use mobilisation as their strategic activities. It can be argued that union 
mobilisation in the textile multinational was more prominent compared to the 
car manufacturer in the previous case study as union chose to mobilise their 
members for industrial actions to get the management’s attention such as that in 
2003 when they rejected the outsourcing plan, as stated by a unionist below. 
“There were several occasions where we undertook industrial action; we couldn’t see any other 
way to win, so we used our rights [of conducting industrial actions] - but only occasionally.” 
(union executive committee member 4). 
 
The union does not have a specific recruitment program. The union executive 
committee introduce the union to the employees during the orientation program 
and those who are interested would have to register. New employees can be 
official union members if they pass the probation period of one year. However, 
the union will assist a new employee if they have problems even if they are still 
within their probation period by giving them advice and advocacy as the new 
employees pay their membership fee (deducted from the monthly salary) even 
when they just started working at this company and were not entitled to be 
union members.  
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The mismatched policy was discussed at the bipartite forum at the time of 
research. The union proposed that the new employees do not pay membership 
fee and cannot become union members until they pass the probation period. 
Their argument was that they want to assure that the new employees are ‘good 
employees’ and thus can be their members. 
 
“The first year of work is a period when somebody has to perform very well for 
the company. So, the good and the bad of his performance, it’s measured during 
this period. It is a hard period. We want that this person (who will be our 
members) should be good. This good behaviour is examined within this one 
year.” (union executive committee member 2) 
 
The decision for union recognition was based on the existence of the laws 
implemented in Indonesia (i.e. Law No. 21, 2000 and Law No. 13, 2003). 
According to management, however, the decision for recognition was based not 
only because of legal requirements; but also because they regarded the union as 
an effective channel for providing communication with employees, rather than 
wasting time communicating and negotiating separately with individual 
employees, representing the voice function of union which benefits both parties: 
 
“We did not consider the law as the key factor in our recognising the union. 
Rather, we saw the union as a necessity. We can communicate with our 
employees more efficiently through their representatives and our policy is to be 
transparent with them. Every policy that will be implemented is discussed with 
them” (manager 2). 
 
 
Thus, management regard information provision and consultation with the 
union as a means of conferring legitimacy on management policies and actions. 
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The current discussion over a proposed new HRM system is an example of joint 
consultation on a new policy. The old HRM system had adopted Japanese-style 
practices in which the longer the tenure of the employee, the more the 
possibility they would get a promotion. The proposed new system is one of 
performance-based management. As such, it would give a higher opportunity 
for high-performers to get faster promotion. However, the new system had not 
yet been implemented (at the time of the research), as the union did not agree 
with proposal. In a classic depiction of pluralism in the workplace: 
 
“Conflicts happen because of different interests. For example, take the proposal 
of the new personnel system. This system will make increased recognition and 
remuneration (for high-performers) happen faster. This will create a condition 
where younger employees will have greater opportunity for enhancing their 
career. The union doesn’t accept it because for them, it won’t be that simple. 
We are still negotiating, and we brought it to the tripartite forum [an industrial 
relations forum consists of the government, the employer, and the trade union]. 
There was a suggestion but it’s not obligatory, the mediator suggested that it is 
the right of the company. The union didn’t accept the suggestion; and now 
management are planning to bring it to the labour court” (Manager 2). 
 
From the union’s point of view: 
 
“They are trying to implement a new system, in which in future, there will be no 
allowances…all allowances would be included in the salary, with no variable 
component. We’re a bit worried with this proposed system particularly for our 
future, as promotion would take longer (if we do not perform). We’re now 
facing a deadlock and it’s going to be brought to the labour court” (union 
executive committee member 2).  
 
 
The CLA (when the research was conducted) did not explain how performance 
was being evaluated although it mentioned about the ‘performance standard’ 
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when it regulates the reward given to employees who achieved the standard 
without describing it in details. In the CLA, the performance standard is 
implicitly set solely by the company and evaluated by direct managers. 
The reward was given to employees when they achieve one of the several 
conditions as below: 
1. Discipline: no absence, punctual, and no warning letters which are given due 
to serious mistakes such as being late for 3 days within 7 working days, leaving 
jobs during office hours without permission, sleeping during office hours and 
refuse to wear company’s uniform. 
2. Behaving within the community so that they maintain or improve the good 
image of the company. 
3. Preventing accidents occurring at work. 
4. Outstanding: finding new methods that improve the quantity and quality of 
production. The invention will then become the property of the company. 
As with the case study outlined in Chapter 5, there are no full-time union 
professionals in the Company; even though the CLA has provisions for the 
creation of full-time union officers. The union representatives commented that it 
was more lucrative for them to remain working as full-time employees. Indeed, 
the concept of performing well at work is shared by all union executive 
committee members, to show the Company that union members are also good 
workers; in order to maintain and improve their career prospects:  
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“Even though full-time union officers are granted in the CLA nobody wants to 
do it as we work in this company, we also want our career.” (union executive 
committee member 2)  
 
 
The absence of full time unionists because of performance and career prospect 
confirms the concern of the union on the implementation of the proposed HR 
system whereby performance is the means to get promotion and thus better 
career at work. 
Additionally, 
 
“We all work for a Company which pay us. Union, on the other hand is an 
employee organisation within the company. So, our main duty is to perform 
well in doing our jobs. We all agree that we have to prioritise our work duty as 
employees and that’s why there are no union full timers here. But we always 
have someone waiting in the office by developing a schedule for union 
executive committees and representatives” (union executive committee 4) 
 
Thus, performing well and career progression are the main reasons of the 
absence of union full-time professionals. There is also a phenomenon that those 
who previously were union executive committees or representatives were 
promoted into managerial levels.  
 
“Many previous union executive committees and representatives become 
managers after they finished their service. There were ten union reps (of my 
period) who are now managers” (manager 5) 
 
 
Most of managers who were involved in the research were ex-union 
representatives. They often use the word ‘we’ when expressing unionism rather 
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than ‘they’. The reason is that they feel they are still workers who need union 
protection despite their position as managers. 
 
“Well, I work here as an employee. Even now I’m a manager, I still feel I’m just 
an employee” (manager 4) 
 
 
However, different interests between the union and management sometimes 
caused role conflict for managers who were union representatives, particularly 
when they had to implement a policy that affect the welfare of the employees. 
An example was described by a manager when he had to make an outsourcing 
proposal for a department under his responsibility. As he was ordinarily against 
outsourcing, he did not make the proposal on time to show that he actually 
disagreed with the plan. When the proposal was eventually submitted to the 
higher managerial level (only several weeks before the research took place), he 
expected that the proposal would be rejected. 
 
6.2 Union-management relationship 
Similar to the automotive company in Chapter 5, management of the Company 
apply a ‘consultor’ (Legge, 2005: 76-7) employment relations style; whereby 
they regard the union as their ‘partner’ in the workplace and both parties engage 
in wide-ranging discussion. The concept of partnership, however, is not clearly 
stated in the CLA. The CLA stipulates that managers do not abuse union 
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executive committees and representatives and that the company will assist the 
union in organising their members as long as the union complies with the CLA.  
Many union executive committee members were promoted to be managers. This 
condition, according to union reps, advantages the union as the managers who 
have the experience of unionism could understand better the expectation of the 
union. Furthermore, it is easier for union representatives to ask for permission to 
leave the job site for union affairs from such managers. Additionally, union reps 
feel that all managers are reluctant to say ‘no’ to union reps when they ask for 
permission as long as the HR Department has given written statement of 
permission.  
 
“We never got complaints from the managers. I think the manager is also a bit 
reluctant to say no to the union rep, but the important thing is that we got 
permission from the HR department.” (union executive committee member 3) 
 
The union, however, suggests that their relationship with management is 
changing. One of the union executive committee members commented that: 
 
“I think the relationship currently is not so good, but saying it’s bad is not also 
true….because there are cases where we agree with management, but compared 
with the previous years, our relationship is not that good anymore.”(union 
executive committee member 3) 
 
 
The union leader suggests that the primary reason for the worsening relationship 
is related to appointment of a new President-Director of the Company: 
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“Basically, it is a Japanese company, so they bring their culture which ‘respects’ 
the union, although that depends on the top manager [CEO] and management... 
Well, I think his [the CEO] character is like a ‘superman’: what he wants to 
have done is what is to be applied, so that local managers become silent. Only 
the union can voice its aspiration, only the union” 
 
 
Other union executive committee members, however, suggest that this change 
has also been caused by the characteristics of the union leader. As one of them 
stated: 
 
“May be, well may be - different leader, different approach; so it depends on the 
leader. However, I think the current union leadership is a bit confrontational 
towards management and the people in the HR department cannot maintain this 
relationship either. The previous HR people always had ways to approach the 
union but not the current management.”(Union executive committee member 3) 
 
The approach chosen by the union leader has created a more confrontational 
union strategy in dealing with management. Even if a confrontational approach 
is not the dominant strategy, union representatives said that they would become 
more radical if the Company does not want to cooperate anymore. 
 
“Being radical is not our strategy as long as the company wants to co-operate. 
But sometimes they couldn’t answer our questions when we tried to look for 
solutions. When we can’t stand anymore, we sometimes walk out from the 
negotiation room.” (Union executive committee 2) 
 
 
The perception of being frontal is more apparent after the industrial action 
conducted in 2003 when the union rejected the outsourcing program although 
the action did not disturb office hours. While the union could feel the difference 
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approach of the company after the action, the managers feel that the relationship 
has not changed. 
 
“The indicator is usually from the personnel manager. They used to have formal 
and informal approaches to the union, but now we just directly meet in 
negotiation forums. Now the management thinks union as an obstacle, because 
we ignore all of their proposals, because we think we don’t have to take any 
concerns to all of those proposals.” (union executive committee member 3) 
 
 
However, one of the managers said: 
 
“This problem (conflict of interest) doesn’t make our relationship becomes 
stiffed, we still see them as a communication bridge to the employees.” 
(manager 2) 
 
The major causes of the current management-union conflict are the 
rationalisation and outsourcing that took place three years ago. These issues will 
be discussed further in the next section. 
 
6.3. Collective agreement process and coverage 
As in the case study detailed in chapter 5, the terms and conditions of 
employment are negotiated between the union and management through 
collective bargaining.  There is one collective agreement in the establishment, 
covering all the workers in the Company and serves as the ‘rule of the game’. 
The union forms a committee whose responsibility is to prepare a CLA draft. 
The bargaining committee includes the union executive committee members 
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and the shop floor representatives. The shop floor reps distribute questionnaires 
to ordinary members, asking for their suggestions for the new CLA. The 
suggestions are brought to the bargaining committee, to be considered for 
formulating into a draft set of proposals to be negotiated with the management. 
The process of CLA negotiation usually takes around 2-3 months.  
 
Table 6.2 Major clauses of the collective agreement 
1(3) The union Union: is the National Workers 
Union (SPN--Serikat Pekerja 
Nasional).  
3(1) The coverage of the 
collective agreement 
Management and union agree 
that the agreement covers and 
adheres to both parties  
4(3) Assurance for the 
company and the 
union 
The management recognises the 
SPN as the only union in the 
Company. 
4(4) Assurance for the 
company and the 
union the union 
The union has the right to 
negotiate with management in 
developing Collective Labour 
Agreement. 
6(1) Union's activity The management can give 
permission for union 
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representatives and members to 
conduct union activities during 
working hours. 
6(3) Union's activity The management tries not to 
repress directly or indirectly, the 
workers who are appointed as 
union representatives 
6(5) Union's activity The union will not conduct 
actions which can disadvantage 
the Company 
11 Internal promotion Promotions will be prioritised for 
existing employees who fulfil  
13 Outsourcing Outsourcing some jobs to other 
companies is agreed as a bipartite 
issue. 
14 Bipartite committee The bipartite committee is a 
communication, consultation, and 
negotiation forum whose 
members are from the workers 
and management. 
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25(1) Daily workers a. Daily workers 5/2 are those 
who work during daytime, 
Monday to Friday and the days 
off are on Saturday and Sunday.          
b. Daily workers 5/1 are those 
who work on 5 subsequent days 
and have a day off on the sixth 
day. The day off is not 
necessarily Saturday or Sunday.  
25(2) Shift workers a. Shift 4/1, consists of 4 groups 
and 3 shifts, each worker works 4 
subsequent days and has one day 
off (further explanation below).    
b. Shift 5/1, where the workers 
work for 5 subsequent days and 
one day off. There are two shifts 
within this system.  
26 Working hours Daily 5/2: 08:00-16:30                         
Daily 5/1: 08:00-16:00                         
Shift 1 (Morning)  : 08:00-16:00         
Shift 2 (Afternoon): 16:00-24:00         
Shift 3 (Night)      : 24:00-08:00 
37(1) Remuneration Remuneration is divided into 
 167
daily and monthly remuneration 
37(2) Remuneration The amount of the remuneration 
is set by the company; by 
considering the company's 
[financial] condition and the 
worker's performance, 
knowledge, and skill. 
37(3) Remuneration Remuneration includes:                       
 a. Salary: base salary, level 
allowance, position allowance.            
b. Allowances: shift, 5/1 
daily/house/family and 
exceptional allowances. 
49 Salary increase Salary increase is given in 
January or in any other month as 
agreed by the union and 
management. The amount of 
salary increase is set by both 
parties by considering several 
factors such as the inflation rate, 
company's [financial] condition, 
and worker's performance. 
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51 Bonus Bonus is the amount of money 
paid by the company to the 
workers based on dividend or 
profit, minus income tax. 
83 Grievance settlement 
procedures 
a. Grievances should firstly be 
solved by the worker and his 
direct superior within a 
maximum of ten days.                          
b. If they have not reached 
agreement, the problem should be 
brought to a higher management 
authority, who will try to solve it 
within 15 days.                                     
c. If the problem is not solved, it 
should be brought to a higher 
level of management; and the 
worker has the right to be 
accompanied by a shop floor 
representative.                           
 d. If it is not solved, the problem 
should be settled between the 
employer and the union within 
the bipartite forum.                              
 169
e. If the problem is not solved in 
the bipartite forum, then 
mediation, conciliation and 
arbitration will be involved. 
 
 
The implementation of clause 6(3) on non-discriminatory treatment is starting to 
be questioned by union representatives, particularly after the union conducted 
industrial action (marching and demonstration), rejecting the first outsourcing 
proposal. 
 
“Previously, there is no pressure to union representatives. But when the union 
organises employees for industrial actions, the pressure is not direct, but 
indirect, like their career promotion is very slow, or their points are not 
increased, or being rotated to other sections. Like there is an issue 
currently…the employees of administration and accounting departments (with 
particular positions) are not allowed to be union representatives anymore, but 
those of production, utility, its, are still allowed. So, when those from utility, 
etc, are seen as too radical, they will be rotated to the personnel department so 
they cannot be union reps anymore. Well, it’s not happened yet, it’s a rumour 
actually. But I know that they think that we are too radical now.” (union 
executive committee member 2) 
 
 
This leads onto an analysis of internal and external factors shaping union 
strategy. 
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6.4 Internal and external constraints 
6.4.1 Internal factors 
Union strategy: past and current 
Similar to that of the automotive case study in chapter 5, the strategy taken by 
the union is highly dependent on the union leader’s style and management’s 
approach. There is a shared value among the union officials that first priority of 
the union is negotiation with the company, or what they say as ‘use the brain’. 
However, when negotiation does not work, they would revert to using other 
sources of power: i.e., conducting industrial action, or what they term as to ‘use 
their hands and feet’. As stated by one union official: 
 
“Yes…our first priority is negotiation, with our brain… but if this technique 
does not work, we can use our hands and feet. Well, what can we do? That’s our 
source of power. There were several occasions where we undertook industrial 
action; we couldn’t see any other way to win, so we used our rights [of 
conducting industrial actions] - but only occasionally.” (union executive 
committee member 4). 
 
 
The union, additionally, argued that they have observed the clause 6(5) which 
guarantees that union would not conduct action that would disadvantage the 
company by conducting their actions in 2003 before office hours (and not 
disrupting production process). Furthermore, the view that union representatives 
have to perform in doing their jobs in shared by all the union executive 
committees to show that unionism is not an obstacle for productivity and 
continuous production. 
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Union officials felt that the union had become more confrontational since 2003, 
when a new union leader was appointed. By the time he was appointed, the 
company had eliminated jobs through its outsourcing program. The union 
reacted by conducting industrial action to ‘remind’ the Company that every 
decision related to the workers should be discussed with the union before being 
implemented. The union gathered the union members before office hours and 
they marched around the plants for then minutes. The union actually planned for 
further action; but the company then opened the chance for negotiation that the 
union withdrew their plan and negotiated with the company over the issue. 
 
“We did it gradually. First, we just did kind of a sign, we marched for 10 
minute; as we tried not to break the company’s rule, that action was executed 
before office hours, actually there would be another action, but because the 
management called us, we cancelled the action.” (union leader) 
 
 
The union leader was then appointed to be an ad-hoc judge for the Labour Court 
in 2006. His replacement, the current union leader is also seen as a radical 
person, having led the union in rejecting the Company’s proposal of a new 
Human Resources System and hence brought the case to the Labour Court. 
 
“The perception of radicalism has existed from 2003 until now. It depends on 
the characteristics of the union leader; as during the meetings, the union leader 
will dominate. So whether the union is radical or not really depends on the 
leader. I’ve been working here for 10 years, with 3 different union leaders with 
different personalities. The first leader I worked under – his character was 
soft…. but the latest 2 leaders, they are very tough, so their character really 
affects the organisation.” (Union executive committee member 2) 
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On the other hand, the current union leader argued that the union’s strategy is 
now softer than before:  
 
“Our strategy was frontal before, now it is almost entirely about full 
negotiation”. 
 
The contrasting view of more frontal or co-operative relations between the 
union leader and other union executive committee was because the union leader 
compared the current condition (during research) with that in the late 1980s. At 
that time, the union conducted industrial action for bonus arrangements causing 
some union officials were brought to the regional security force to be 
questioned; and thus the company was seen as their enemy. This condition, 
according to the union leader is believed will not happen again due to the 
improved relationship between management and union.  
However, unlike the case study in Chapter 5, the union leader in the textile 
multinational is not really concerned about developing a pro-active strategy for 
dealing with the Company. The union would react based on management’s 
approach. If the Company still wanted to negotiate, the union would negotiate; 
however, they could also conduct industrial action and thus become more 
radical if they found deadlock. Additionally, the union sets an unwritten 
requirement for appointed union representatives that they should hold at least a 
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diploma to enable them to be educated and articulate in handling difficult 
problems: 
 
“We expect that union reps are those who have a good educational background 
because we’re going to handle difficult cases. Well, at least D3 (diploma). It is a 
union requirement that the representatives should have a quite high educational 
background, as they will have learned systematic ways of thinking.” (union 
executive committee member 2) 
 
Tensions within levels of the union hierarchy 
Hierarchical downward and upward communication systems also appear in the 
union, as in the case study in Chapter 5. However, as there are fewer workers in 
this multinational than the one studied in Chapter 5, there is also a simpler 
hierarchy. The representatives distribute information to so-called ‘member 
representatives’, representing union members in particular department; during 
the research, there were 25 member representatives and member representatives 
are selected directly by members in each department.  
The union representatives’ executive committee invites member representatives 
every three months for a regular meeting at which they distribute information. 
Member representatives then distribute this information through their monthly 
meetings with ordinary members. If there is urgent information to be 
distributed, then the union representative executive committee can invite 
member representatives for an extraordinary meeting, or they can distribute 
circulars to members. The same mechanism applies for upward information. 
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According to the CLA, the grievances settlement has a different mechanism. 
Employees are expected to solve their problems with their direct managers at 
the first place. If no settlement made, the problem will be brought to higher 
managerial levels. The union is involved in bipartite forum if the settlement is 
not achieved. However, members prefer to directly come to the union office 
once they have problems rather than discuss it with their direct manager.  
Members are welcome to come to the office to talk with union executive 
officials. A schedule is set to ensure that there is always a union official (or 
volunteer from the member representatives) in the office for ordinary members, 
should they seek information or pass on grievances, as there is no full time 
union officer appointed. As noted previously, the reason for the absence of 
salaried union officials is because of concerns over career progression. 
In the Company, female workers comprise not more than 10 per cent of total 
employees. The small number of female workers has led to the absence of 
female union executive representatives in the Company. Union representatives 
argued that the absence is not deliberately created, but rather is caused by the 
rejection of female workers to be union representatives and preferring to choose 
their male counterparts in elections: 
 
“The way we choose union representatives is very democratic. We ask every 
department to choose their own representatives, but no female workers were 
willing to be one of them” (union executive committee 4)  
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Furthermore, union representatives argued that the low enthusiasm of female 
workers towards unionism is because most of the female workers are not 
supervisors who are able to ask their subordinates to cover their work if they 
have to leave for union job (female supervisors and managers only comprise not 
more that 15 per cent of total female workers).  
However, there was one female member representative, who also participated in 
the research. She implicitly argued that low enthusiasm towards unionism was 
driven by the condition that female workers’ rights were respected and 
implemented in the company such as period, maternity and miscarriage leaves. 
Female workers were also entitled to all allowances as male workers, except the 
family allowance which was under revision (at the time of research). 
 
“We have good working conditions here and all the female workers’ rights as 
stated in the law are implemented here. We have period, maternity and 
miscarriage leaves and we also get same allowance like the male workers except 
the family medical allowance. But the union is negotiating over this allowance 
for us currently” (female member representative). 
 
 
The result of union negotiations over the family medical allowance is stated in 
the newest revision of the CLA. The current CLA allows female workers to get 
family allowance if her husband does not work or if he does not have a medical 
allowance. 
 
“Previously, female employees were considered as singles and this was very 
disadvantageous for them. If they have children, then the children were not 
accounted. In the new CLA we are looking for a win-win solution, so that the 
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company will give them family medical allowance as long as her husband 
doesn’t work, or if her husband does not have medical allowance. However, 
there are still requirements she has to fulfil (e.g., a letter confirming that her 
husband is unemployed), it’s not automatic - and the new CLA only applies 
from this year” (union executive committee member 1). 
 
 
Financial Resources 
The union cooperates with the HR Department in collecting member fees by 
direct debit from a member’s monthly salary. The fees paid by the members 
consist of three components: check off system, social fund, and incidental fund. 
Check off system is used to fund union and its affiliate (SPN) operations. 
According to the union’s treasurer, the fee is sufficient in funding the union’s 
operational costs. Thus, they are independent from the company in terms of 
financial resources. However, another union executive committee said that the 
union sometimes have to ask some financial assistance from the company by 
giving proposal to the company, which can be accepted or rejected. 
The social fund is used when there are employees or family members who have 
passed away; whilst the incidental fund is distributed to the victims of natural 
disasters that have happened in Indonesia, such as the tsunami in Aceh and the 
earthquake in Yogyakarta. In distributing the incidental fund, the union 
cooperates with its affiliates and helps the victims, particularly the members of 
the affiliates. 
 
6.4.2 External factors 
Employer strategies 
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As a ‘consultor’ in employee relations, the Company ‘recognises’ the union in 
negotiations as the ‘voice’ of employees (Lewis et al, 2003: 111). Management 
also seek co-operation from the union as they regard the union as having an 
important role in contributing to managing the company. One strategy 
implemented by the company to gain union support is by sharing information on 
the condition of the company, including financial conditions. Hence, 
management use the provision of such information to expect the union to 
compromise (or be accommodating) on decisions taken by management in 
reducing costs and raising profit margins: 
 
“I think we all agree that the union is very, very important. Without the union, 
we cannot manage at all. So I think management and the union have to co-
operate and look for the best way. We work mutually and now we try to…. have 
an open relationship. For example, we share the information about our company 
situation. Not only in company report…but we also share this problem with 
them” (CEO) 
 
 
However, the appointment of the new President-Director was seen by the union 
as an attempt by corporate headquarters to repress the union and thus unsettle 
the relatively harmonious relationship. Regarded by union representatives as a 
‘superman’ or ‘macho manager’; the new President-Director reduced the 
number of employees by nearly 50 per cent through the outsourcing and 
retrenchment measures mentioned previously, as a means of “coping with a 
difficult situation”. The union leader said that the role of the union is thus more 
important currently to protect the interest of employees (members) as the local 
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managers are unable or unwilling to prevent the radical steps taken by the 
President-Director. 
 
Economic context 
According to the CEO, higher operational costs and intense competition have 
forced the company to take various measures such as reducing the number of 
employees from 2,000 to 1,200 and outsourcing jobs. The higher operational 
costs were caused by higher fuel and electricity prices, particularly after 2005 – 
and the annual minimum wage increase. In terms of wages, however, the CEO 
stated that Indonesian employees received lesser wages than their counterparts 
in China. However, when cost per labour was calculated, Indonesian workers 
are more expensive than Chinese as the productivity of Indonesian workers are 
lower. 
“We cannot compete with the Chinese companies. Now in Indonesia the 
minimum wage is around $100 per month, but in China it’s already $200. So 
actually Indonesia has more competitive power that the Chinese if we’re 
efficient. But our productivity is lower that the Chinese companies. The 
productivity of Indonesian workers is lower than Chinese workers. Indonesian 
workers are sometimes lazy.” 
 
 
Management tried to enhance the productivity of workers by providing them 
with training and introducing a new HR system which rewarded high-
performing employees with faster career progression. However, the new system 
was rejected by the union as has been described earlier in section 6.1.2.  
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Additionally, the CEO also implied that low productivity was also caused by the 
use of old machines as acquiring new machines were difficult due to high 
interest rate in buying those machines. 
 
“Indonesia has lower productivity compared to other countries also because we 
use old machines. For example, compared to China, they invest new machines, 
while here we use mainly old machines. We cannot compete with them. Well… 
we are active in JJC (Jakarta Japan Club) and in an association in textile 
industry. We made a proposal to the government to increase the competitive 
power of Indonesia. We talked to the government through the Indonesian 
Ministry of Industry. They then allowed textile companies to invest or buy new 
machines, and the government reduced the interest rate for this purpose.” 
 
 
Although wages are lower than in China, union representatives stated that the 
lowest wage in the company is higher than the regional minimum wage. 
However, unlike those in the UK, most of the CLAs applied in companies in 
Indonesia do not provide information on wage scales; therefore, the comparison 
of the wage scale in the company cannot be directly compared to the minimum 
wage applied in the region (where the company operates). 
The management respondents argued that the redundancy program implemented 
by the company in overcoming the problem of cost were voluntary for 
employees; by providing them with option of an early retirement program: 
 
“In three years, we have cut 800 people here. We now only have 1,200 people. 
At that time we offered an early retirement scheme. Those who wanted to retire 
from the company, we gave additional money…a golden handshake. It was 
voluntary; and there was no rejection at that time. Everybody was happy with 
the program” (manager 1) 
 
 180
 
Not surprisingly, the union reaction towards the plan was negative. They 
conducted industrial action (a demonstration) for a week in registering their 
dissatisfaction. However, many employees, who were also union members, 
reacted differently.  When the Company opened a registration for those who 
wanted to take the voluntary early retirement program, many employees were 
queuing to register themselves.  
 
“There were 3 periods of the redundancy plan: the first period, 3 years ago, 
when the outsourcing plan started – this was on a first-come first-served basis. 
There was a long queue to register… Some of them were very disappointed 
knowing they didn’t get onto the program. The second one… the mechanism 
was made better. It was like a gamble… so the company chose randomly, but all 
370 employees that registered got the program. And the third one, it was an 
open choice for employees who did not trust management anymore: there were 
250 employees.”(union executive committee member 3). 
 
The union suspected that this apparent enthusiasm for voluntary departure by a 
significant proportion of the workforce was caused by the very high incentive 
given by the Company to induce volunteers.  
 
“The situation is difficult for us. Difficult, because the amount of severance pay 
that is offered by the company is very big; many employees preferred to get it. 
Now what we do is, when the company wants to outsource a department, we ask 
the employees whether they want to join this program or not. We had 
experience when we defended them, they joined the industrial action, but two 
days after that, they accepted the company offer. They wanted the cash. Now, 
we talk to each of the employees. For employees working 1 year, they’re 
entitled to get 46 times of their monthly salary. For those working 8 years, they 
can get up to 130 million Rupiah (equal to approximately £ 7,200). This does 
not include income from the Jamsostek (Social insurance for workers—where 
workers pay a contribution) as they lose their job. So, it’s really a big amount of 
money.” (union executive committee member 2) 
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The Indonesian Law No. 13 Year 2003 regulates the severance pay in articles 
156: 
1. 2 (two)-month wages for years of employment up to 1(one) year but less 
that 2(two year) 
2. 9 (nine)-month wages for year of employment up to 8 (eight) years or more 
Thus, although Indonesian law is considered as quite generous in terms of 
severance pay, the amount of severance pay given by the company is far more 
than what is obliged by the Law. The union representatives argued that the large 
amount of money was the company’s strategy to make the outsourcing program 
more palatable to workers. 
Given that a considerable proportion of members were interested in the 
voluntary severance package offered by the Company, the union changed their 
strategy in dealing with this issue. They negotiated with the Company over the 
guarantee of the welfare of employees who accepted the package. Currently, 
when the Company wishes to outsource a job, there are three choices for 
employees: 
1. Keep their work in the Company but move to another department. 
2. Participate in the outsourcing program (with incentive and a guarantee of a 
job at the outsourcing company). 
3. Participate in the early retirement program (with high pension incentive). 
According to the HR manager, many employees chose the second option.  
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The law (Number 13 Year 2003 article 64, 65 and 66) states that company can 
only outsource non-core business as outsourcing practice is meant to enable the 
company to focus on its core business to maintain competitiveness.  However, 
in this company, there is still a debate between core and non-core business as 
ambiguity arises when one tries to categorise core and non-core (Domberger, 
1998: 35). One of the union’s main concerns was when the company outsourced 
one department they considered as a core department in production: the testing 
department. 
 
“One of the departments being outsourced was actually a core, it’s the testing 
department, it’s a crucial department.” (union executive committee 2) 
 
 
However, concern was not only expressed by union representatives. Managers, 
on the other hand also had concerns about the quality of job done by the 
outsourcing company which may disrupt the whole quality of production. As he 
said: 
 
“There are advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing. Well, we don’t have 
many permanent employees in one hand, but in the other hand, employing new 
employees without experience can be a problem too. The management expects 
that the outsourcing employees are handled by outsourcing companies with their 
own quality control. This is the weakness, the outsourcing companies usually 
employ new employees who don’t know anything about the job, so our 
employees have to go there to give trainings. So the problem of quality now is 
occurring. It’s true the labour cost is decreasing now, but it’s not the only thing 
we have to concern.” (manager 2) 
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On the other hand, some of the previous employees who chose to be redundant 
and get severance pay, work for the subcontracting companies while others 
started their own business. Those who joined the outsourcing company, 
according to the union representatives, cannot enjoy the ‘privilege’ they used to 
have such as high wage and union service as there are no unions organising the 
employees in the subcontracting companies at the time of research. As for those 
who chose to set up a business, many of them failed (but the respondent did not 
say how many of them). 
The union representative suggested that the loss suffered by the company for 
three subsequent years is also a main reason of the successful redundancy plan. 
The loss has deteriorated the confidence of the employees that the company 
would be able to survive or relocate their business. 
 
“They (who took the redundancy plan) don’t trust that this company will 
survive because we have loss for 3 years. But in reality 90 per cent who took the 
program failed (in their life).” (union representative 1) 
 
The deteriorating financial condition of the Company, however, has not made 
the union (at the time of writing) worry about the possibility of closure or 
relocation. Union representatives suggested that their optimism was based on 
the fact that the Indonesian market still had significant potential and that labour 
costs are still cheaper compared to other countries (despite the fact that 
managers expressed an opposite view): 
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“Worry? Of course I worry sometimes. However, the possibility [of closure] is 
small, because the Indonesian market still has lots of growth potential; so it’s 
now just how we can compete with others - and I think labour costs here are still 
lower.”(union executive committee member 3) 
 
Moreover, 
 
“Until now they [management] think that high labour costs are less important 
than low material costs; because the cost make-up is 70% material cost; 25% 
maintenance and operation cost; and 5% labour cost. They want to keep this 
business. When the price of oil was increasing, they thought that they could use 
coal, which is abundant in Indonesia. Now they’re installing new machinery. 
I’m still very optimistic. When I gave a speech during the company’s birthday 
ceremony, I said that this company will be able to keep this business with the 
support of all components.” (union executive committee member 2) 
 
The manager said that the overall policy dictated by headquarters in Japan was 
to maintain a presence in Indonesia. However, he could not guarantee that the 
Company would keep its business in Indonesia in the future: 
 
“Our business is slowing down. We serve the local market. But conditions in 
Indonesia… since the year 1997, the start of democratisation, or actually in 
1998 have deteriorated. Many companies have not invested in Indonesia since 
1997 - and Indonesia has lower productivity compared to other countries; for 
example, compared to China where they [the Company] are investing in new 
plant and machinery. Here, we use mainly old machines. We cannot compete 
with other countries. Our business condition is getting worse and worse. Frankly 
speaking, we’re now thinking how just to survive: if the business environment 
gets worse… well, I’m not so sure…” (manager 1) 
 
Public perception of unions 
The affiliate of the union in the Company, the SPN (Serikat Pekerja National—
National Workers Union) is known as one of the strongest unions in Indonesia, 
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organising more than 400,000 members. SPN traditionally organise workers 
from textile and apparel industries as it was previously the textile, apparel, and 
leather section within the SPSI. 
However, with the removal of the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) in 2005, SPN 
lost many of its members as many textile and apparel factories were forced to 
close due to their failure in coping with more extensive competition from low-
cost producer countries such as China, India, and Bangladesh. Based on this 
condition, the SPN started to organise new industries such as logging as well as 
non-formal workers from the sex industry.  
Organising non-formal workers is a strategy implemented by SPN as part of a 
comprehensive strategy taken by its confederation, the KSPI (Konfederasi 
Serikat Pekerja Indonesia—Indonesian Workers Confederation) to persuade the 
community that the union contributes to the improvement of Indonesia workers 
rather than just being an anarchic organisation. As described in the previous 
chapter, the KSPI is currently trying to organise in the informal sector, e.g., 
immigrant workers and agricultural workers, in order to broaden the people’s 
understanding of unionism. The service they give for informal workers are 
mainly in education, particularly health education for sex workers. 
Also stated in the previous chapter, becoming a strong union in Indonesia is not 
without its challenges, due to the widespread negative perception towards 
unionism. Particularly unions which organise textile and apparel industry that 
traditionally serves the biggest employment for Indonesian workers27. The 
                                                 
27http://www.expresstextile.com/20050430/perspectives03.shtml  
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factory closures and business relocation of giant textile and apparel businesses 
are said to be caused by the emerging union development in the workplace that 
forces management to pay higher labour costs whilst facing increasing 
competition28. While the union has lost members because of relocation, 
Indonesian people also blame unions for job losses. Thus, the high 
unemployment rate, the possibility of losing jobs and widespread negative 
perceptions all serve to discourage workers from joining the union. 
 
Technology and skills 
Producing staple fibre, polymer and filament yarn, the general educational 
background of the workers in the Company are high school graduates to enable 
them coping with the production process.  
  
Table 6.3 Summary of workers’ educational background 
Educational level No. of employees Percentage 
Elementary School 48 3.90 
Junior High School 178 14.47 
Senior High School 903 73.41 
Academy 53 4.31 
Undergrad/Postgrad 48 3.90 
                                                 
28 (http://www.ksworkbeat.org/Globalization/Nike_vs_Indonesian_ Workers). 
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The practice of outsourcing has created a challenge in providing workers who 
chose to keep their job in the company with the new job matched with their 
skill. The concern of skill was expressed by union members. They feel that 
moving from their previous job (which has been outsourced) was not easy as 
they might not have sufficient knowledge and experience required in the new 
job. Consequently, when the manager asked them to ‘do the best’ they were 
failed to do it. For such employees, they were usually moved again to another 
department. 
 
“With outsourcing, we were moved to a new department where we might not 
have skill to do the job. I was in the delivery department but it was outsourced. 
Then they put me in the polymer department. I told the union that I did not have 
experience to do the job in this department. Then they moved me again to the 
inspection department, but it was again outsourced. Now they put me in the 
ESH (Environmental Safety and Health), and I think I’m OK now as it does not 
directly connect to the production process” (union member) 
 
Additionally, as has been discussed previously, outsourcing has led the 
company to ‘hire’ new employees without experience (through their outsourcing 
companies). This practice has created concern among the managers; They 
commented that it would be difficult to guarantee high quality of product with 
the new, less-experienced workers, particularly because there was a core 
business was outsourced in the latest outsourcing program: the testing 
department where the quality of product are ensured. 
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6.5 Summary— Evaluating the union’s strategic choices 
The union in this Company has a quite strong tradition and bargaining power 
despite the condition that they operate in a highly competitive industry. As in 
the union in the automotive multinational, the union in this company also 
negotiates over the Collective Labour Agreement (CLA) as a means to regulate 
employment issues that their members are concerned about as well as to protect 
their members (Flanders, 1971). The strong position, it can be argued, is 
supported by the extensive involvement of its affiliate in giving advice and 
advocacy. 
Although the union in the company does not enjoy the closed-shop policy like 
the union in the automotive multinational, union density in the company 
remains very high, nearly 100 per cent, except for certain levels (managerial 
level). Those who are interested to join the union have to pass the one-year 
probation period of the company and fill in the registration form. However, 
there was a mismatched policy where new employees within probation period 
paid the membership fee while they were not eligible to be union members. The 
union proposed that new employees do not pay membership fee and are not 
entitled to union service. 
Similarly to the union in automotive multinational, the union did not have full-
time union professional in giving service to their members despite the high 
membership density. Career progression and performing well at work are the 
main reasons of the absence of salaried union professionals. Instead, they 
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develop a schedule for the union executive committees and representatives to 
alternately picket in the union office to give service for the members. 
The main challenge faced by the union is the outsourcing program implemented 
by the company since 2003. The industrial action they conducted in rejecting 
the outsourcing program has created an image of radicalism. However, the 
union leader commented that radicalism is not their strategy as long as the 
company is still willing to negotiate. The industrial action (demonstration before 
office hours) has attracted management attention and led to a new phase of 
negotiation towards the outsourcing program. Despite the union’s struggle to 
against the program, the members were enthusiastic with the offer due to the 
generous severance pay. Nonetheless, the members are ensured that the union 
would always serve the interest of the members. 
Chapter 5 and chapter 6 have examined male-dominated blue collar industries. 
In chapter 7, a contrast is presented, by examining a service industry: the 
banking sector. 
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CHAPTER 7 
MULTINATIONAL IN BANKING INDUSTRY 
 
This chapter presents the findings of the case study in a foreign bank. This 
multinational has recognised unions since it commenced operations in 
Indonesia. Section 7.1 provides the overview of the Company and the union, 
while section 7.2 examines the union-management relationship which mainly 
represents the unitarist value of industrial relations. Section 7.3 describes the 
Collective agreement process and coverage with some of the major clauses 
being listed down, followed by the union’s internal and external constraints 
based on Huzzard’s strategic choice model (Section 7.4). This chapter ends with 
an evaluation of the union’s strategic choices given the internal and external 
constraints faced by the union. 
 
7.1 Overview: Industry profile 
The banking industry in Indonesia has undergone several changes from 
independence in 1948 to the post-crisis era. During the Sukarno period, the 
industry was dominated by state-owned banks. Suharto maintained this 
situation, though he allowed for the establishment of local private banks in 
1966. However, the ease for new entries was suspended in mid-1968 when the 
number of local private banks reached 122. Foreign banks, on the other hand, 
were given permission to open their branches in Indonesia only in 1968, when 
the regime allowed 11 foreign banks access to the Indonesian market.  
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In October 1988, the Indonesian Government launched a new policy introducing 
liberalisation in the banking industry, by giving permission for the entry of 
private banks, the entry of foreign banks through joint ventures, and loosening 
the requirements for opening branches for all banks. Six years after the second 
liberalisation, the number of private banks doubled to reach 164 banks 
(Pangestu and Habir, 2002: 7). 
However, the increasing numbers of private banks operating in Indonesia were 
not complemented by an adequate system of sound prudential regulation. The 
lack of monitoring and risk management systems towards banking operations, in 
particular, would later lead to the massive bankruptcy of private banks in the 
wake of the 1997 financial crisis. Local banks tended to fund high-risk sectors 
such as property by incurring foreign debts, which were highly sensitive to any 
changes of the exchange rate. When the Rupiah devalued sharply against 
foreign currencies (particularly towards the US dollar), the banks’ debts 
multiplied. In turn, their customers were also facing problems of paying back 
their debts, worsening the impact of the crisis. As a result the sector was facing 
severe liquidity problems.  
Trying to cope with the problem, the Indonesian government took several 
radical steps. First, they closed 16 private banks in Indonesia - which shocked 
people who assumed that the banks would always be propped up by the 
Government (as a lender of last resort). The closures, which were initially 
directed to rebuild the confidence of the people towards the banking system, 
actually made the situation worse – by generating a massive withdrawal in 
savings by the populace from banks, even from previously ‘healthy’ banks. The 
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reaction of the people, worsened by hyperinflation and further contraction on 
the currency exchange rate has exacerbated the banking crisis into an overall 
systemic crisis (see for example: Sato, 2005: 102; Pangestu and Habir, 2002: 
17). 
A banking reconstruction program has since been implemented by the new 
institution created by the Indonesian Government, IBRA (Indonesia Banking 
Restructuring Agency). IBRA then created a classification of banks in Indonesia 
based on the ability to survive. The classification was: 
A Banks: Those banks which did not need to be recapitalised (healthy banks). 
B Banks: Those banks which were worth to be saved but need to be 
recapitalised. 
C Banks: Those banks which had to be liquidated.  
All of the state-owned banks were in the category C Banks. Four of the banks 
were merged and all of the state-owned banks were recapitalised. Among the 
private banks, 72 were A banks, 40 were B banks, and 30 were C banks. The 
banking restructuring program has resulted to the merger of four state-owned 
banks, the closure of 67 private banks, the nationalisation of four private banks, 
and the recapitalisation of seven private banks. 
The government spent 658 trillion Rupiah (around 35 million pounds) as public 
capital injection for the banks under recapitalisation. 
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Table 7.1 Changes in ownership structure in the banking industry 1996, 
2000 and 2002 
 
Number of 
banks before 
restructuring 
Bank 
categories 
 
Restructuring 
process 
 
Number of 
banks after 
restructuring 
A B C 
State Banks  - - 7 4 merged into 1 
1 new 
All recapitalised 
5 
Private national 
banks 
7
2 
4
0 
3
0 
48 closed 
11 recapitalised 
9 merged into 1 
92 
Source: Pangestu and Habir, 2002: 24 
 
The structure and ownership of the industry has hence experienced major 
change in recent years, with foreign-owned banks becoming increasingly 
important as a category although foreign banks have not become sole owners of 
any Indonesian banks. Instead, they actively involved in the restructuring 
programs as major shareholders or consultants of the banks that were 
restructured.  
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Some examples might be of Bank Danamon, Lippo Bank and Bank Central 
Asia, three largest private banks in Indonesia. The new largest shareholder of 
Bank Danamon, Temasek Group of Singapore, took over control by appointing 
half of the directors and commissioners from Singapore. Lippo Bank invited a 
team of 12 advisers from ANG Bering Bank of Holland under a three-year 
contract, while BCA appointed Deutsche Bank as their consultant. Deutsche 
Bank played a major role in the internal development of the ‘new BCA’ (after 
the change of ownership) (Sato, 2004: 116) 
 
7.1.1 The Company 
The Foreign Bank being studied operates in 75 countries worldwide since its 
establishment in 1870 in Europe and currently employs around 78,000 
employees worldwide. Enjoying growing profits since 2002, it claims that it is 
the world’s leading investment bank (Company profile 2006). 
In Indonesia, it commenced business in 1969 when the Indonesian Government 
loosened the permission for foreign banks to open branches in Indonesia and 
currently has around 300 employees. They do not provide service for individual 
(retail) apart from what they call as “high net-worth”, a very prosperous 
individual who has to keep his saving deposit as minimum as 5 billion Rupiah 
(around GBP 263,000) within his account. For this kind of client, they offer 
suggestions on investment plans as well as manage the client’s wealth.  
However, the main business of this foreign bank is within the financial market. 
In Indonesia, they have significant ownership of Government bonds which 
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generally benefit the holder as the Government would always pay the dividend 
and the interest; thus, this is called fixed income instrument. This practice is not 
solely dominated by this foreign bank; most of foreign banks have preference to 
buy Government bonds for the advantage they may obtain. Further explanation 
about this practice will be explored in the later section of the economic context 
of this bank. 
The severe financial crisis which hit Indonesia in 1997 did not negatively affect 
this Company. Instead, the CEO claims that the business so far has been stable 
and that the growth of this multinational is always within the growth path. In 
2006, they claim that their pre-taxed profit was 1,461 billion Rupiah (around 
GBP 77 million), mainly obtained from the profits of bond ownership.  
As the CEO mentioned: 
 
“We’re always on the growth path. Although decline happened, it was only for a 
short time. We only have resources that catch up with the growth of the 
business”. 
 
 
However, the data on the Company’s profitability prior to 2006 cannot be 
obtained and thus, further explanation on the financial condition of the 
Company before, during and after the financial crisis is not possible. 
On the other hand, banking restructuring in Indonesia also meant the 
introduction and encouragement of a new, more comprehensive banking system 
which requires efficiency. In order to reach the efficiency, management 
introduced an early pension programme in 2000 targeting the employees whose 
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qualification were non-university graduate (high school graduate). The reason 
of management offering the programme was that high school graduates would 
find it very difficult to cope with the efficiency programme which involves 
complicated and full computerised system. The reaction of the employees and 
unions will be discussed in later section. 
Contract workers have been hired by the Company since 2003 when the new 
Employment Law No 13 that legitimised the use of contract workers was passed 
by the Government. Neither the permanent employees nor the union have 
reacted unduly negatively to the use of contract workers as the Company has 
assured them that contract workers will not replace permanent employees. The 
Company argue that many positions cannot be filled by contract workers as 
Company’s confidentiality needs to be kept. Contract workers help the 
permanent workers in doing administrative and routine jobs. According to a 
union representative, contract workers comprises less than 10 per cent of total 
employees and that the Company has no intention to increase the number of the 
contract workers. 
In terms of the continuation of their business in Indonesia, the CEO stated that 
the Company would definitely stay and expand their business in Indonesia for 
the emerging market in the future. He also believes that the Government is 
trying to make conditions better and thus, the people should start to think 
positively. Additionally, in contrast to the previous example, as a service 
industry company catering to domestic demand; direct contact with customers is 
essential and hence necessitates “producing” in Indonesia  
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7.1.2 The Union 
The union in the Foreign Bank being studied for this chapter has been 
recognised since 1977 as an in-house union. Formation was initiated by a group 
of employees who also convinced management that a union would assist 
communication between management and employees. In 1998, after the 
democratisation era the union affiliated to Aspek Indonesia (Asosiasi Pekerja 
Indonesia – Indonesian Workers Association), a union federation which 
organises mainly in the banking and retail sectors. However, the name of the 
federation was eventually changed in 2007 to become OPSI (Organisasi Pekerja 
Seluruh Indonesia—All Indonesian Workers Organisation) as a result of internal 
conflict among the executive committee of the federation.  
Regarding the internal conflict within Aspek Indonesia/OPSI, a unionist who 
supported the Aspek Indonesia (not OPSI) stated that some of the (previously) 
Aspek Indonesia members were not satisfied with the result of the union’s 
general meeting in 2003, particularly on the replacement of the union executive 
committee. The dissatisfaction led to some members detached themselves to the 
federation and formed a new federation with the same name although they 
changed it eventually into OPSI.  
A contrasting view was raised from a union representative in the Company 
(who supported OPSI). Although he confirmed that there was a deadlock in the 
union’s general meeting in 2003, he argued that the cause was because some of 
the representatives were trying to bring a political agenda to the union’s 
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program which is against the (independence) spirit of the union. He also claims 
that around 50 per cent of the meeting’s participants were leaving the meeting 
(walked-out). While the general meeting was continued and developed new 
programs, the dissatisfied representatives claimed that they were the ‘true’ 
Aspek Indonesia. Later, they announced that Aspek Indonesia has been abated 
and OPSI was formed. However, the Aspek Indonesia from the representatives 
who continued the general meeting still exists. 
Similarly to the previous case studies, the union in this Company does not have 
a specific recruitment program. They are confident that workers would like to 
join if they could see the positive contribution of the union towards the 
membership. A ‘personal’ approach is used in recruiting new members. 
However, the success of this method really depends on a representative’s 
willingness to approach their colleagues to make them interested in joining the 
union. 
 
“For recruiting new members, we do not have any specific programs .The 
employees can see and examine what we do. Then they may be interested to 
join us. Of course, we’re very welcome.” (union leader) 
 
 
“What I did was, I looked at the employee data and I knew who hadn’t joined 
us. I would try to approach her and explain all the benefits she could get to be 
union members, and that they would have to pay 3,000 Rupiah for the 
membership fee. Some of them complained why they have to pay and I told 
them it was for the administration fee” (union executive committee member 4) 
 
 
Furthermore, they are confident that workers would like to join if they could see 
the positive contribution of union towards the members. Unionists in the 
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Company stated that many new members joined the union because they saw that 
the union has been successful in increasing employee welfare through the 
improvement of the CLA, such as the increase on benefits and medical 
insurance.  
“For recruiting new members, we do not have any specific programs .The 
employees can see and examine what we do. Then they may be interested to 
join us. Of course, we’re very welcome.” (union leader) 
 
Despite this confidence, union membership consists of less than half of the 
around 300 employees (including temporary workers) in the establishment. The 
majority of the union members are female, although the difference is not 
significant (77 females and 61 males by September 2007). The lower union 
density in the Company compared to the other companies being studied in this 
research is argued to be the result of the ‘comfort zone’ that the Company has 
created for its employees (union executive committee member 2). He further 
argues that the comfort zone is not only experienced by the employees of the 
Company but by most employees who work in foreign banks.  
Within the “comfort zone”, employees enjoy relatively high incomes and a good 
working environment. Furthermore, unlike the local banks, foreign banks are 
more secure from the threat of restructuring and recapitalisation which may lead 
to employees lay offs. Job security, high income and the close relationship with 
the management would weaken the employee interest to join the union.  
Furthermore, the large number of female employees compared to male 
employees can also be a reason of low level of union density in the Company. 
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Schur and Kruse (1992) argued that there are several reasons underlying the 
hesitation of female employees to join unions.  
First of all, women are more concerned with home and family responsibilities 
than with conditions in the workplace. Additionally, women may confront 
additional barriers because of family commitments and time pressure (from the 
family members). Second, women are taught to be relatively passive and less 
confrontational than men; thus, they may tend to resign themselves to existing 
job conditions rather than engaging in union aggression activities such as 
strikes. They also argued that women may dislike the ‘masculine cultures’ 
(combative image) of unions - and that unions often failed to cater to the 
specific needs of female workers (Schur and Kruse, 1992: 90). However, 
subsequent research suggests that female workers’ attitude towards unionism is 
similar to that that of male workers and thus the number of members is 
insignificantly different between female and male workers for a given sector 
(see for example Benson and Griffin, 1988 for the case of Australia and Forrest, 
A., 2001 for the case of Canada). 
In this Company, all levels of the employees are eligible to be union members, 
with the exception of temporary workers. The union leader themselves is female 
whose position in the company is also one of the senior managers. Although 
managers are allowed to be union members, a union representative said that 
only two managers joined to date. However, this respondent also argued that the 
term ‘manager’ in the Company is not clearly defined either in the company’s 
rule or within the CLA. He assumed that ‘manager’ is similar to ‘head of a 
division’.  
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 In terms of contract workers, the union deliberately does not recruit this kind of 
workers as they argue that their (the contract workers’) tenure would only be 
temporary. Unlike the union in the automotive components multinational which 
still give advocacy to contract workers, the union in this Company does not 
provide advocacy for non members; which means that contract workers and 
non-member permanent workers cannot consult their problem with union. 
There are no full time union officials in this Company, as the CLA does not 
allow union executive officials to be full-timers. The CLA only states that ‘the 
company will release one of the elected union officials who serve at the 
national/international levels, to work for the organisation everyday after 14:00’. 
This clause affects all union officials who work as employees for the Company; 
thus, the approval from the Department/Division Head where he/she works is 
required for union officials to work for the union. 
The union also encourages their members to perform their work well and that 
union activities should not disrupt their main duty as employees. When a big 
demonstration took place in Jakarta in 2006 on the refusal of the Employment 
Law 13 (2003) revision, members who were willing to join were asked to take 
their annual leave or joined the march during lunch time. 
 
“When there was a big demonstration in Jakarta several months ago, we told our 
members that if they want to join the demonstration, they had to take their 
annual leave so it won’t disrupt their jobs. If they just wanted to see it like for 
only 15 minutes, they had to get permission from their boss; otherwise, they 
could do so during lunch time”. (union leader) 
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7.2 Union-management relationship  
Given the above, it should not be surprising that the concept of ‘partnership’ is 
promoted in the workplace. Management regards the union as part of their team 
in creating a collaborative (‘healthy’) working atmosphere. However, the union 
leader argues that it is not actually 100% partnership; as there are a number of 
issues which are not discussed with the union, particularly those related to 
finance or the budget. 
 
“We can’t say that there is 100% partnership between the union and 
management in this company. There are several matters where the management 
has sole prerogative to decide, usually those related with budget.” 
 
 
Management and the union both favour negotiation in reaching agreements. The 
union leader stated that strikes are only entered into as a “last resort” and that 
they prefer to negotiate, even if it takes time. As she stated: 
 
“We value negotiation… the ‘white collars’ in Indonesia are quite hesitant to 
get involved in industrial action. We prefer to argue with the management even 
if we have to do it overnight. When we cannot reach agreement or if they want 
to show their sympathy to their colleagues, we just wear special signs in our 
costume (e.g. black ribbon) or write our disagreement and put it on their desks - 
but we keep working.”  
 
 
Management and the union suggest that their relationship is always 
“harmonious”. As such, the union largely accepts the agenda of the company 
and communicates it to members. The union in this company provides a 
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communication (voice) function which in turn, gives advantages to management 
and confers a degree of legitimacy to management actions. Both managers and 
union representatives stressed that the Company paid employees very well 
(office jobs typically entailed pay over three times that of the region’s minimum 
wage) and that employees were generally satisfied with their pay rates. As such, 
jobs in the Company were highly desirable as formal service sector jobs. 
 
7.3 Collective agreement process and coverage 
The terms and conditions of employment are negotiated between the union and 
management through collective bargaining, similarly to the automotive and 
textile companies which serves as the means to set ‘the rule of the game’ in 
employment relations. The CLA does not cover all types of employees, 
however; it only covers clerical employees. The officers have their terms and 
conditions of employment determined from the ‘employee handbook’, solely 
produced by the Company which is different for each branch, following local 
rules and norms. The union, however, does not appear to be concerned about the 
use of the handbook, as they say that the contents of the handbook are similar to 
the CLA, essentially covering the rights of the employees. 
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Table 7.2 Major clauses of the collective agreement 
  Clause Brief Description 
6 Recognition 
for the union 
The company recognises that the union must 
be free of prejudice to carry out its business. 
The elected union officials will be treated as 
ordinary employees and they retain full 
opportunities to develop their career. The 
union and the company shall endeavour to 
settle any labour disputes by mutual 
consultation 
7 Union 
facilities 
The company may give permission to 1 
(one) elected union officials/members who 
serves in the National and/or International 
levels, to work for the organisation (union) 
everyday after 14:00. 
The coverage of the CLA is for employees 
with Grade 7B and 8. For employees with 
Grade 7A and above (managerial level) the 
agreement within the employment contract 
would be applied. 
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12 Overtime work Overtime work is of a voluntary nature. 
However, in particular situations the 
company may ask employees to work 
overtime in accordance with the valid 
regulation. Calculations of overtime 
payments will be in accordance with the 
applicable labour regulation and its 
implementation regulation.  
13 Shift work The union and the company recognise that 
for certain types of work a shift system is 
necessary, e.g computer operators and other 
divisions/sections as may be required to 
perform a smooth banking operation. 
14 Remuneration Base pay is driven by local market factors 
with the aim of targeting the market median. 
Bonuses are targeted to rewarding 
individuals based on particular 
achievements. The company and the union 
agree to implement "clean wage system": 
every employee receives salary without 
guaranteed allowances.  
18 Sick pay Sick pay is regulated in accordance with the 
prevailing applicable labour regulation. 
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44 Breach of 
regulations and 
disciplinary 
measures 
Employees who commit serious fault (gross 
misconduct) may be dismissed by the 
company without any severance and service 
pay. Employees who have failed in duties 
and responsibilities (general misconduct) 
will be given letter of warning twice before 
the final letter which may result in the 
termination of employment. The company 
shall inform the union before taking the 
aforementioned action. 
46 Grievance 
procedures 
Any employees not satisfied with the 
company's action or measures may make a 
written report to the union, which will open 
negotiations with the company. If no 
agreement can be reached, both parties 
agree to involve a third party (the 
government) in accordance with the 
prevailing applicable regulation. 
48 Termination of 
employment 
Termination of employment is carried out in 
accordance with the procedures in the 
prevailing applicable regulations. Upon the 
sole initiative of the company, an employee 
may be suspended from the duties. 
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Table 7.3 Salary scale based on grade in Rupiah and in (GBP)  
Grade Description Minimum Median Maximum 
8.1 Messenger 991,667  
(GBP 52) 
1,328,228 
(GBP 70) 
1,664,781 
(GBP 88) 
8.2 Driver 1,140,683 
(GBP 60) 
1,664,779 
(GBP 88) 
2,188,879 
(GBP 115) 
8.3 Junior Clerk 1,292,260 
(GBP 68) 
1,965,368 
(GBP 103) 
2,638,471 
(GBP 139) 
8.4 Clerk 1,441,270 
(GBP 76) 
2,339,173 
(GBP 123) 
3,237,076 
(GBP 170) 
8.5 Senior Clerk 1,739,286 
(GBP 92) 
3,012,278 
(GBP 159) 
4,285,272 
(GBP 226) 
7B Secretary, 
Supervisor 
2,638,471 
(GBP 139) 
3,985,969 
(GBP 210) 
5,333,466 
(GBP 281) 
 
The negotiation of the latest CLA (at the time of the research) was done in one 
day - the shortest amongst the companies being studied. Being “realistic and 
understanding the Company’s situation” and respecting the prerogative rights of 
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the Company were the main reasons for the one-day negotiation.  Furthermore, 
the union only negotiated over an increase in wages which is indicative of a 
market-oriented union, without revising or changing any other substantive terms 
of the agreement.  
 
“Our latest CLA negotiation was done only in one day. We were being realistic: 
we did not want to have a hard negotiation… Realistic with the condition of the 
Company and that we were aware which parts are the management’s right to 
decide” (union executive committee member 3). 
 
 
Before the CLA was negotiated, a draft was made by the union representatives 
and was distributed to the members for their comments. However, only a few 
members actively responded to the draft, while most of them did not appear to 
be concerned with the CLA negotiation process. When the CLA was finally 
distributed amongst the membership, some members started to complain about 
the changes in the agreement. Union representatives, on the other hand stated 
that as long as the complaints were not “formally submitted” to the union, there 
would not be any steps taken to counter them. On this point, one union official 
commented that 
 
“Our members generally are not responsive; they even don’t care about the 
CLA negotiation. I don’t understand why…. the CLA regulates our rights and 
obligations, but they don’t pay much attention to it. When they have problems, 
they come to us, but when they are save players, they just ignore the union” 
(union executive committee member 6) 
 
Additionally 
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“I’ve heard that some members complained about our latest CLA. For us, as 
long as they do not make a formal submission, we will not take any actions to 
respond to the complaints” (union executive committee member 3) 
 
 
The union suggests that the Company always pays respect to the 
implementation of the CLA. However, when the latest CLA was being 
implemented, there was an occasion when the union considered it to be in 
breach. The negotiations agreed that the non-absence reward would be removed 
and replaced by an increase in the meal allowance. The complaints were made 
during the first days of the implementation of the new CLA, that the meal 
allowance had remained the same while the non-absence reward has been 
actively implemented. When the union confirmed the practice to management, 
management said that the there was some time needed to effect the increase of 
the meal allowance, but it would be implemented very soon. The union was 
satisfied with the explanation and communicated the explanation to the 
members.  
 
7.4 Internal and external constraints 
7.4.1 Internal factors 
Union strategy: past and current 
In contrast with the other case studies, the union’s strategy in this Company is 
clear and consistently implemented. The strategy has been more established 
since the union affiliated with its federation, OPSI. The federation hold a 
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philosophy that they and their affiliation have to be dialogue partner for the 
Company in regards of employment issues.  
In order to express and communicate their philosophy to their affiliates and 
companies in which they operate, they make an abbreviation of their basic 
values: SIDURE (Solidarity, Independence, Democracy, Unity, Responsibility 
and Equality). With this philosophy, the federation urges their affiliates to 
negotiate with the Company using complete and accurate data to support their 
argument. Demonstration and strikes are the last actions they would do in 
achieving their purpose. 
The federation has an economic analyst who is active in writing his opinions in 
newspapers as their leader and a banker as the secretary general. The 
combination is expected to show to the employers as well to the members and 
prospective members that the union’s strength is using accurate data and 
analysis in negotiating with the management. Thus, their demand would always 
be realistic and not counter productive and achieved through comprehensive 
negotiations. For this federation, demonstration and strikes would lead to 
investment uncertainty which would disadvantage the work. 
The banker who became the current Secretary General in this federation is also 
a union leader in the Company being studied. Thus, the value of the federation 
is strongly maintained and implemented within the union’s operation in the 
Company. According to a unionist, there have been no significant industrial 
actions in the Company since he was employed in 1998. He claimed that all 
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problems and grievances were settled through negotiations (union executive 
committee member 2). 
Thus, it can be argued that OPSI (and consequently the union in this foreign 
bank) tried to combine the values of a market, class and society- oriented union. 
The regular collective bargaining over employment terms and conditions 
provides an activity of a market-oriented union. However, the union also 
consider themselves as the employer’s partner in creating industrial peace and 
as white-collar employees whose preference are comprehensive negotiation as 
opposed to industrial action—represent an identity as a community and society-
oriented union 
 
Tensions within levels of the union hierarchy 
A hierarchical system of downward and upward communication also appears in 
the union although it is less-layered as the number of the members is fewer than 
the unions in the automotive and textile companies. The executive union 
officials consist of a leader, secretary general, vice president, treasurer and HR 
division are helped by the so-called DPA (Dewan Perwakilan Anggota—
Members’ Representative Committee) in the communication system. 
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Figure 7.1 Union’s information/grievances flow  
 
The effectiveness of the DPA function is questioned, particularly by the union 
executive committee. They argued that the DPA does not do their function 
effectively both for downward and upwards communication. In terms of 
downward information, the DPA does not actively seek information from the 
union executive committee nor does it distribute it to members. As for upward 
information, members tend to directly report their problems to the union leader 
or secretary general rather than to their representative. It can be argued that the 
non-responsiveness of the committee has led to a hesitation of members to come 
to them to seek advice. 
 
“The DPA are supposed to distribute information to the members. But 
sometimes even when they know the information, they do not communicate it 
with our members because they are too busy with their jobs. When I was only a 
member, sometimes I asked them some questions about issues the union is 
negotiating, but they could not answer them; they even didn’t know what was 
going on in the union organisation” (union executive committee members 4 and 
5) 
 
 
Leader
Vice President Secretary General Treasurer HR Division
Members’ Representatives Committee
Members
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Financial Resources 
The union funds all their activities form the monthly membership fee paid by 
the members, which is 3000 Rupiah per member. Similar to the other unions 
researched in this thesis, the union cooperated with the HR Department in 
collecting member fees by direct debit from a member’s monthly salary. Some 
of the fees were contributed to the federation, which is 500 Rupiah per member.  
Despite the relatively more limited funds this union had compared to the other 
unions in this research, a union representative claimed that the funding 
resources were sufficient for their activities. It can be argued that unlike the 
other unions which sometimes conducted big events out of the establishment 
which entailed transportation and accommodation costs, the union in the 
Company conducted their activities within the establishment, except for the 
training provided by the federation. Training, meetings and negotiations are 
always held in the office and thus adequate funding was not perceived to be an 
issue. 
Furthermore, in contrast with the union in the Automotive Company, the union 
willingly provides funding to the federation, as the federation provided useful 
training and advice for them.  
 
7.4.2 External factors 
Employer strategies 
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Similar to the previous case studies, the employer chose to be a ‘consultor’ in 
employment relations, by recognising the union as the ‘voice’ of employees; 
thus, the union provides a communication channel from the management to the 
workforce and vice versa. The CEO stated that the union was part of the team in 
creating a healthy work environment. The union is involved in negotiation over 
the issues which are not clearly stated in the Employment Law No. 13 Year 
2003 and are not concerned as part of management prerogative rights. 
Therefore, the union has an extensive limitation on the issues which can be 
discussed with the management.  
 
Economic context 
It can be argued that foreign banks operating in Indonesia are “safe players” 
resulting from the nature of their operation which is more limited compared to 
(conventional) local banks. From an interview with a bank expert, the 
arguments of saver environment of foreign banks compared to (conventional) 
local banks are: 
 
“First of all, unlike local banks which provide credits both for retail (individual) 
and (any kinds of) business, foreign banks do not allocate their loans for 
individual and small business. Foreign banks have mainly focused their 
operation on the corporate sector, particularly to multinationals operating in 
Indonesia and top domestic corporations which have more extensive credit-risk 
profile (see also Pangestu and Habir, 2002: 14). Furthermore, all foreign banks 
require high amount of deposit in their customer’s account, usually more than 
20 million Rupiah (around 1,100 pounds) while local banks usually only require 
50,000 Rupiah (3 pounds) for the deposit. Thus, only ‘selective’ people can be 
customers of local banks”. 
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Foreign banks also have very limited branches all around Indonesia, usually 
only in big cities, leading to easier monitoring mechanism compared to local 
banks which have many branches. The data in the table 7.1 above shows that the 
number of (conventional) local banks was 119 with 8,996 branches while the 
number of foreign banks was 11 with 114 branches. The foreign bank studied in 
this research only has two branches in two big cities in Indonesia. 
Additionally, one of the advantages of foreign banks is that they have offices 
and branches all around the world. The advantage is sometimes used to do a 
practice which is called ‘carry trade’. Carry trade is a practice where a foreign 
banks buy a currency of a country when the price of the currency is low, 
converted onto another currency and put it as a short-term government deposit 
of a country which offer high interest rate. They will withdraw the deposit and 
gain the interest and use their money for another carry trade. Thus their money 
is safe as they will always get the return from the short term deposit, unlike 
local banks which use the money to fund businesses or personal loans. 
As noted above, the banking restructuring in Indonesia requires efficiency from 
all banks operating in this country. In order to achieve efficiency, the Company 
offered an early pension package for non-university graduates (high school 
graduates) as the management argued that there would be difficulties for them 
to cope with the innovations on the system which involve complicated 
instruction and are fully computerised. 
Not all of the employees who were offered this package voluntarily accepted it 
particularly those who had worked more than 10 years in the Company. Union 
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members who were offered this package tried to seek support and advice from 
the union. The union advised them to accept the package as it would benefit 
them in long term as the career progression for high school graduates would be 
very hard as many were recruited by the Company. The union also argued that 
the lump sum given by the Company was very sufficient, enabling those who 
took the packed started their own business. A union representative further 
argued that their advice was accurate as there were hardly any complaints after 
the programme was being implemented. 
 
“When the Company offered the early pension package in 2000, not all of the 
employees being offered accepted it. Our members asked for our advice. We 
told them that this is a good offer from the Company. They have to think that 
the work in the future would be more complex and involve high technology. It 
would be very difficult for them to cope with the innovations and they would 
experience a stagnant career. So, we advised them to take the package and start 
a business” (union executive committee member 2) 
 
 
Apart from the early pension package introduced in 2000, there were no other 
programmes introduced by the Company to reduce the number of employees. 
According to a unionist, the efficiency program affects positively to increase of 
the number of clients and transaction which result to higher workload to the 
employees. In order to cope with the growing business, the Company started to 
hire new workers; however the type of workers hired by the Company is 
contract workers instead of permanent ones.  
However, a union representative stated that he had concerns over the use of 
contract workers for the sustainability of the Company business. He argued that 
contract workers may perform poorly as the nature of their contract is 
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temporary; they have a weak attachment to the Company and thus they would 
think that their termination for their mistake would not be a big problem. In 
contrast, their poor performance might result to the Company lose its clients and 
business. Although it has not happened, the unionist argued that the company 
has to think about this possibility. 
 
Reaction to external challenges 
As noted above, low labour costs are not the main attraction for multinationals 
operating in the banking industry. Rather, they try to recruit and retain highly 
productive workers. As such, one of the main concerns of the CEO has been 
Employment Law 13 (2003). The CEO argued that this law gives too little 
discretion to the company to dismiss or demote poorly performing individuals 
(severance pay for example, must be paid, even if it is the dismissed employee 
who has committed gross negligence) and thus is a constraint on the managerial 
prerogative of “hire and fire”: 
  
 “I think the law is not good for the spirit of competitiveness. We should stick to 
competitiveness. For example, the spirit of the law currently doesn’t allow us to 
penalise non-performers. Some will stay and perform poorly and get paid rather 
than perhaps getting a better [for them] job elsewhere. The law guarantees a 
comfort zone for non-performers”.  
 
 
Despite believing that the government of Indonesia is trying hard to make 
everything better, managers also want to see improvements in the legal system, 
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stability of the currency, public infrastructure, and labour quality. But the 
company has assured employees that they will stay in Indonesia. 
 
Public perception of union 
The federation to which the union in the Company affiliate (OPSI) mostly 
organise white collar workers from the banking and telecommunication sectors. 
Their philosophy of becoming management’s partner and pursue their demands 
through negotiations is expected to remove the negative public perception over 
chaotic unionism. They claim that their approach in winning the ‘fight’ with the 
employer by comprehensive analysis, negotiation and shaping public perception 
through publication is the most effective as the community have been tired with 
aggressive action of trade union (such as strikes and demonstrations). 
However, despite the effort of showing a “non-chaotic” approach of unionism, 
the OPSI-Aspek Indonesia case is a general phenomenon of unionism in 
Indonesia. Many unions in Indonesia are formed based on some of the 
members’ dissatisfaction of the union organisation. Tjandraningsih (2007) 
argues that the dissatisfaction is usually led by practical issues rather than 
ideological problems; thus, these unions tend to compete in gaining members. 
Members usually choose the union which they have close relationship with the 
representatives. Competition among unions has created an exclusive 
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environment whereby unions are reluctant to cooperate among them and that 
their concern is just over the welfare of the members where they operate.29 
 
7.5 Summary—Evaluating Union’s Strategic Choice 
The union in the foreign bank is the only union in this research which has a 
clear definition on its value and approach: SIDURE (Solidarity, Independency, 
Democracy, Unity, Responsibility and Equality). The union implements this 
value by promoting the partnership relationship with management and 
emphasises on comprehensive negotiation while avoiding ‘hard’ industrial 
actions such as strikes and boycotts. 
As quoted previously:  
 
“We value negotiation… the ‘white collars’ in Indonesia are quite hesitant to 
get involved in industrial action. We prefer to argue with the management even 
if we have to do it overnight. When we cannot reach agreement or if they want 
to show their sympathy to their colleagues, we just wear special signs in our 
costume (e.g. black ribbon) or write our disagreement and put it on their desks - 
but we keep working.” (union leader) 
 
Despite the clear value of union membership, the union suffers low interest 
from employees to join, as well as low participation by union members. As 
noted, one of the main reasons is that this union operates within a ‘comfort 
zone’ where employees receive a relatively high salary as well as job security. 
The workload given to each employee has also prevented them from having 
                                                 
29 See the article of Tjandraningsih, I in http://indoprogress.blogspot.com/2007/08/serikat-buruhserikat-
pekerja-di.html  
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more time for union activities. Thus, it is not surprising that the union does not 
have full time unionist to serve the members, given the additional fact that the 
CLA does not allow union executive officials to be full-timers.  
The low interest toward union activities can also be described by the low 
response on the CLA proposals distributed to members before they are formally 
approved and singed by the union and the management. 
 
“Our members generally are not responsive; they even don’t care about the 
CLA negotiation. I don’t understand why…. the CLA regulates our rights and 
obligations, but they don’t pay much attention to it. When they have problems, 
they come to us, but when they are save players, they just ignore the union” 
(union executive committee member 6) 
 
 
However, the union leader and the general secretary did not show any concerns 
neither over the low union density nor the low interest among the members on 
participation. There is no specific recruitment program to attract new members 
to join the union. The recruitment of new members depends highly on ‘internal’ 
willingness of employees to join when they see the positive contribution of the 
union in improving the work condition. 
The next chapter will again discuss the union strategy in a manufacturing 
company, i.e., an automotive component multinational. While the other unions 
described previously affiliated with a union federation, the union in the next 
case study chose to be an independent in-house union as a result of 
disappointment over their previous affiliation. 
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CHAPTER 8 
MULTINATIONAL IN THE AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENT INDUSTRY 
 
The previous case study has demonstrated the behaviour of so-called ‘white-
collar unionism’ operating in a foreign bank, whereby the union has consistently 
maintained ‘partnership’ approach towards the management as their strategy. 
However, despite having a clear strategy, the union membership is relatively 
low. Working in a ‘comfort zone’ with high salary and good working conditions 
is argued to be the main reason of the low interest among employees to join the 
union. Furthermore, the union did not have a recruitment program and believed 
that employees would join the union if they see the union’s success story in 
defending the aspiration of its members. 
This chapter again presents the findings of the case study in a manufacturing 
company; an automotive component multinational. This multinational has 
recognised an in-house union which was founded in 2003 following 
dissatisfaction over the previous union affiliate. The in-house union is the 
majority union while the union which affiliates to a federation still exists 
although the number of its members keeps diminishing. 
Similar to the previous chapters, section 8.1 provides the overview of the 
Company and the union, while section 8.2 examines union-management 
relationship following by the collective agreement coverage which will be 
explored in section 8.3. The final sections (section 8.4 and 8.5) discuss the 
internal and external constraints based on Huzzard’s strategic choice model and 
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the evaluation of the union’s strategic choice given the constraints previously 
explored. 
 
8.1 Overview 
8.1.1 The Company  
The company was established in Indonesia in 1975 as a joint venture between a 
Japanese company and an Indonesian company. The main business of the 
Company is manufacturing automotive components in its two plants in Sunter 
(Jakarta) and Bekasi in West Java. The Sunter plant was built in 1978 and at the 
time of research employed around 930 employees. The Bekasi plant, which was 
built in 1996, provides larger and more complete facilities and employed around 
950 (at the time of research). 
The majority of employees in the Company are males: around 85 per cent. The 
employment of females in the plants was actually just started no sooner than in 
2003, when a new President Director was appointed. He viewed that the 
absence of females in the plants is a practice of discrimination in the workplace. 
Thus he started to hire female employees to work in the plants as short-term 
contract workers. Most of female employees are contract workers and work in 
the plants; only 2 of them are managers (permanent workers).  
The use of contract workers in the Company began when the government 
legitimised this practice in Employment law No. 13 Year 2003. The reaction of 
the Union towards the use of contract workers will be discussed in the 
subsequent chapter. The management argued that contract workers enable them 
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to cope with production uncertainty and hence provide numerical flexibility. 
When the domestic market is slowing down, they usually cut the number of 
contract workers. At the time of research, contract workers comprised 18 per 
cent of total employees. 
In terms of sales, the Company has enjoyed an increasing trend, except in 1998 
when the regional financial crisis hit Indonesia severely. As the growth of the 
business highly depends on the growth of automotive industry, the highest sales 
was achieved in 2004 when the domestic car industry reached its highest sales 
volume after the financial crisis.          
                              
Figure 8.1 Sales Growth 1978-2004 
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One of the Company’s biggest customers is a giant Japanese car maker which 
dominates the Indonesian market. Thus, management and the union were 
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optimistic that this multinational will remain in Indonesia as long as the 
Japanese car maker still operates in Indonesia. The Japanese car multinational 
itself is the market leader in Indonesia which adds to optimism for the 
Company. 
Moreover, this multinational has advocated the concept of a global production 
network whereby each country it operates in produces different products. In the 
South-East Asian region, Indonesia is one of the main subsidiaries of the 
multinational. 
 
“I think this company is great, they like distributing profits. So in Thailand they 
make this, in Indonesia they make that, in the US they make something else…so 
they shouldn’t close their plant here as it is an integral part of their network”. 
(manager 4) 
 
 
However, managers also demonstrated their concerns over the continuity of the 
multinational’s business. They noticed that the multinational chose Thailand as 
the production centre in the ASEAN region. There was a competition between 
Indonesia and Thailand before Thailand was chosen, but Indonesia lost it. 
Managers assumed that it was because of the lower discipline of Indonesian 
workers as well as external factors such as political and economic stability. 
 
“They (the Indonesian workers) are smart…but the discipline is low… Before 
they chose Thailand, our competition was fair, and our quality was better. Well, 
may be Thailand’s strength is their stability” (manager 4). 
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Managers were also concerned with Indonesia’s labour laws and infrastructure 
which according to them, were not adequately supporting business and were 
discouraging foreign investment: 
 
“The labour law is protecting the labour so much. The government tried to 
change the labour law but it was postponed. One of the inconvenience, that 
contradicts is that when employees want to go to a demo, the company has to 
provide the bus so they can reach the place where the demo takes place… And 
also what important is the infrastructure in Jakarta is very bad. The car in 
Indonesia is only 500,000 units. Compared to Japan, this figure is far much less. 
But why we see lots of traffic jams here; it’s because the infrastructure is bad.” 
(manager 1).  
 
 
8.1.2 The Union 
The union in this multinational has been recognised since the 1980s and 
previously had an affiliation with the SPSI. However, by 2003, many union 
executive committees and members were no longer satisfied with the SPSI and 
decided to detach themselves. An independent in-house union was then formed 
and run by an (ex-SPSI) executive committee. However, there are several SPSI 
members that still maintain their membership in SPSI; thus there are two unions 
in the Company although the membership of SPSI in the Company accounted 
not more than 5 per cent of total union membership.  
Union membership in this company is voluntary. However, approximately two-
thirds of the employees who are eligible to be union members were registered as 
union members (at the time of research). Those who are eligible are employees 
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of level 1-5 out of 12 levels in the Company. Level 1-5 employees are attributed 
as ‘workers’ while level 6-12 are ‘managers’. The managers argue that the 
limitation adhering to the Law No. 13 Year 2003 that introduced the concept of 
‘employees’ and thus are eligible to be union members; and ‘employers’ or 
managers in the Company’s term. 
The Union, on the other hand, expects that managers can also be union 
members, at least managers at level 6. They believe that having managers as 
part of union members will enhance their bargaining position as managers will 
have a better view towards the condition of the Company and thus better 
information useful for negotiation. However, management rejected their 
proposal; it is likely that the current limitation would still remain in the future. 
It can be argued that the relatively high density of union membership in the 
Company was generated by the generous membership benefits (e.g., a loan) 
provided by the union. With this loan, union members were able to buy a house, 
motorbike, and electronic goods as part of this mortgage arrangement. 
 
“Well, so far they (the employees) come to the union office and say they want 
to be union members. I think they are interested to be union members because 
we have loan facilities for members. It’s a loan to buy a house, motorbike and 
electronic items. And yes, it’s exclusive for our members” (union executive 
committee member 2) 
 
 
In providing the loan, the union co-operates with other employee co-operatives 
as well as with other companies. For example, in providing motorbike loans, 
union co-operates with the ASTRA employee cooperative while in providing 
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electronic goods, it works together with Federal International Siemens (at the 
time of research). The union launches its programs regularly, and interested 
members could register themselves by fulfilling all the requirements (e.g. proof 
of identity, letter of agreement of deducted wages every month for the payment, 
etc). However, the personal loan works in a different way. The union uses the 
membership fee in providing a personal loan for the members who will pay it 
back in several terms without having to pay the interest. 
Union representatives argue that providing loans for members gives the union 
double advantages: first, as discussed above, it is one of the main reasons for 
employees to join the union; second, it generates income for union from the 
loans/mortgages interest union gets apart from the personal loan. 
The loan is eligible only to the in-house union members although accessible for 
level 6 upward employees who, according to the company’s regulations, cannot 
be union members. The previous union leader argued that this policy is to 
support their preference of only having one union as it will strengthen their 
position towards the management. As he stated: ‘our power lies on the 
coherence among us. When we have disagreement among each other, how can 
we face the Management?’ Additionally he also stated that giving access to 
level 6 upwards (to the loan) is because they are not in any of the two unions’ 
side.  
The union had also expressed their concern over the practice of hiring contract 
workers. However, under Indonesian labour law the Company can hire contract 
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workers; despite union opposition. The Company was successful at negotiations 
though, by using the law as their argument. 
 
“The first time we heard of the company’s plan to use contract workers, we 
thought about the advantages and disadvantages. I remember 5 years ago, we 
had a debate with the management over the use of contract workers and we 
won, we did not use contract workers. But the minister changed, the president 
changed, the law changed…and the new president director then decided to use 
contract workers as it is common in other countries. And he recruits female 
workers which is also a new phenomenon here…about 4 years ago. We tried to 
negotiate, but we lost” (Union executive committee member 3). 
 
 
The union argued that female contract workers working in the plants have 
created an unexpected negative moral impact among the fellow male workers. 
They had received some complaints from employees and the families of 
employees about the suspicion of ‘love affairs’ at work, particularly from the 
wives of the employees. The union has discussed this problem with the 
management; the solutions the Company has offered to minimise the problem 
include providing a separate place for male and female restrooms as well as 
working together with the union in giving advice or warning to employees 
involved in such problem. 
 
“One of the problems we’re facing now is the love affairs among the 
employees. If both of them (the male and female) are singles, it’s ok for us. But 
the problem is, the love affairs also involve employees who already have a 
family. We got a letter from a wife of an employee, asking us to solve the 
problem. Usually their productivity is also disturbed when they have problem in 
their family. We’ve discussed it with the management” (union executive 
committee member 4)  
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The contract workers were previously ineligible to be union members as the 
union; union executive officials argued that the administration of contract 
workers would be very difficult as they work temporarily (maximum 2 years). 
As union members have rights to have membership identity card and loan 
facilities, implementing the same rights to contract workers who wish to be 
members would be a problem; providing membership cards would be costly and 
would be used only for a short term, and loan facilities would have higher risk 
as the duration of the employment in uncertain. 
 
“We were debating among us whether contract workers can be our members. 
First, our administrative matters would be more complicated, like providing the 
membership cards. But when they have problems with their boss and they ask 
for our advocacy, we do help them” (union executive committee member 4) 
 
 
The union had proposed that management hire a full-time union professional 
who was in charge of day-to-day union operations. The proposal was granted by 
management; and a union full-timer was hired as the Company’s contract 
worker and paid by the Company. However, despite the dependence of the 
union towards the company in terms of financial matters, one manager thought 
that the union was tough during negotiations; they did not merely compromise 
to the company’s interests (manager 1). 
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8.2 Union-management relationship  
The management in the Company also implements a concept of ‘consultative 
employment relations’ in the workplace, similarly to all the previous case 
studies. Management cooperates with the union in creating a good environment 
in the workplace in order to try and ensure high productivity. The condition of 
high productivity is seen as necessary; because in Indonesia, the company does 
not have any competitive advantages but high quality and on-time delivery 
products.  
 
“Their (union) contribution is in providing a good working environment. As I 
said, the items we manufacture are not designed here. Our contribution towards 
the business success is actually very low. So our contribution is creating a good 
and supportive working environment, that’s the most important thing. We 
develop this company to be an efficient one, customer oriented, and deliver 
good quality products. If we improved technology, then we could significantly 
improve our performance. But we don’t have it; as the government does not 
support us (in implementing technology transfer from the multinational). So the 
union’s contribution is definitely on increasing labour productivity by creating 
good working conditions. (manager 2) 
 
 
As such, management feels that the union is generally cooperative in helping 
them to achieve a high-productivity environment; on the other hand the union 
also feels that management treat them as partners in the workplace. According 
to both parties, the implementation of partnership concept is through regular 
meetings between union and management where they discuss issues and try to 
look for solutions for any problems occurred. Management also decided to 
disclose all information including financial information to the union in order to 
gain union’s trust and support: 
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“The Union is very co-operative. But it may be because it’s the president 
director’s policy to disclose all information including financial data to all 
managers and the union, so they can understand the situation of the company 
right now. When the company provides information, the union can understand 
better the situation of the company, so that they’ll be more co-operative”. 
(manager 1) 
 
 
In 2003 the union conducted an industrial action called ‘red ribbon action’ for a 
week. It was not a total strike; rather, there were orations for a week to canvass 
a plan to refuse overtime on the subsequent Saturday. In the CLA, overtime is 
voluntary; therefore, refusing overtime did not violate agreed conventions. 
However, refusing overtime in this Company is considered as a serious action as 
it will affect the production continuation of the Japanese car company which is 
their main costumer. Their products are continually delivered to the car maker 
every two hours; thus, stopping the production for even only two hours will 
cause production chaos at the car maker company. 
The issue that led to a ban on overtime was salary adjustment for senior 
employees. The Indonesian government increased the minimum regional wages 
in 2003, in order that new employees would receive an income that was the 
same amount as established employees. The union proposed an adjustment but 
it was rejected. As one management respondent argued: 
  
“Management did not stop the negotiation in the first place, so when they 
undertook industrial action, first, they left the negotiation table. Second, the loss 
because of the action was suffered by both the company and employees. Third, 
they damaged the relationship which had been built so far and so we also had 
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right to take some actions. If they stopped working we would say it was a 
disturbance.” (manager 2) 
 
 
Furthermore, 
 
“We gave them two alternatives. First, go back to negotiations, or we involved 
the police. We gave them time to decide. They chose to negotiate, and then we 
achieved an agreement. We told them again that the loss was suffered by both 
parties. We also told them that the major investor is Japan and that the local 
partner could not produce this product without them. So, if we don’t play our 
role properly, they might relocate their business as what is happening currently. 
We reminded them that we have competitive advantage internationally: not 
technology - but cheap labour costs.” (manager 2) 
 
Therefore, before the strike was conducted on Saturday, management and the 
union were back to the negotiation table. A solution was then agreed by both 
parties, where the company paid the established (senior) employees 0.75 of one 
month’s wage. Even though the union did not get what they proposed, they said 
that they were satisfied with the result.  
 
“The compensation was actually an effort to calm down the employees. If they 
didn’t give anything, then employees would always remember the unfairness. 
But with this compensation, I think it’s better…at least the union didn’t totally 
lose on negotiation…. It was just to show that the employees were with us. 
(union executive committee member 2) 
 
Although there were no direct effects from the action such as employee 
dismissals, indirect effects were felt by their members, particularly by those 
who actively supported the action such as more strict performance appraisal and 
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slower career progression. The previous union leader who led the action had to 
resign as the result of pressure from management. 
According to union and management respondents, their relationship soon 
“recovered” after this incident was resolved. Union executive committee 
members argued that their bargaining position towards the management was 
stronger after the action as the management could see that the union was 
supported by the majority of employees. In gaining the union’s support and 
avoiding a frontal approach in the future, the management currently allows the 
union to have access to the company’s financial reports, which can be used for 
bonus negotiations. The union feels that this is a positive outcome from the 
action. 
However, union executive committee members prefer not to conduct such 
action in the future as long as negotiations can still be done as they cannot avoid 
the possibility of victims from such action as have been discussed above 
(resignation and slower career progression) 
 
“Although at the end we got the money we’ve struggled for, everybody could 
still recall the bad environment in the workplace between the managers and our 
members. As for me, I hope this won’t happen again in the future. As union 
executive committees, we have to negotiate as hard as we can, don’t involve our 
members if possible” (union executive committee member 2) 
 
8.3 Collective agreement process and coverage 
As in the previous case studies, the union in the Company negotiates over the 
terms and conditions of employment with the company through collective 
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bargaining. There is one Collective agreement in the Company, similar to the 
other multinationals, covering the terms and conditions for employees in level 
1-5. The terms and conditions of employment from employees in level 6-12 are 
governed in the Company’s handbook, created solely by the Company. 
The negotiations over the CLA usually take about 6 (six) months including one-
month’s intensive negotiation. The union forms a committee for bargaining, 
which first analyses and lists the regulations governing employment 
implemented in Indonesia. The Laws and rules are the frames necessary to make 
any changes in the CLA.  They also seek for information from other companies 
in their neighbourhood or in similar industries to about the CLA they have and 
compare it with their previous one. 
They develop a proposal and distribute it to their members and ask for their 
suggestions. The union leader stated that their members are active in giving 
suggestions, particularly in terms of amounts of money. The management also 
makes a proposal and each party examines the other party’s proposal. The one-
month full negotiation is conducted after the union and the management have 
observed the proposals. 
 
Table 8.1 Major clauses of the collective agreement 
1 (4) Employment Status (a). Permanent employees: have no 
time limit and are paid monthly. (b). 
contract-based employees: are hired 
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for a definite time, based on a 
contract, as regulated in Law No.13 
year 2003 clause 59.  
1 (7) Majority trade union Trade union which has the most 
members, and act as the name of the 
workers level 1-5 in bargaining with 
the company. 
1(9) Trade union members The workers who are not in 
managerial positions. 
3 The coverage of the 
collective agreement 
The collective agreement is for 
employees in level 1-5.  
5 Company-trade union 
relationship 
The company and the union are 
obliged to cooperate in creating 
harmonious industrial relations 
environment. 
8 (4) Negotiation principles Negotiations between the company 
and union must be based on good 
wills of the two parties; the company 
tries to avoid lockouts, while the 
union avoid the strikes. 
13 (1) Performance Appraisal Performance appraisal is conducted at 
least once a year. The mechanism 
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should be explained to the union 
before being implemented. 
14 Job ladder and level of 
employment 
Job ladder is set by the company 
based on the function of the 
employees within the organisational 
structure. Those employees who do 
not hold any positions is call 'non 
title'. There are 12 positions apart 
from the non-title within this 
company: leader, foreman, sub section 
chief, assistant section manager, 
section manager, department manager, 
assistant general manager, general 
manager, deputy director, director, 
vice president director, and president 
director. 
15 (3) Right to refuse promotion 
to managerial position 
The employees who are promoted to 
managerial positions will 
automatically lose her right to be 
union member. Thus, she can refuse 
the promotion by writing a letter to the 
employer no more than one week after 
the promotion. 
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20 Work hours Work hours is 40 hours in 5 working 
days per week. Work schedule is 
arranged by the employer and the 
union. 
21 (2) Work calendar Work calendar is the plan of working 
days in a year, set by the employer 
and the union. 
23 (2) Overtime pay Overtime pay is calculated based on 
hourly wage (which is 1/173 of 
monthly income) as follow: 1 hour: 
1.5 X hourly wage; 2-7 hours: 2 X 
hourly wage; 8 hours onwards: 3X 
hourly wage. 
24 (1) Remuneration 
components 
Salary components are: base salary, 
fixed allowance, non-fixed allowance, 
incentives, overtime pay. 
25 (1) Base salary Base salary is set on the basis of 
agreement between the company and 
the employed worker. 
28 (1) Annual wage increase The company will increase the wage 
once a year, on January 1. For the 
workers level 1-5, the amount of the 
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wage increase is on the basis of the 
agreement between company and 
union. 
28 (3) Special wage increase Special wage increase can take place 
if there are unforeseen factors that 
significantly increase the consumer’s 
price index or if there is a change in 
government policy. This special 
increase is discussed by the employer 
and the union. 
42 Annual bonus Annual bonus is awarded to the 
employees if the company gain profit 
in a budget year. Employees in level 
1-5 will receive the bonus based on 
the company profit and their 
performance appraisal. The bonus for 
the managerial positions is set by the 
employer. 
63 Menstrual leave Women employees have right to take 
2-day menstrual leave every month.  
75 Disciplinary sanction The company and union work together 
to enforce the discipline among the 
employees. Hence, employees that 
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violate the collective agreement can 
be sanctioned 
76 Spoken notification Employee who has done a non-
significant mistake will be given this 
kind of notification by his manager. 
His manager however, takes a note 
about this notification where the 
employee has to sign the note. 
77 Written notification Written notification is a kind of 
punishment for employees who violate 
the company's rules. The written 
notification should mention the 
mistake the employee has done. There 
are 3 steps of this notification:  1. First 
notification, applicable for 3 months; 
2. Second notification, applicable for 
6 months; and 3. Third notification, 
applicable for 6 months.                              
80 Employment dismissal Employer may dismiss an employee if 
he: 1. Conducts a serious mistake or 
violation such as being dishonest, 
being drunk in workplace, reveal 
company's secrets; 2.  When he still 
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breaks company's rules after the third 
written notification; 3. Being absent 
for more than 5 days without 
notification and authorised proof. 
85 Grievances Employees can say their complaints 
directly to the employer or through the 
union. If they do not satisfy with the 
action taken by the company / union, 
they can go to the government agent. 
 
 
8.4 Internal and external constraints 
8.4.1 Internal factors 
Union strategy: past and current 
The union regard themselves as the partner of management, as an institution that 
balances the governance of the Company. In implementing the partnership 
concept, the union and management held routine meetings every two months to 
share each party’s concerns. The union does not want to be seen as an obstacle 
to the company’s growth.   
Hence, the union prefers negotiation with management. The union leader, who 
was newly appointed at the time of the research, said that the union would rather 
avoid strikes or any actions that would lead to a chaotic condition in future. 
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“Even we had lots of differences, but we solve them in negotiation forums… 
well, no strike… Yes, (we emphasise negotiations) as long as management 
wants to negotiate, negotiation will be done.” (union executive committee 
member 1) 
 
 
However, management think that the level of union’s cooperation with 
management depends on the leader. 
 
“It depends on the leader. The previous representatives demanded too much, for 
example, salary. But the current one is more co-operative. For example, they 
want to become involved in patrol system activity. This activity is conducted 
every month to examine potential dangers and hence improvement in the work 
environment. This is conducted by a committee involving related managers.” 
(manager 3) 
 
Tensions within levels of the union hierarchy 
As the number of members is relatively high in the Company, a hierarchical 
downward and upward communication system to ensure the union’s voice 
function is also implemented by the union in the Company, similar to the 
previous case studies although it is simpler than that in the automotive 
company. The union executive committee which comprises 19 unionists are 
helped by around 60 wakil seksi (section representatives, which will be termed 
representatives accordingly) in distributing downward information and handling 
upward complaints and suggestions and grievances. 
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Figure 8.2 Union information/grievances flow 
 
 
Union executive committee members argue that the effectiveness of this system 
has to be improved, due to the different shifts applied for the factory workers 
which have created communication gaps among the representatives. As the 
union meetings are held during the daytime, representatives who have to work 
night shift would find difficulty to gain information and thus in distributing the 
information to the members.  
In trying to overcome the communication problem in the night shift, the union 
had proposed to the Company to have two representatives in each section to 
cover both shifts. However, the proposal had been rejected as the two 
representatives might have to leave their jobs if the union conducted activities 
and thus, might disturb the production process. The union has also tried to 
provide a note book in each section where they write the minutes of meeting 
that can be read by night-shift union representatives. However, not all 
representatives would read the book and as night shift workers rarely held 
meetings, the distribution of information is still a problem. The union has also 
tried to provide a notice board where their members can read any announcement 
Union executive committees 
(19 unionists) 
Representatives Representatives 
 
Representatives 
Members Members Members 
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and information. This means has not overcome the problem either as members 
prefers to take away the information attached on the notice board for his own 
use rather than make a copy or make a note. 
Upward information or grievances procedures on the other hand, hardly follow 
the hierarchical system, similar to that in the automotive company. Members 
prefer to talk directly to the union executive committee members by sending 
text messages or visiting the union office in discussing their complaints and 
problems. However, unlike their counterparts in the automotive company, the 
union executive committee members in this company do not feel disturbed by 
such practice. 
 
“Our member can contact us directly when they have problems. They can ring 
us or text us, anything they prefer. They even sometimes just text us saying they 
are having a problem and we call them back to help them. Otherwise, they can 
come to our office and talk to our full timer or the union executive committee 
officer who is in the office.” (union executive committee member 1) 
 
Financial Resources 
The union members pay the monthly membership fee of Rp 2,500 regardless of 
their level of employment. When the union was still affiliated with the SPSI, 
half of the membership fees gathered was allocated to the SPSI as the COS 
(Check Off System). The custom of paying the affiliate had been one of the 
main reasons of the union’s detachment with the SPSI. Union executive 
committee members argued that the union did not get any advantages of having 
affiliation despite their COS payment. The union executive committee further 
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argued that it would be more useful if they could manage the membership fee 
for union’s activities without allocating it to their affiliate which had not given 
any service for their members. 
 
“We used to allocate half of the member fee gathered to our affiliate (the SPSI). 
Let say, if we’ve got 2000. Let say, if we’ve got 2,000, we give them 1,000. But 
they never provide us trainings. They also never involve in any negotiations; we 
did it just with the management in the bipartite forum.” (union executive 
committee member 2) 
 
 
Furthermore, 
 
“Actually, we sometimes still ask for financial assistance to the Company, 
particularly when we hold big events such as annual general meetings which 
need millions rupiahs. Union can only fund 10-20 per cent of the total money 
needed for such events, and the rest is from the company. This funding 
assistance has been like a tradition… When we conduct general meetings the 
Company would provide accommodation and so farm we are still independent 
in making our own decision.” (union executive committee member 3) 
 
 
However, despite the current authority to manage all members’ fee without 
allocating it to an affiliate, the union has not been independent in funding their 
activities, particularly their big events such as their annual meetings. In gaining 
financial support from the Company, the union submits a proposal by which the 
Company decides whether to provide the proposal with financial support. The 
union argued that the financial support has not weakened the union’s bargaining 
power over the Company. 
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6.4.2 External factors 
Employer strategies 
The Company in the case study also apply ‘consultative’ employee relations in 
their relationship with the union, similar to the other case studies. The Company 
recognises the union as their partner in communicating to the employees as well 
as ensuring the quality of work among the employees. As the CEO stated: 
: 
“The union is important for the quality of employees. We communicate that 
with union so union can control the employees.”  
 
 
Furthermore, one manager argued that a strong union is preferable rather than 
several small informal groups led by a leader which would make the Company 
difficult to communicate with the employees. 
 
 “Before the reform era in 1997, unionism was restricted; there was only one 
union, the SPSI. But the reform era has brought euphoria, lots of unions are 
formed. In the Law No. 21 Year 2002, 10 people can form a union. Company 
thinks that it will be more difficult to communicate with lots of groups with no 
certain formation. They just make small groups or they have informal leaders. 
And it makes difficult for us to talk. So for us, a strong union is needed to 
support our business. We have to have the right partner, a group of people who 
are the representatives of all employees. So, they are very important for us, 
rather than if they feel dissatisfied working in this company and handle that in a 
wrong way, unions in this company for us and for myself is very important. One 
of the functions is to communicate with the employees.” (manager 2) 
 
 
Management also stated that employees are more open to the union when they 
have problems which affect their work performance. One of the management 
 246
respondents stated that when the management could not handle a disciplinary 
problem of an employee, the management would have a discussion with the 
union where they ask the union to find out the problem of the employee. 
 
“I had an experience where there were some employees who were often absent 
from work. I’ve warned them but they didn’t change. Well in such case, the 
union is always the last resource to help me find out what the real problem is. 
The employees always talk any problems they have with the union but not with 
the managers. One of the employees admitted to the union that he had a big debt 
that he had to find other source of income; other said that they had problems 
with their managers. When the union could not find a solution to make the 
employees work better, they would let the Company to take action towards the 
troubled employees” (manager 3) 
 
Thus, management would be granted a ‘justification’ of the action they 
undertake towards employees. Management also tried to convey messages of 
the importance of good working behaviour by discussing the Company’s 
business condition and the needs of the employees to perform to support the 
business growth with the union. Furthermore, the CEO has also decided to 
enclose the financial report to the union in order to gain union’s co-operation 
and support.  
 
“The Union is very co-operative. But it may because it’s the president director’s 
policy to disclose all information including financial data to all managers and 
union, so they can understand the situation of the company right now. When the 
company disclose the information, the union can understand better the situation 
of the company, so that they’ll be more co-operative.” (CEO)  
 
Economic context 
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The growth of the automotive component industry is highly dependent on the 
growth of the automotive industry as the first is the supplier and sells their 
products to the latter. However, as mentioned before, the parent company of the 
Company being studied has a policy of global production network where each 
branch from different countries in a region manufactures different products to 
avoid a competition among the branches. 
Thus, the CEO of the Company has argued that although the domestic 
automotive business in Indonesia had been declining, the business of the 
Company would be sustainable as they also export their products to other 
countries. The CEO further argued that hiring contract workers is needed in 
coping with the uncertain domestic automotive industry. 
 
“Now we hire some contract workers. So we just cut the number of contract 
workers. As I also explained about the Asian complementation, we have export 
products. So, if our Indonesian market drops 50%, but our export products are 
stable, it’s not really a problem for us. Like what is happening currently. We 
have contract workers; we’ll have cut some of them if something happen. 
Contract workers comprise only 18% of our total employees” 
 
Similarly to the Company being studied in chapter 6, contract workers have 
been hired by the Company to provide numerical flexibility. Contract workers 
allow the Company to become more adaptable to the changes in price, quality 
and variety of goods and services they produce to cope with the increasing 
(global) competition (Marginson, 1991 as cited in Legge, 2005: 181-182). 
In terms of the company’s production continuation, managers show their 
optimism due to a historical reason. One of the major customers of the 
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Company is the biggest car manufacturer in Indonesia discussed in Chapter 5. 
The managers argue that the car manufacturer would maintain the relationship 
with the Company as loyal customer as both companies has a historical bond: 
The Company was previously part of a division within the car manufacturer 
before separation and became an independent business entity.  Thus, most of 
managers and union officials are optimistic that the Company would not 
relocate their business from Indonesia as the car manufacturer has a significant 
market share in car sales in Indonesia and thus, would choose to stay.  
 
“The parent company’s strategy is that the production should be placed nearest 
to the customers. And we are in a group with the biggest car manufacturer here 
and they have the biggest market share of car sales in this country. So if there 
are 10 competitors who can be suppliers for the car manufacturer, they will 
choose us. It’s not because we offer them the cheapest price. Rather, it’s 
because of historical reason. We were previously the car manufacturer’s parts 
division.” (manager 2) 
 
 
Furthermore,  
 
“From my experience, we’re not worried with relocation… I think this 
Company is great, they just like distributing profits among branches. So branch 
in Thailand makes this, in Indonesia makes this, in US makes this…so they 
won’t close their plant here as we are part of their network” (manager 3) 
 
The managers also consider Thailand as the Company’s toughest competitor in 
the region as has become the production centre in the Southeast Asia and the 
Pacific regions. However, managers argue that the less advantageous position of 
Indonesia towards Thailand is not because of the quality of skills of the 
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employees; but rather because of the less disciplined behaviour of Indonesian 
workers compared to Thailand’s. Thus, a disciplinary problem has to be solved 
together with the union. 
 
“Our workers are smarter, even smarter than the Thai. My boss told me about 
this. But our discipline is very low, and we are lost at this point. We’ve asked 
the union to raise the discipline issue to their members. Welfare is not an issue 
anymore here. The union leader challenged the company. He said ’Ok, if the 
employees are discipline, what are the compensation?’ Well, we haven’t 
answered.” (manager 3) 
 
Public perception of unions 
The union in the Company have shown a degree of militancy when they planed 
to refuse overtime as part of their industrial action against the management. It is 
important to note that this action was done when the union was still affiliated to 
the SPSI, a union confederation that is said to be close with the government and 
employers. This action became a trigger for the detachment with the SPSI as the 
previous union representatives (when the action happened) argued that there 
was no support from the SPSI at that time. Rather, the SPSI negotiated with the 
management over the issue that had caused the action (adjustment payment) 
without involving the union. Thus, the union representatives perceived the SPSI 
as ‘stand on the management’s side, not ours’. 
The existence of more than one union in a company is indeed legalised by the 
Law No. 21 Year 2000 on trade unionism. This law not only allows more than 
one union organises employees in a company, it also allows the formation of a 
union by a minimum of 10 members. However, many argue that this may 
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weaken the unions rather than give them stronger bargaining position. While in 
this Company there are two unions, there are companies where six unions 
organise the employees or even more. 
According to an ILO officer who was interviewed by a reputable newspaper in 
Indonesia, having more than one union in a company may cause a chaotic and 
non-productive situation as they would not focus on bargaining with the 
management for welfare of the members. Rather, each of them could only focus 
on increasing their member’s income and conduct demonstration if their 
proposal was being rejected to gain sympathy from the employees.30 
 
Technology and skills 
Management argued that the technology they use in their production process is 
not country-specific although the parent Company implements the global 
network production system where each country produces different products. 
One of the managers argued that the parent company can easily get the products 
the Indonesian branch produces from other countries. This was shown in 1996 
when heavy floods restricted the Company’s output for two weeks. However, 
their biggest customer (the Japanese car company) was still able to maintain 
their level of production in the absence of supply from this Company. 
However, the non country-specific skills and technology has also served as an 
advantage for this Company when the severe financial recession hit Indonesia in 
                                                 
30 See http://www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0205/21/jatim/seri46.htm 
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1998. Despite the extremely low revenue from domestic market, the Company 
was able to give quite big bonuses for the employees as the parent Company 
gave them new foreign markets which used to be served by other countries; and 
thus, the Company was able to survive. 
As one manager said: 
 
“In 1996, we couldn’t run the production for two weeks because of heavy flood. 
Our customers could still get what they need from other countries. However, in 
1998-1999 during the recession, when domestic revenue was nearly zero, we 
could still give the employees big bonus because the Headquarter in Japan gave 
us new foreign markets to help us which used to be served by other countries.” 
(manager 2) 
 
 
However, a certain level of knowledge and skills are needed to be able to adapt 
with the production system as the Company applies global standards in 
product’s quality, quantity, delivery and service. The global standard is set by 
the parent Company in Japan. Additionally, regardless the concept of global 
network production system, the quality of the product manufactured in 
Indonesia has to be maintained in order to cope with the indirect competition 
from other countries (such as ordering more products to be produced in 
Thailand or India). 
The majority of the employees are senior high school graduates, comprising 
around 80 per cent of the employees. 
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Table 8.2 Employee figure based on educational background (August 2006) 
 Primary JHS SHS Diploma UG 
Sunter plant 18 42 759 50 68 
Bekasi plant 5 19 854 35 43 
Total 23 61 1613 85 111 
 
JHS: Junior High School 
SHS: Senior High School 
UG: Undergraduate 
 
In addition to the minimum educational background or working experience for 
employees to be able to adapt with the production system, the Company also 
provide trainings on the introduction of the production’s machineries, finishing 
techniques and process, and also on the waste treatment process (source: 
Company profile). 
 
8.5 Summary—Evaluating Union Strategic Choice 
The majority union and thus the one being recognised for collective bargaining 
in the automotive component multinational is an in-house union. This union is 
relatively new, founded in 2003 as a result of dissatisfaction oven the previous 
single union which affiliated with the SPSI (union federation). Offering an 
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exclusive loan service for union members, the union has attracted two-thirds of 
the eligible employees (employee levels 1-5) to join the union. 
The union values negotiations with the management and try to avoid ‘hard 
industrial actions’ after experiencing an unfavourable result from an action of 
boycotting overtime in 2003 which led to the resignation of the union leader. 
However, they do not have a clear strategy and their approach to the 
management is highly shaped by the style of the union leader.  
A key challenge faced by the union is the increasing use of contract workers. 
The union chose not to organise contract workers because of the possible 
administration difficulty; considering than once an employee becomes a union 
member, she is eligible to apply for the loan program, whereby the tenure of 
contract workers are only temporary. However, at the time of research, the 
union executive committee members were considering this choice as many 
contract workers were interested in joining the union to gain protection. 
 
“We were debating among us whether contract workers can be our members. 
First, our administrative matters would be more complicated, like providing the 
membership cards. But when they have problems with their boss and they ask 
for our advocacy, we do help them” (union executive officials 4) 
 
 
Union representatives also stated that there is another ‘serious’ problem related 
to the use of contract workers. As all contract workers hired by the Company 
were females (at the time of research), ‘love affairs’ started to become a 
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problem at work. The union often received complaints from the wives of the 
workers who involved in the affair. 
 
“One of the problems we’re facing now is the love affairs among the 
employees. If both of them (the male and female) are singles, it’s ok for us. But 
the problem is, the love affairs also involve employees who already have a 
family. We got a letter from a wife of an employee, asking us to solve the 
problem. Usually their productivity is also disturbed when they have problem in 
their family. We’ve discussed it with the management” (union executive official 
4)  
 
It can be argued that the use of contract workers is an opportunity used by the 
Company when the Government legalised the practice in 2003 rather than a 
pure business strategy. Both the managers and the union were optimistic that the 
multinational would maintain their business in Indonesia for historical reason as 
well as a grad strategy of the parent Company to distribute profits among the 
branches. 
In terms of union strategy, the sustainability optimism did not result to a clear 
strategy of ‘militant’ type of trade union either when the union was affiliated or 
when they became an independent in-house union.  Similarly to the unions in 
the automotive and textile multinationals, the approach of the union is highly 
shaped by the union leader. 
 
“It depends on the leader. The previous representatives demanded too much, for 
example, salary. But the current one is more co-operative...” (manager 3) 
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The next chapter will discuss and summarise the key findings from the case 
studies and try to explore the most influential aspects in shaping union strategy 
of the unions studied. 
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CHAPTER 9 
DISCUSSION 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This thesis has explored the strategic choices of unions in multinationals in 
Indonesia in balancing their roles between negotiating for a better quality of 
working life and preserving job security. For a developing country like 
Indonesia where a high population offers an abundant labour supply and where, 
as seen, economic and political stability is questionable, balancing this role has 
not been a simple issue, particularly when the bargaining powers of 
multinationals are taken into account. 
This chapter will summarise and discuss the findings of the case studies done in 
the four multinationals; seeking to make critical comparisons of the internal and 
external constraints that combine to shape unions’ strategic choices.  
The first section revisits Huzzard’s union strategic choice model, which was 
used as the key theoretical framework in this thesis for analysing the case 
studies. This section is then followed by a deeper discussion of the internal and 
external constraints faced by unions; which determine their choice of strategy in 
their relations with the employer, as well as with their members and society.   
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9.2 Theoretical framework and research questions 
As noted in Chapter 3, trade unions have been widely regarded in many 
countries as raising labour costs and hence driving up unemployment. This view 
is largely based on the arguments within the neoclassical model of economics 
that the activities of unions would disrupt the equilibrium of the wage 
determination in the market which would lower employment (employers 
decrease the number of employees and undertake factor substitution) or see 
undercutting of the wage rate by the unemployed (given substitutability of 
workers). Suffice to say, both of these outcomes would be non-preferable for 
unions. Neoclassical economists argue that trade unions disrupt labour market 
equilibrium which is characterised by free individual choices to enter and exit 
the labour market, assisted by the perfect information provided to make his 
decision. 
However, as seen, institutionalists have a critically contrasting view to this 
simple model of supply and demand regarding the operation of the labour 
market. They argue that the labour market is shaped by institutional forces such 
as collective bargaining by trade unions and minimum wage set by the 
government, not merely by free individual choices. Their studies also show 
inconsistent findings on how institutions affect economic performance: there is 
a condition where institutions do affect economic performance and where they 
do not indeed affect the performance (such as when market constraints are very 
high). Moreover, institutions can also improve outcomes (such as by providing a 
more efficient communication channel between employers and employees) or 
on the contrary, hinder the performance (like wage setting above the market 
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price that leads to less employment) (see discussion in Freeman, 2007: 11-17). 
This should not be surprising, given the complexity and variety of institutions 
shaping the economic and employment relationship. 
As seen, collective bargaining and communication channels are forms of 
institutions provided by trade unions at the workplace. However, to deliver the 
‘service’ effectively, trade unions are bounded to develop a viable operating 
strategy; particularly when confronted with the use of sophisticated HRM tools 
such as the individualisation of employment relations (Jeffries, 1996: 180) and 
‘soft’ forms of joint consultation by the employer, as well as (the generally 
accompanying) absence of state sponsorship for union survival under a more 
atomistic IR system (Boxall and Haynes, 1997: 567). 
Although ‘strategy’ is a familiar term in business and management field, it is 
somewhat less familiar when union strategy is discussed and explored. Child 
(1972) defined strategy as a framework of critical choices about the ends and 
means of an organisation. The choices are then very critical when they play a 
decisive role in the success or failure of the organisation (Boxall and Haynes, 
1997: 569)31. However, the notion of union strategy is not that well understood 
and more difficult to develop. One of the reasons is the locus of control where 
leadership plays a very important role. It is more difficult to identify the locus of 
leadership in a union, as a union is typically a “voluntary association” of 
employees who believe that acting collectively will benefit them (ibid: 570). 
Thus, leadership ‘power’ (and thus bureaucracy) should be balanced with the 
                                                 
31 In a similar fashion, Porter (1996) defined (competitive) strategy as a deliberate action of choosing 
set of activities to deliver a unique set of value; in contrast, Mintzberg (1978) defined strategy as ‘a a 
pattern in a stream of decision’ and classified strategy into intended and emergent strategies. 
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representation function; the effects of which in practice will entail that a union 
leader can find themselves in complex (and even contradictory) decision-
making situations, potentially resulting in a situation of the principal-agent 
problem where the agent (union leader) could experience difficulty in 
addressing the ‘tasks’ from the principals (the members). 
Despite these issues, as described in Chapter 3; there have been several 
approaches suggested by scholars in developing trade union strategy (Kelly, 
1996; Jeffries, 1996; Huzzard, 2004). Through identifying various constraints 
that shaped the effectiveness of union activities and exploring the important 
context of ideology (pluralist, Marxist, anarcho-syndicalist etc.) in shaping 
union strategies; and the influence of external factors such as the state and 
general labour market conditions, it was possible to arrive at the use of a 
preferred theoretical framework to conduct the analysis of the case studies. 
Hence, in this thesis Huzzard’s model of unions’ strategic choice was arrived at 
as the preferred theoretical model. Huzzard’s model was chosen as it provided a 
comprehensive conceptual tool via which the various factors that shape union 
strategy could be depicted and integrated – and importantly, enables the 
identification of key causal relationships. To recap, Huzzard’s model argued 
that strategy is developed through several levels where the choice in each level 
will influence the choice in the next level. 
As noted, ‘level 1’ was concerned with union decisions on identity and mission; 
that in turn will shape the union’s long-term decision making. Level 2 in 
Huzzard’s strategic choice was where the decisions on what activities to 
undertake should be made. Level 3 of the model was to a great extent shaped by 
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the choice in level 2. Unions which offer products to their existing members 
would tend to choose the traditional approach of collective bargaining and thus 
might choose to become ‘militant’. On the other hand, if the union decided to 
offer new issues or services to existing members, they could become more 
moderate and would prefer the partnership model in their relations with the 
employers, as little evidence shows that this could be achieved by 
militant/traditional approach (Gustavsen et al., 1996 as cited in Huzzard, 2004: 
31).   Finally, Level 4 demonstrated the implications of union choices in level 3, 
as it was concerned with a union’s internal structures and processes; which is 
sometimes referred to as ‘union renewal’. For example, if a union decides to 
refocus on promoting gender equality, then it might have to change its structure 
if it is a male-dominated hierarchy. 
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Figure 9.1 Huzzard’s strategic choice model 
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Hence, based on the theoretical and literature review, there were two research 
questions that this thesis attempted to explore were: 
 
What is really happening in the workplace in terms of union-management 
relationship?  
 
Do unions enjoy greater freedom after the reformation era and how have 
multinationals reacted to the changes? 
 
These questions are now revisited first through a critical comparison of how 
external constraints have shaped union strategy in the case studies analysed. 
 
9.3 Union’s external constraints in developing strategic choice 
9.3.1 IR system and employers’ strategy 
All of multinationals being studied recognised unions and the management 
stated that the unions were their partner in creating a harmonious workplace. 
Considering that the manufacturing multinationals were Japanese, this feature of 
unionised workplace is similar to Japanese manufacturing multinationals in 
Australia, and the UK (however, Japanese service multinationals are hardly 
unionised). Unions were treated as communication channel between the 
management and the employees. Nevertheless while in the Japanese 
multinationals in this research unions were the only communication channel, 
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Japanese multinationals in Australia tend to create an alternative communication 
channel through a company representative body. 
Enterprise unions have been the common form of unions being studied in this 
research, particularly within the (Japanese) manufacturing multinationals where 
collective bargaining emphasised on the terms of employment of the workers of 
the particular enterprise (despite their affiliation with national federation). This 
model of enterprise unionism – where all of the eligible workers can be 
members regardless of their occupation or job status-- is consistent with the type 
of unionism within Japanese companies (Tachibanaki and Noda, 1996; Benson, 
2008: 28)).  
In the case of Japanese (manufacturing) multinationals operating in the UK, the 
type of enterprise unions was chosen to adapt UK’s strong (occupation) 
unionism traditions within manufacturing companies - whilst conforming to 
Japanese single-unionism to ensure flexibility across jobs. Noting that 
traditionally UK unions were occupational/craft unions which address 
occupations demarcation, single enterprise unions would allow the 
multinationals to move workers across jobs and avoid occupation solidarity 
awareness which potentially disrupt productivity (Reitsperger, 1986: 77). 
Enterprise unions provide both advantages and disadvantages for the unions and 
the management. Tachibanaki and Noda further argued that the advantages of 
enterprise unions include their ability to discuss firm-specific matters with the 
management and find suitable solutions for problems. Firm-specific 
information, argue Freeman and Lazear, would help management in getting 
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workers’ concession in difficult time and thus avoid industrial actions and 
reduce turnover (Freeman and Lazear, 1993).  
Furthermore, Tachibanaki and Noda also argued that Japanese management 
listens to union and accept a union’s ‘voice function’ as being advocated by 
Freeman (1980) and Freeman and Medoff (1984). As explained in Chapter 3, 
voice function allows trade unions to establish desirable working conditions for 
their members by providing discontented employees a communication channel 
to resolve the dispute and thus, avoid quitting (or exit) as the first source of 
problem solving (Freeman and Medoff 1984: 8). The voice function is believed 
to provide advantage to both parties: employees would help them to disclose 
their true preferences through union and the management would be able to 
prevent losing employees and possible sabotage as a result of dissatisfaction. 
However, the management strategy to listen to the union as well as disclosing 
firm-specific information to unions to get workers concession can also be a 
disadvantage of enterprise unions as unions may become too moderate and fail 
to address their members demand.  
 Most of the companies studied appeared to operate within a pluralist industrial 
relations system, whereby the employer and unions were well aware that each 
party effectively had different interests in the workplace and thus, collective 
bargaining and negotiations were the main tools used to try and achieve 
agreement as the rules of the game, as well as represent the unions’ preference 
towards market-oriented value.  
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Only in the Banking Case Study was there more overt evidence of a unitarist 
outlook by the participants; both management and union representatives stated 
that they shared common interests and view the company as a happy family — 
surely indicative of a unitarist approach. The union in the foreign bank avoided 
‘hard’ industrial action such as strikes or demonstrations and the union 
representatives argued that the ‘white collar’ employees preferred 
comprehensive negotiation in achieving agreement with the employer—and 
therefore a class-oriented union is also indicative for this union.  
Given the workforce was predominantly female; there was also a distinct 
cultural dimension (Hofstede, from http://www.geert-hofstede.com/) which 
would suggest a more traditional subservient outlook by female workers in 
Indonesia (though not exclusively so), which in itself could generate a tendency 
for a more compliant workforce to emerge in the banking study. 
Collective bargaining is a distinct characteristic of pluralist industrial relations; 
and collective bargaining and collective agreements were present in the 
companies, even in the banking study. However, the union representatives in the 
banking study stated that they only needed two days to renew a collective 
agreement. In contrast, the process took about three to six months in the other 
companies. Despite the difference, it was evident that the collective agreements 
in all of the companies studied had similar substantive and normative clauses, 
i.e., covering the employer’s, union’s and employee’s rights and obligations. 
Collective bargaining was conducted at firm-level in all of the multinationals 
studied, involving the management and the (majority) union at the workplace. 
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Although collective bargaining was conducted by the union on behalf of their 
members, the collective agreement was applied to all (eligible) employees 
regardless of whether they had union membership..  
The coverage of the collective agreements varied between each multinational, 
from limited levels of employees (car manufacturer, foreign bank and car 
component multinational) to broader levels of employees (textile multinational).  
In the car manufacturer, foreign bank and car component manufacturer, the 
CLA covered employees only up to a certain level. Employees beyond this level 
were categorised as ‘managers’ whose employment condition was determined 
solely by the Company (in the foreign bank, it is called ‘employee handbook’). 
On the contrary, although there was a restriction on who could become a union 
member, the CLA for the textile multinational covered both employees and 
managers, as stated in the CLA. 
The management of all the companies studied could be said to have applied the 
approach of sophisticated moderns: “consultative” in their relationship with the 
union and seemingly engaging in willing union recognition; in practice through 
promoting the concept of “partnership” – symptomatic of the traditional 
Japanese company approach to industrial relations (and of course, three of the 
multinationals studied were Japanese in their origin). However, it could be 
argued that this approach only applied to unionised occupations; or core 
workers. Evidence from the case study in the automotive component 
multinational suggested more of a “standard modern” approach of engaging in 
different practices for different sectors of the workforce.  
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As was discussed in chapter 8, the automotive component multinational started 
to employ contract workers in 2003 when the Government legalised the use of 
fixed-term contract workers in business establishments. These contract workers 
were not eligible to be union members, mainly because the union declined to 
organise them (rather than a restriction from the Company). The main reason of 
the exclusion was the nature of the tenure of contract workers which is only 
temporary, potentially created undue administrative complexity for the union 
(particularly as the union had a loan program for its members). Thus, contract 
workers could not benefit from union protection and services at work although 
they could report grievances to union and seek some advice.  
On the other hand, there was also an expression of reluctance to join the union 
from contract workers, despite the feeling of the necessity of union protection. 
Given the high unemployment rate in Indonesia, contract workers have a great 
pressure to keep their job by performing well and being non-unionised. 
Although managers stated that they gave their blessing to all workers (level 1-5) 
to join a union, the public perception that unions are the enemy of employers 
has impinged on the motivation of the contract workers to join union.  
Thus, despite the presence of contract workers in the automotive-component 
manufacturer and subcontract workers in textile multinationals, all the 
multinationals being studied, unions organised only the existing members and 
had no real plans to expand membership. Only the union in the automotive 
component multinational provided a new (differentiated) service—the loan 
service —the other multinationals served the members with an existing service 
mix. Consequently, the main activities chosen by the unions were mobilisation 
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to show their ‘root-based power’ to the employers; however, the unions also 
chose to cooperate with employers and negotiate whenever grievances occurred. 
Despite the standard sophisticated modern approach applied by the 
management, management representatives from the multinationals being studied 
generally argued that they needed to have the union engaged as their partners at 
the workplace and thus, management placed greater emphasis on joint 
consultation and joint problem solving, particularly in terms of employment 
affairs (Farnham, 2000: 37). 
Hence, to reiterate, the concept of partnership was introduced within the 
management-union relationship at all multinationals being studied. Management 
representatives stated that they needed the unions to become their partners in 
order to create a harmonious, productive work environment. In this context, it 
could be said that unions and collective bargaining were seen primarily in 
having a governance function; and thereby providing greater legitimacy to 
management decision-making if a process of “consultation” and “negotiation” 
was seen to be entered into.  
Some of the multinationals (the automotive component and textile 
multinationals) provided financial support for the union, in order to demonstrate 
management’s goodwill; and further involving the unions in contributing to 
discussion on the business of the companies and hence as per the legitimacy 
argument outlined above, to gain union support in for their agendas. 
However, some union representatives felt that partnership in the workplace was 
deteriorating as the trust between the two parties was declining. This was 
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particularly evident at the car components plant where a change in ownership in 
2003 was accompanied by a shift in management attitudes to a more explicit 
focus on cost-minimisation (further exacerbated by a fall in market share); 
which in turn has strained the traditionally cosy relationship with the union. The 
management at the car manufacturer stated that the problem with trust was 
caused by the lack of union “succession” strategy whereby a new union leader 
was installed who did not have enough experience in “negotiating” with 
management. However, this could also be interpreted in terms of management 
(apprarently?) targeting workers who had conducted the “red ribbon” action in 
terms of more rigid performance appraisals for example – i.e., that partnership is 
acceptable when workers are largely compliant to management’s agenda. The 
union representatives, on the other hand, blamed the uncertainty of the 
implementation of the new system. This example shows how external market 
constraints can change employer attitudes and practices; and it is to this that the 
discussion now turns to. 
 
9.3.2 Economic context  
As noted, multinationals operate in more than one country and serve global 
markets. Therefore, the economic context influencing a union’s strategic choice 
can be defined as being the global market and competition that the 
multinationals are facing, as well as economic conditions in the local market 
and industry development where the multinationals operate - in this case, in 
Indonesia. The global market and competition are particularly prescient for 
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unions in multinationals, whose products/services compete globally (with 
multinationals from other countries) in a relatively saturated market where 
sellers and buyers are abundant.  
The textile multinational in this research appears most indicative of a 
multinational that operates in a saturated market. With cheaper Chinese textile 
products flooding the market in recent years, this multinational has been facing 
severe financial difficulties for several years. The management stated that their 
strategy is now one of survival and in securing their market. The message of this 
financial difficulty has been clearly noted by the union; which in turn has made 
the union more concerned about the possibility of closure of the plant by this 
multinational. However, despite this concern, the union in this multinational is 
the most militant union, when compared with the other unions studied in this 
thesis - although the union representatives in the textiles case studied did state 
that active unionism should “not disturb their work performance”. It was also 
evident that the “frontal” (i.e., more willing to disagree and engage in 
confrontation with management) union approach used by this union was also 
influenced by the union’s affiliate which is also regarded in Indonesia as a 
frontal union federation. The discussion of the union ideology and approach will 
be deepened in the section of unions’ internal constraints. 
On the opposite continuum of market competition, is the banking case study; the 
foreign bank enjoyed a relatively secure (domestic) market and thus it could be 
said had a low possibility of business closure (the continued viability of its 
portfolio pending, particularly given the current world economic downturn at 
the time of writing). Serving high profile customers within the domestic market, 
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the foreign bank had survived and expanded its business when the banking 
crisis was deteriorating Indonesia’s economy during the downturn at the end of 
1990s. The union in this multinational regarded themselves as a close partner of 
management in creating a compliant “healthy environment”, which could be 
argued to be a distinct characteristics of (predominantly female here) white 
collar employees. Furthermore, as might be expected in a comfortable work 
environment and relatively high incomes, the employees in this multinational 
were not enthusiastic about joining unions and getting involved in union 
activities. 
Although the automotive component multinational also served a secure market 
(as their main customer was the biggest car manufacturer in Indonesia; and 
historically was part of the division within the car manufacturer), the economic 
context of this multinational was different. There was a mixed view from 
respondents of optimistic and pessimistic expectations from both the 
management and union representatives regarding business sustainability in the 
future. The pessimistic view was that the products manufactured in Indonesia 
could actually be produced by another branch of the multinationals, e.g. by the 
Thailand branch. The fact that their customers were still able to operate when 
this multinational had to close because of severe floods, has only served to add 
to the pessimistic view. 
On the other hand, some managers and union representatives were more 
optimistic as to the future of the multinational, stating that the parent company 
had a policy of diversifying production and profit distribution amongst its 
branches, known as a ‘global network production system’ – so as to spread the 
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risks of operating across several countries. They also believed that as long as the 
biggest car manufacturer in Indonesia remains operating in Indonesia, this 
multinational will continue their business in this country (the impact of the 
current world economic downturn notwithstanding).  
Given this spread of expectations, the union in this multinational applied a 
relatively moderate approach in conducting negotiations with the management. 
After conducting a ‘hard industrial action’ in 2003 where they boycotted doing 
overtime, the union preferred to engage in comprehensive negotiation with the 
company, so as to avoid strikes. The union tried to present a good image to the 
management, that unionism was not an obstacle to growth; but rather, that the 
union could assist the management in creating a good work environment for 
business development and sustainability.   
A long production history and secure market were also mentioned as reasons for 
optimism amongst the union representatives and management of the biggest car 
manufacturer multinational studied for this thesis. Serving the domestic market 
as the market leader, both management and union representatives believed that 
the business of the multinational would be very much sustainable for the 
foreseeable future. However, there was also concern expressed by management 
over the declining domestic market after the Indonesia’s economic downturn 
and tighter competition from other branches, particularly from the Thailand 
enterprise. Economic stability and higher productivity of Thai workers were 
mentioned as having given Thailand an advantage of becoming the centre of 
production in South-East Asia region whereas Indonesia has lost out in terms of 
becoming the centre of production. 
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9.3.3 Labour use policy 
Evident from the previous sections is that the economic context faced by each of 
the multinationals studied has directly affected their labour use policies and 
practices. The most pronounced example evident in this research was the labour 
use policy of the textile multinational. Being hit by severe financial problems, 
the management of the textile multinational decided to cut operational costs 
(i.e., a policy of cost minimisation) by reducing the number of employees 
significantly and outsourcing some jobs to subcontractors. Suffice to say, the 
employee reduction plan was successfully implemented. Although the union 
initially rejected the plan, their action was not fully supported by the members 
because of the big cash compensation (severance) package that the company 
was offering as an inducement to employees.  
As a result, the union changed their strategy from rejecting the redundancy plan 
to seeking to moderate the impact of the implementation of the plan, by 
obtaining assurances that all employees joining the early pension plan obtained 
their compensation as promised. Some of the redundant employees chose to 
work with the subcontractors, but the union representatives stated that their 
work environment was not as good as when they were employees for the 
multinational and that the union could not assist them anymore as technically 
they were no longer union members. 
A similar approach of numerical flexibility of labour use was also adopted by 
the automotive component multinational in dealing with fluctuation of domestic 
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automotive demand. Management decided to hire contract workers since 2003, 
when the Government legitimised the use of contract workers in the 
Employment Law launched in that year. The union stated that they could not do 
anything about this policy as the Law legitimised this practice. However, they 
did not organise contract workers for administrative reasons (as contract 
workers’ tenure is only temporary) - although at the time of research, the union 
was considering revisiting this policy. 
While the aforementioned multinationals decided to externalise their labour use, 
the car manufacturer multinational and foreign bank maintained distinct 
approaches of upholding internal labour market structures and thus providing 
higher level of job security to their employees. With a more predictable and 
stable market, the car manufacturer and foreign bank saw no particular need to 
make drastic changes to their labour-use practices, although some changes had 
occurred. At the car manufacturer, fixed-term contracts were offered to new 
employees during their probation period (three months). The foreign bank, on 
the other hand, had implemented en early pension program for under-qualified 
employees (those who did not have college/university degree) in dealing with a 
more comprehensive banking framework introduced by the Government. The 
union supported this program, convincing their members and employees that 
this decision was essential for long-term business sustainability. Apart from this 
program, there were no other measures introduced by the management to reduce 
the number of employees (at the time of research). However, in responding to a 
growing market, management started to hire fixed-term contract workers for 
more peripheral jobs i.e., those jobs that did not require knowledge of the 
 275
company’s particular systems and commercial-in-confidence material). 
However, a union representative was concerned about the quality of work of 
contract workers as their tenure was only temporary which could in turn result 
in temporary workers as having lower productivity and potential poor 
performance, given the lack of incentive of permanent work. 
Thus it can be concluded that externalisation in labour use has been chosen as a 
strategy in the textile and automotive component multinationals chose in 
dealing with lower/uncertain production demand. The externalisation strategy 
has created the feeling of job insecurity for a particular occupation: operators. 
Job insecurity is an opposite of the traditional ‘Japanese’ practice of lifetime 
employment. It has been argued that he practice of Japanese lifetime 
employment appears to be diminishing, particularly after the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis – where it exists it seems to be mainly applied for male 
employees who work for the government or big companies (Hirakubo, 1999).  
However, empirical research has shown mixed evidence on this diminishing 
practice. Despite the downsizing or restructuring that has taken place within 
Japanese firms, layoffs were hardly found and thus this practice is still an 
ongoing practice (Jackson and Tomiyoka, 2004: 122). In Australia, for example, 
Japanese multinationals had guaranteed lifetime employment for Japanese 
expatriate managers and technicians while many Japanese multinationals in that 
country provided high level of job security for local employees (Purcell, W. et 
al, 1999: 6).  
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It has also been evidenced that If a Japanese employer cannot provide long-
tenure employment within the company, (permanent) labour transfers among 
subsidiaries or related companies were more common would be chosen as an 
alternative; expanding the definition of lifetime employees: it is not only a long 
tenure (lifetime employment) in a company but includes its subsidiaries and 
related companies (Kato, 2001: 510).  
Form the discussion above, the various external constraints and how they differ 
across the case studies are described in Table 9.1 below.  
 
 
Table 9.1 Union’s external constraints in developing strategic choice   
Constraints Union 1 Union 2 Union 3 Union 4 
IR system Pluralist,  
partnership 
Pluralist, 
partnership 
Unitarist, 
partnersh
ip 
Pluralist, 
partnership 
Economic 
context 
Market 
leader, 
Declining 
market, 
difficult 
financial 
condition 
Stable 
and 
expandin
g market 
Secure market 
as long as their 
biggest 
supplier 
operates in 
Indonesia 
Management Internal Job cuts, Internal Contract 
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Labour use 
practices 
(internalise/ex
ternalise) 
labour 
market 
outsourcing labour 
market 
workers for 
production 
 
 
9.4 Union internal constraints in developing strategic choice 
As noted, a union’s strategic choices are also shaped by the internal constraints 
it faces. In this section the internal constraints facing the four unions in the case 
studies are critically compared and contrasted. 
 
9.4.1 Union ideology and goals 
Invoking Hyman’s (2001) typology of trade union identity and ideology, the 
unions in all multinationals studied could be classified as ‘market-oriented’ 
unions; whose focus was on bargaining over labour market issues such as 
wages, working hours, etc. The unions in all the multinationals studied devoted 
most of their time negotiating with the management in improving their 
member’s welfare; i.e., through engaging in collective bargaining regularly.  
It can be argued that the market-orientation identity held by all unions studied in 
this thesis is a general identity of Indonesian trade unions. As Isaac and 
Sitalaksmi argued, the Indonesian trade unions seek to engage in collective 
bargaining, to improve employment condition, to provide grievances channel 
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for workers, to secure membership and to persuade the government to secure 
terms to assist the achievement of these objectives (2008: 247). 
However, as Hyman also noted, unions seldom identify themselves with only 
one ideology. Thus, he described this typology in a triangle of apexes, where 
each union would fit in one side of the triangle. For example, he identifies 
British trade unions as being indicative of the aspects of “market orientation” 
and “class struggle”. Similarly, the case study findings demonstrated that the 
unions in this research could also be shown as indicative of having more than 
one ideology, particularly when their confederation affiliates are taken into 
account. It could be argued that although the main activity of the unions studied 
for this thesis was that of negotiating collective agreements (the key function of 
market oriented unions), some of them also devoted attention to matters related 
to the more overtly militant (though not necessarily anti-capitalist) function of 
society/class struggle, as outlined below. 
The first example is what had been done by unions in the automotive 
component multinational and the (union confederation) affiliate of the foreign 
bank. The union of the car parts multinational had expressed concerns over the 
hire of contract workers practiced by management. As all of the contract 
workers hired were female and worked at the production plant (where there had 
been no female workers before), they argued that female contract workers 
working in the plants created an unexpected negative moral impact among the 
fellow male workers (because of the potential for “workplace liaisons”). They 
had received some complaints from employees and the families of employees 
about the suspicion of “love affairs” at work - particularly from the wives of 
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some employees. The union discussed this problem with management; and the 
solutions the Company offered to minimise the problem were that of providing 
a separate place for male and female restrooms as well as working together with 
the union in giving advice or warnings to any employees suspected in being 
involved in such problems. 
The union of the foreign bank, on the other hand, was affiliated with a union 
federation who mainly organised white collar employees (mostly from banking 
and other service sectors). This federation emphasised the value of partnership 
with employers by promoting their jargon ‘SIDURE’ which stands for 
Solidarity, Independence, Democracy, Unity, Responsibility and Equality. 
Federation leaders actively canvass their opinions in the media to demonstrate 
that unions are organisations which negotiate comprehensively with accurate 
data - and not seeking to disrupt the economy and societal cohesion by 
conducting strikes and boycotts. Here, there is evidence that union leaders still 
feel the stigma of being portrayed as “communist” or “disruptive” by most 
sections of Indonesian society. 
As such, it could be argued that the action of responding to (and trying to shape) 
public opinion on union behaviour have indirectly defined the interests of 
unions which represent the working class - as opposed to the interests of the 
employers as capital owners. However, the term ‘class struggle’ is not an easy 
fit in this case, as the approach is suitable really only for one part of working 
class; so-called white collar employees, who have the level of education and 
awareness necessary to engage in such debates. Their counterparts, that is, the 
majority of workers in Indonesia with lower skills and education rarely express 
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(or are even able to express) their opinions and interests through the media. 
Instead, they deliver their messages and aspirations through sporadic collective 
outbursts to gain public attention (which may not be organised by unions but 
rather more loose spontaneous outbursts of dissatisfaction).  
Hence, it may be argued that although unions indeed claim to represent general 
interests of the working class, they actually defend the particular interests of 
relatively protected groups of workers (Hyman, 2001). This argument is based 
on the situation where the interest of core groups of full time workers (typically 
skilled-white collar male workers) can conflict with, or hinder the interest of 
peripheral workers (part-time/women/migrant workers etc.). It could be argued 
that Hyman’s argument can be applied in the case of OPSI, whose leaders 
actively try to shape public opinion of worker aspirations, as their interests and 
approach might be different to the (majority) of lower-skilled workers who are 
organised by other union federations. 
 
9.4.2 Union’s past strategy 
The only union studied in this thesis which had a clear past and current strategy 
was the union in the foreign bank. Their strategy was derived from the value 
held by their affiliates (the union federation OPSI)—known as SIDURE, which 
emphasised partnership with the employer.  
The other unions studied, in contrast, had relied on the leadership style of their 
union leader in their approach towards management. There were two views on 
the importance of developing a pro-active union strategy. The first view was 
 281
from the union of the car manufacturer multinational, whose leader stated that 
developing a pro-active strategy was important. The necessity was particularly 
driven by the significant change of the company’s majority ownership from 
local partner to that of the parent company.  
The change indirectly had an impact on the industrial relations system which in 
turn had resulted in a more rigid union-management relationship. Whilst 
management announced that all processes in the company (including in the 
process of industrial relations) should be clearly outlined in formal 
documentation, the union argued that there was no clear guidance on how 
minutes of meetings, for example, should be produced. In the context of this 
uncertainty, the union leader felt that it was time to start to develop a coherent 
union strategy for achieving their goals. Nevertheless, he stated that the process 
of formulating a strategy was very difficult as the union did not have enough 
resources and knowledge on how to develop an effective strategy. 
The second view was from the union leader in the textile multinational study, 
who argued that there was no point of trying to put together a pro-active 
strategy, as unions were reactive organisations by nature. This respondent’s 
view was that their actions were generally based on what management has done. 
They commented that as long as management was willing to negotiate over 
issues that the union raised concerns about, they would negotiate with the 
management, although it took time. However, when deadlock occurred, or if 
management wanted to stop negotiating, then the union would engage in “hard” 
industrial actions, such as demonstrations and strikes. 
 282
The union leader of the car-parts component company, on the other hand, stated 
that they valued the partnership and negotiation approach with management. 
Having experienced the negative effects of conducting hard industrial action (by 
boycotting overtime), the union choose not to conduct such actions in future and 
would seek to use the negotiation forum. 
 
9.4.3 Financial resources 
In terms of financial resources, all unions studied in this thesis financed most of 
their activities from a membership fee, paid by the members through automatic 
deduction of their monthly salary/wages. However, whilst the unions in the car 
manufacturer multinational and the foreign bank claimed that they were 
independent in financing their activities, the unions in the textile and car-parts 
components case studies admitted that they still asked for financial assistance 
from management in financing some of their activities (by putting forward 
proposals which could be accepted or rejected). 
The union in the car manufacturer multinational enjoyed the advantage of a 
closed-shop policy which led to 99 per cent of employees being members of the 
union (about 5,000 members). As directors and managers were also included in 
the union membership, the union were able to generate around 26 million 
Rupiah every month, a significant amount of revenue when compared with the 
other unions being studied. 
The membership fee generated in the foreign bank, on the other hand, was not 
as much, as the union membership only counted for less than half of the 
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company’s 300 employees. However, the union did not conduct many activities 
due to the workload of the union leaders and members as well as a manifest low 
enthusiasm of the union members. Hence, the membership fee was sufficient to 
finance the union’s day-to-day operations. 
Both the unions in the textile and car-component multinationals sometimes 
asked for financial assistance from the companies, particularly when they 
conducted massive events such as annual general meetings. Nevertheless, the 
union leaders in these two cases stated that such financial assistance had not 
resulted in a weaker bargaining position during negotiations. As described in 
case study chapter six, the union in the textile multinational was the most frontal 
union amongst the unions being studied. 
 
9.4.4 Tensions between administrative and representative functions 
The unions studied in this thesis did not have full-time union officials, except 
the union in the car-component multinational. The full-time official in this 
company was employed by the company as a contract worker and paid by the 
company. However, the union leader stated that the company gave the union 
full autonomy to decide the duties of the full-time union organiser. The union 
representatives also stated that members were free to communicate with them 
through any means of communication such as text messages or phone calls. The 
union representatives expected that the varied access to the union 
representatives would serve the members well. 
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However, while serving the members by giving alternatives of access, unions 
were sometimes forced to compromise with the employer’s agenda that against 
the members’ interests – an illustration of the principal- agent problem. An 
example was shown in the case of foreign bank where the union backed the 
management decision of laying off employees who did not qualify in 
implementing a new, sophisticated banking system (see Chapter 7).  
The main reason of the absence of the full-time officials was the shared value 
among the union executive committees studied that unionism should not be an 
obstacle in performing well in their (main) jobs as employees. However, the 
unions in the remaining three multinationals being studied had different 
approaches in fulfilling their representative function to serve their members. 
The union in the textile multinational developed a rotating schedule to ensure 
that there was always someone in the union office to serve the members. In 
addition, similar to those in the car-parts multinational, the union 
representatives in the textile multinational offered varied communication means 
for members to get advice or assistance from the union, such as by using text 
messages or phone calls. 
The union leader of the car manufacturer multinational also stated that there was 
always someone in the union office although no fixed schedule was ever made. 
The union leader here also stated that becoming a leader meant that he would 
have to leave his main job as an employee temporarily and serve the members 
on a full-time basis. However, management had expressed a view that the union 
office had become a hiding place for union representatives from their main job. 
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Despite this, management had never complained to the union nor discussed this 
with them. 
In contrast to the first two unions being discussed, the union representatives in 
the car manufacturer multinational expected that members should follow the 
procedure of grievances settlement rather that directly talked to the union 
leader/representatives. The union leader stated that talking directly to the union 
representatives without discussing the problems first with the managers and the 
member representatives is disturbing as the union representatives would then 
have to deal with many day-to-day problems. 
The union office in the foreign bank was always locked unless a meeting was 
held. The union representatives stated that there was no need of having someone 
in the union office as everybody was busy with their own job. The union 
representatives also argued that members did not have to go to the union office 
to report grievances or express their concerns as the union leader and the 
secretary general were approachable at any time. 
The internal constraints and how they vary between the case studies are 
summarised in Table 9.2  
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Table 9.2 Union’s internal constraints in developing strategic choices 
Constraints Union 1 Union 2 Union 3 Union 4 
Union 
ideology 
Market 
oriented 
Market 
oriented 
Market-
class 
oriented 
Market-
society 
oriented 
Past 
strategy 
Reactive Reactive Co-
operative 
Reactive 
Financial 
resources 
Membership 
fee 
Membership 
fee and 
assistance 
from the 
Company 
Membership 
fee 
Membership 
fee and 
assistance 
from the 
Company 
Tensions 
between 
administrati
ve and 
representati
ve functions 
No full time 
unionist, but 
union office 
is always 
open; union 
reps prefer 
hierarchical 
approach in 
solving 
problems 
No full time 
unionist, but 
there is a 
rotating 
schedule to 
serve the 
members; 
union reps are 
approachable 
No full time 
unionist; the 
union office 
is close 
unless a 
meeting is 
held; 
grievances 
should be 
reported 
formally 
There is a full 
time unionist 
hired by the 
Company; 
union reps are 
approachable  
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9.5 Formulating Union Strategy; Most Important Factors and Links 
Between 
The previous comparative discussion on internal and external constraints hence 
enables an identification of the key factors shaping unions’ strategic choices. 
Similarly to business strategy, union strategy is shaped and influenced by many 
aspects; internal and external. Unions organising workers who are ready to act 
collectively within an environment where employers are willing to reach 
accommodation will have a different strategic approach to unions organising 
‘peripheral’ workers in a hostile industrial relations environment (Boxall and 
Haynes, 1997; 569).   
The concept of union strategic choice embraces the idea of voluntarism, where 
union has its own discretion in determining its own future by anticipating what 
would happen in the future and thus developing policies and actions 
accordingly. Arising from the Huzzard framework it could be argued that 
undertaking strategic choices is necessary for unions to survive in the more 
hostile industrial relations environment. 
However, the case studies in this thesis demonstrated that most of the unions 
studied did not really undertake proactive, strategic choices as such, nor feel the 
emergence of making a strategic choice. They chose to act reactively vis a vis 
the employer’s policy and action (with a degree of exception the union in the 
car manufacturer multinational). Acting reactively is a characteristic of 
determinism when actors are tightly constrained by external factors (Huzzard, 
2004: 25). It can be argued that the reluctance of making a clear strategy was 
 288
mainly caused by the situation that they organised workers within a relatively 
favourable environment: above-average wages, employer cooperation, long 
history of business establishment, and secure product market (except for the 
textile multinational). They have survived and are optimistic about their future 
without a well-developed strategy. Thus there was little manifest concern with 
the need to formulate proactive approaches to membership or recruitment for 
example. 
For the unions studied in this thesis, the employer’s industrial relations policy 
and approach was the strongest influence in shaping union ‘strategy’ and 
approach in industrial relations. As long as the employers regarded the union as 
their partner, the union would apply a soft approach of negotiation and even in 
many situations, compromising (to the employer’s agenda). They also 
persuaded their members that this approach was the best means of achieving the 
union’s goals, needs - and addressing the members’ aspiration which mainly 
related to the union’s market function (negotiating remuneration and better 
work environment for their members). It can be seen from the interview below 
with a union representative of the foreign bank regarding an early pension 
package offered by the Company: 
 
“When the Company offered the early pension package in 2000, not all of the 
employees being offered accepted it. Our members asked for our advice. We 
told them that this is a good offer from the Company. They have to think that 
the work in the future would be more complex and involve high technology. It 
would be very difficult for them to cope with the innovations and they would 
experience a stagnant career. So, we advised them to take the package and start 
a business” (union executive committee member 2) 
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Additionally, a union executive committee member from the union in the car 
manufacturer multinational also stated: 
“Yes, we compromise a lot, because if we don’t do so, we are afraid that they 
will relocate this business. They never explicitly say anything like this though; 
but the pleno, coordinators and the members are worried.” 
 
The economic context also influenced the way the unions interact with the 
employers as a key external constraint on strategic behaviour. The late 1990s 
Southeast Asia economic recession had driven up the cost of production 
(particularly for the manufacturing multinationals) whilst driving down their 
product demands and thus their income. Furthermore, as multinationals operate 
in several countries, competition among the multinational’s branches to provide 
the most preferable place for production. A harmonious relationship between 
multinationals and their workers (which might be represented by the unions) is 
one of determining aspects of this preference together with the host country’s 
political and social condition, government’s policy and market potential.  
The relatively tighter financial conditions and intensive competition among 
branches has forced unions to cooperate with the employer rather than use a 
‘militant’ approach such as mobilisation and industrial action. Although both 
the managers and union representatives in the multinationals studied were 
optimistic that the multinationals would maintain their business in Indonesia, 
winning the competition of producing new models as well as increasing 
production volume also meant that the preferable condition – a guarantee (from 
the union) that there is no production disruption from action such as strikes and 
boycott-- should be provided. Rather, union tried to serve the members by 
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offering them service development (Ansoff, 1968) such as loan program 
conducted by the union in the automotive component multinational. 
Thailand and China were countries which are seen as the closest competitors. 
Thailand has become a production centre for Asian region for the car 
manufacturing multinational; whilst cheaper Chinese textile products have 
undermined textile production from Indonesia. Both managers and union 
representatives blamed government policy and poor infrastructure for the 
disadvantage. However, a manager from the car manufacturing multinational 
has indirectly pointed to unionism as an important aspect in winning the 
competition. 
 
“Currently this company makes a production base in each country it operates. 
So far in Asia, I’m sorry to say, Thailand is the best. There are no worker 
demonstrations and the infrastructure is very good. Thailand is the most 
comfortable production base; it makes our Indonesian employees and also the 
government very disappointed” (Manager 1) 
 
 
Public opinion that unionism has negative effect on Indonesia’s competitiveness 
toward foreign investment has also resulted in a soft approach and an effort to 
show the employer that unionism does not disrupt productivity and work 
performance. One of the union representatives in the textile multinational stated: 
 
“We all work for a Company which pay us. Union, on the other hand is an 
employee organisation within the company. So, our main duty is to perform 
well in doing our jobs. We all agree that we have to prioritise our work duty as 
employees and that’s why there are no union full timers here. But we always 
 291
have someone waiting in the office by developing a schedule for union 
executive committees and representatives”  
 
All of the industrial actions were never conducted during ‘normal’ work hours. 
The most severe industrial action was the one conducted by the union in the car 
component manufacturer in 2003 by boycotting overtime. The result was 
unfavourable: the union could not obtain their demands from management and 
the union leader resigned. The union in the textile multinational conducted a 
demonstration before work hours started and the union in the foreign bank 
encouraged its members to wear a special signs in their costume to show 
disagreement with the management and keep doing their job – however, these 
were all very mild forms of action. As the union leader stated:  
 
“We value negotiation… the ‘white collars’ in Indonesia are quite hesitant to 
get involved in industrial action. We prefer to argue with the management even 
if we have to do it overnight. When we cannot reach agreement or if they want 
to show their sympathy to their colleagues, we just wear special signs in our 
costume (e.g. black ribbon) or write our disagreement and put it on their desks - 
but we keep working.”  
 
 
The shared value of unionism should not disturb good work performance has 
led to the absence of full-time union organisers in all multinationals except for 
the union in the automotive component manufacturer. However, the full time 
union organiser in this multinational was hired and paid by the company based 
on a fixed-term contract. The concerns about career path and the continuity of 
income have also become key reasons for the reluctance of becoming full-time 
 292
union organisers, although the law as well as the CLA in each establishment has 
given the right to the union to appoint a full-time representative. 
A management HR practice that the unions should start to take further into 
consideration is the use of fixed term contract workers and the practice of 
subcontracting; whereby the employment of non-standard workers that are more 
difficult to organise has taken place. The union in the car component 
manufacturer chose not to organise them at the time of research. However, some 
of the contract workers have expressed their desire to be able to become union 
members and the union executive committees were planning to discuss about 
this possibility in the future. The use of fixed-term contract workers was also 
found in the foreign bank; on the contrary, the union did not have a plan to 
recruit the contract workers in the future. 
Additionally, the textile multinational had also cut the number of employees by 
introducing voluntary redundancies and subcontracting some jobs in coping 
with the financial difficulties they have suffered for several years. The union did 
not organise the workers in the subcontracting companies and had no plans to 
organise them, although they work in the same area and most of them were the 
multinational workers who chose to be redundant (thus their ex members). 
Along with the continuing debate between the employers and the employees on 
‘core’ or ‘peripheral’ jobs (as the law stated that only peripheral jobs can be 
subcontracted) as well as the flexibility enjoyed by the employers by using 
contract workers, there is always a possibility that the multinationals would 
choose to subcontract more jobs or increase the use of contract workers in the 
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future. The absence of unionism amongst such workers might add the 
advantages as the Company can apply its prerogative towards such workers (and 
hence the wider workforce) while on the other hand, the unions would 
experience declining membership. 
 
9.6 Summary 
This thesis has reported on case studies that explore the factors underpinning 
unions’ strategic choices (or lack of). It can be argued that the unions being 
studied were company unions as they operated within establishments. While the 
unions in car manufacturer, textile and foreign bank multinationals had an 
affiliation with a union federation, the union in the automotive component 
manufacturer chose to be an in-house union due to past bad experiences with its 
previous affiliation.  
Furthermore, the unions studied had generally enjoyed a relatively friendly 
environment as well as better working conditions compared to many local 
companies and other multinationals. These circumstances have given the unions 
both opportunity and challenges: they can negotiate with the management 
towards many issues; on the other hand, they might compromise a lot to the 
management’s agenda which results in dissatisfaction among their members. 
A mix feeling of optimism and fear towards the continuity of the multinational’s 
business among union representatives being interviewed has generally made 
them choose a “safe” path of compromising to management’s agenda. Whilst 
the government policies are beyond their reach, controlling and maintaining 
 294
their relationship with the management is much easier in their effort to provide 
the necessary condition of competitiveness. 
None of the unions studied had a clear strategy nor have a strong feeling of 
necessity to develop one except the union in the foreign bank, owing much to 
the union federation they affiliate with that provides them with a strategy 
(where full-time union organisers and officials who have such expertise tend to 
be concentrated). The union in the foreign bank chose to become management’s 
partner, negotiate comprehensively with them, and avoid ‘hard’ industrial 
action. Other unions chose to act reactively to the management’s approach and 
decision, counted a lot to the style of the union leader.  
However, despite the clear strategic choices, the union in the foreign bank had 
hardly boosted their membership level. The favourable environment as 
mentioned above, added with the high workload and tight performance 
appraisal, has created low enthusiasm among the employees to join the union. 
Moreover, the union members were not actively involved to union activities and 
‘used’ their membership only when they felt dissatisfied with new CLA. 
The situation was different in the other unions, where the membership density 
was all above 90 per cent. The high membership density was caused by 
different reasons: the union in the car manufacturer was advantaged by the 
closed-shop policy; the union in textile multinational benefited from a high 
unionism tradition and ‘social sanction’ for non-union members; whilst the 
union in the automotive component manufacturer believed that their loan 
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program exclusively for union members had boosted the number of workers that 
joined the union. 
Thus, it can be argued that the unions being studied did not have a strong 
feeling of necessity to develop a clear union strategy because they have 
survived without one: high membership, partnership with the employer, and 
smooth CLA negotiation, despite the compromising the have to make to 
maintain good relationship with the management. However, it was also evident 
(and increasingly recognised by union leaders) that a more strategic approach 
was necessary in a changing IR environment. 
Other threats that might be faced by the unions in the future included the use of 
contract workers or subcontracting workers (which is legal since 2003 through 
the current employment law). The automotive component manufacturer and 
textile multinationals as well as the foreign bank have used quite a significant 
number of temporary contracts or engaged in subcontracting. The unions chose 
not to organise these non-standard workers as their tenure was only temporary. 
However, when the use of the non-standard workers increases in the future, 
unions might have to rethink to offer membership to these workers for their 
survival, as the multinationals may choose to hire non-unionised workers, so as 
to maintain/enhance the numerical flexibility of the workers. 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has explored the strategic choices chosen by unions in multinationals 
which in turn have influenced union behaviour towards management. It can be 
argued that a more strategic approach for unions is increasingly necessary 
within a ‘neo-liberal’ context whereby union survival and success is mostly 
dependant on the ability to develop a strategy which fits to its internal and 
external environments. 
The theoretical model underpinning this thesis has been that of Huzzard’s 
(2004) strategic choice model. This model suggested that there are four levels of 
strategy which unions would have to choose, where the choice of each level of 
the strategy is influenced by the choice of the preceding level. Huzzard’s 
strategic choice model ranges form choosing and defining the union’s mission, 
ideology and identity to that of choosing union’s structures, processes and 
capacities. This model also suggests that the choice of the strategy is highly 
influenced by the internal and external factors of the union. 
Multinationals were chosen for this thesis as multinationals have been among 
the role players in Indonesian economy particularly after the Suharto’s era 
(1966-onwards). As cheap labour is one of the necessary conditions to attract 
foreign investment as Indonesia does not have technological superiority or 
abundant skilled labour, it was important to examine the role of trade union in 
multinationals as the representative of the employees to enhance to conditions 
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of its members. Four multinationals from different industries were studied to 
enable comparison. 
This chapter presents the conclusion arising from the research in this thesis. 
Section 10.1 restates the major findings of the case studies. Finally, section 10.2 
considers limitations of the research and offers suggestions for further research.  
 
10.1 Summary of Research Questions and Findings 
The fundamental premise in this thesis has been that unions in Indonesia have 
enjoyed greater freedom after the reformation era where trade unionism is 
guaranteed through several legal means such as the ratification of ILO 
conventions and new Laws. However, despite the general protection from the 
Government, developing strategy is necessary for unions to be able to survive 
and achieve their goals in the current ‘neo-liberalism’ environment. The need of 
developing a clear strategy is more pronounced for the unions in work-place 
level as their freedom and survival are actually determined by the employer’s 
industrial relation’s policy and approach (given that the legal enforcement in 
Indonesia is still weak). 
 
10.1.1 Theorising union strategy 
Union strategy has not been widely discussed in detail (Satrya and Parasuraman, 
2007:  32). However, scholars such as Kochan, McKersie and Katz (1986); 
Gardner (1989); Kelly (1996); Jeffries (1996); Boxall and Haynes (1997); and 
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Gahan (1998)are among those who have attempted to define and explain union 
strategy.  
Union strategy from a straightforward choice (e.g. Kelly’s moderate vs militant 
trade union) to a more comprehensive choice such as those proposed by Jeffries 
and Huzzard. Huzzard’s strategic choice has been used as the theoretical 
framework in this thesis as it enables a comprehensive evaluation of the 
influence of the internal and external factors towards union’s strategy. 
Furthermore, this model suggests that a strategic choice in fundamental and 
conceptual level (such as ideology and identity) will then shape the choice in the 
practical (such as processes and structure). 
This framework was used to examine the following research questions: 
 
What is really happening in the workplace in terms of union-management 
relationship? This will be examined by using the strategic choice theory. 
 
Do unions enjoy greater freedom after the reformation era and how have 
multinationals reacted to the changes? 
 
Multinationals were chosen to evaluate this framework as they are one of the 
main players in Indonesia’s economy, usually establish in the form of big 
business and employ many workers. Scholars argued that multinationals obtain 
a superior position towards labour as they operate within more  than one country 
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which enable them to fulfil customer’s demand when a branch is temporarily 
unavailable to continue production (due to strike or boycott, for example) (see 
for example: Enderwick (1985) and Bean (1994)). 
 
10.1.2 Union strategy in multinationals in Indonesia 
Apparent in this thesis that the unions in the multinationals being studied do not 
have clear strategies in managing their relationship with the management 
(except the union in the foreign bank, owing to the strategy set by its 
affiliation). However, a strong tradition of partnership exists in all 
multinationals (which as noted for the Japanese company case studies, is 
symptomatic of Japanese company attitudes towards unionism), and unions 
tried to avoid hard industrial actions (such as strikes and boycotts), a distinct 
character of union moderation.  
It can be argued that partnership is the most practical strategy for the unions, 
given that management always stated that unions are their partner in creating 
healthy and harmonious working environment. Furthermore, the unions operate 
within a comfort zone with higher pay and better working conditions (compared 
to other multinationals and local companies) where their goal in economic 
function –improving members’ welfare—has (to date at least) largely been 
achieved. 
Competition among branches and with other multinationals within the same 
industry has added to the strong preference of union moderation/partnership. 
Unions see the need to cooperate with the employer rather than use a ‘militant’ 
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approach such as mobilisation and industrial action in winning the competition 
of producing new models as well as increasing production volume by providing 
preferable condition (i.e., no production disruption from actions such as strikes 
and boycotts). The partnership tradition also appeared to be reinforced by the 
fact that union executive committee members were volunteers who did not wish 
to compromise their own careers in the companies studied. 
 
10.1.3 External factors shaping union strategy 
It can be argued that external factors are more pronounced in influencing 
unions’ behaviour toward the management in the multinational being studied. 
As noted in the previous chapter, the reactive action constrained by external 
factors is the character of determinism—as the opposite of voluntarism where 
unions are able to develop strategy and determine their own future. 
The most influential external factor is the employer’s industrial relations policy 
and approach. As long as the employers regarded the union as their partner, the 
union would apply a soft approach of negotiation and even in many situations, 
compromising (to the employer’s agenda). 
The economic context in terms of competition among branches or other 
multinationals as explained on the previous section also led unions to moderate 
their demands and use a soft approach towards management. In addition, the 
general public perception that unions are obstacles on Indonesia’s 
competitiveness toward foreign investment has also resulted in a soft approach 
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and an effort to show the employer that unionism does not disrupt productivity 
and work performance. 
 
10.1.4 Internal factors shaping union strategy 
The case studies show that the union studied in this thesis have embraced the 
ideology of market orientation, whose focus was on bargaining over labour 
market issues such as wages, working hours, etc. through engaging in collective 
bargaining regularly.  
With the absence of a clear union past strategy (except for the union in the 
foreign bank), the style of the union leader influences the behaviour of the 
unions towards the management. Although the partnership industrial relations 
system was always reserved by the union the degree of cooperation is mainly 
determined by the union leader. The unions in the textile and automotive 
components are the most obvious examples of this case, where the union leader 
(at the time of research) applied different level of cooperation (towards 
management) with the previous leader. 
The findings of the case studies also found that the union do not have full time 
union officers, except for the union in the automotive component multinational 
(however, it is important to note that the full-time union “official” is hired by 
the Company as a fixed-term contract worker). The absence of the full timers is 
derived from the shared value among the union representatives that that 
unionism should not be an obstacle in performing well in their (main) jobs as 
employees, reinforcing the interest in ‘partnership’ outlined earlier. However, 
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the unions in the remaining three multinationals argued that they have 
approaches in fulfilling their representative function to serve their member. 
 
10.1.5 Summary 
The findings of this thesis then, validate the research aims defined in the 
introduction. To summarise: 
 
What is really happening in the workplace in terms of union-management 
relationship? 
The partnership system can be found in all multinationals studied, although it 
can be argued that this is not derived from a well-developed union strategy; but 
rather a practical strategy given to the constraints of the union’s internal and 
external environments (and relative weakness). The case studies show that the 
unions did not have clear strategy (except the union in the foreign bank) and 
that the union’s behaviour and approach were highly influenced by the union 
leader’s style. 
 
 Do unions enjoy greater freedom after the reformation era and how have 
multinationals reacted to the changes? 
 
The case studied show that the unions have enjoyed freedom from a long 
period. However, the reformation era has given greater freedom to the unions to 
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choose their own affiliation (not merely with the SPSI) or to become an in-
house union (such as the union in the automotive component multinational). 
This choice, together with the style of the union leader, has influenced the way 
unions behave towards management. Management, in turn, has acceded to the 
unions in choosing their affiliation as it is guaranteed by the Law No. 21 Year 
2000 on Trade Unionism. However, continuing high unemployment and a 
deteriorating external environment have served to mollify unions’ demands and 
objectives: a fastened and moderate orientation towards management.  
 
10.2 Suggestion for further research 
This research has been conducted in four multinationals which claim to have a 
cooperative approach towards unionism. The main reason for doing so was 
because of the limitation of time and funding to do PhD research, which has 
resulted in the choices of studying easily accessible multinationals. Several 
approaches have been done to get the access to the multinationals where the 
relationship between the management and union is not harmonious to enable 
comparison, but they had not been successful. 
Thus this research might not be a comprehensive picture of all union-
management relationship in multinationals. Given that three of the case studies 
were conducted in Japanese companies which conducted an approach towards 
unionism consistent with the stylised Japanese approach of partnership, it would 
be ideal if a research could be done in a multinational where unionism is 
restricted or where the union evidently uses a more militant approach in 
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achieving their goals to compare reactions and (possible) strategies to the unions 
studied in this research.  
It would also be interesting to focus more on the female employees’ role in 
unionism as the unions studied in this research largely represented traditional 
core workers (male-dominated unionism).  The case study in the automotive 
component multinational showed that many contract workers hired by this 
Company were females, whose employment security was not guaranteed and 
where protection from the union was absent.  
These caveats aside, this thesis has provided a useful contribution to the debate 
on trade union impact in Indonesia, and labour process issues in developing 
countries more generally. 
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